Military Intelligence

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KFOR: Operations in Kosovo

FROM THE EDITOR

In 1999 Serbian forces occupied Kosovo to combat Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) forces. The Serb attacks also included ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo. This forced a decision by the United Nations (UN Security Resolution 1244, 12 June 1999), and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to intervene in what has been called the "ethnic cleansing" of Kosovo.

Before NATO forces arrived, thousands of Albanians died in the fighting and ethnic cleansing initiated by the Serbian Army. Since the arrival of NATO and other military forces the level of violence has diminished; however, because of the sporadic violence, some form of peacekeeping force will be required in the future. Today some 46,000 military personnel from 39 countries are deployed in Kosovo, all to some extent, or at some time, relying on support from the others. It is a difficult and often frustrating mission but one which provides a wealth of experience to U.S. Army forces deployed there. This issue of the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)*** *examines the impact of operational tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) on U.S. Army forces there, specifically those performing or supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.*

Leading off this issue is Major General Bantz Craddock's look at the unique operations of Task Force (TF) Falcon's peace enforcement mission and Lieutenant Colonel John Rovegno's articles on his thoughts, experiences, and lessons learned after a year of conducting intelligence operations there. These feature articles are followed by two written by CW3 Gary Barnett that discuss human intelligence (HUMINT) operations in Kosovo. Additional features focusing on ground surveillance operations (CPT Robert Culp, II, and CPT Frank Tank), G2 operations (CPT Gregory Lisi), analysis and control team (ACT) operations with the U.S. and allies (CPTs Kirk Loving, Jason McCoy, David Payne, Jeffrey Thurnher, and 1LT Melanie Shippitka), and the ACT in Mitrovica (CPT McCoy), analysis and control element (ACE) operations (MAJ Donald Wood and MAJ Joan Mercier), TF Hunter UAV operations (MAJ Stephen Cook), and electronic warfare (EW) operations (1SG David Redmon), round out the review of intelligence operations in Kosovo.

As a final note, the ***MIPB*** *staff would like to thank all the writers, especially the soldiers of the 101st Military Intelligence Battalion, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), for the many fine articles and photographs that supported development of the KFOR issue of* ***MIPB****.*

Michael P. Ley

Writers of the Quarter

MIPB *is pleased to announce that Major Robert L. Chamberlain and First Sergeant Ralph Kluna are our* **Writers of the Quarter** *for their article, "Long-Range Surveillance Operations In Kosovo—Complementing Existing Capabilities." Congratulations MAJ Chamberlain and 1SG Kluna and thanks to all of our authors for thier great articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. Contributions like yours make* ***MIPB*** *the professional forum for military intelligence professionals.*

How to Submit and Article to MIPB

MIPB is always seeking good articles on a variety of topics as well as action photographs of MI soldiers. Please see page 72 for instructions on how to submit your articles, photographs, and book reviews. Upcoming themes include the First Digital Division, Bosnia and Macedonia, INSCOM, and analysis.

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http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/mipb/mipbhome/welcome.htm

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Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*** quarterly under provisions of **AR 25-30**. ***MIPB*** disseminates material designed to enhance individuals' knowledge of past, current, and emerging concepts, doctrine, material, training, and professional developments in the MI Corps.

Submissions: Please send your manuscripts, letters to the editor, photographs, and any inquiries to: Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-FDR-CD, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; send via E-mail to michael.ley@hua.army.mil; or telephone (520) 538-0979 or DSN 879-0979.

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FEATURES

DEPARTMENTS

By order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
0110805

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

VANTAGE POINT

by Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

We all understand that the world holds a great deal of uncertainty and this uncertainty has significant implications for the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps. An excellent example of the challenges the 21st century holds for the MI Corps is the mission in Kosovo. Operations in Kosovo included many of the challenges we expect in the small-scale contingency (SSC) operational environment. The task of organizing and executing the Kosovo mission has challenged the MI Corps. Working from a structure more appropriate for the Cold War than an SSC, MI leaders quickly established the necessary organization and capabilities. We need to learn from their experiences. This ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*** (***MIPB***) issue addresses the lessons that many individuals and units learned during these unique times. The sharing of experiences and lessons learned is an important way to stimulate critical thinking and the innovation required to meet our challenges. I appreciate the willingness of those involved to share their experiences and perform the hard work to put those experiences in writing. We need to do more to encourage this kind of dialog. Thanks to the authors.

We need to build on these kinds of experiences as we move forward in transforming the Army. As we begin to understand the future operational environment through the work of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), we had better understand the events in operations like Kosovo. Additionally, we gain experience through Combat Training Center rotations. Taken together, this broad baseline of experience will help us to successfully shape the Interim Force and, consequently, the Objective Force. The Army's accomplishments with the Interim Force and the establishment of the Interim Brigade Combat Teams—as outlined in the last issue of the ***MIPB***—are exciting, but these are only the first steps toward the Objective Force.

We have learned an important lesson from the Army's initial efforts with the Objective Force—information is critical to the success of the Objective Force Commanders. **FM 3-0**, **Operations**, clearly explains that information is an element of combat power, and the correct use of information in increasing the knowledge of the combat commander is critical to success on the battlefield. Intelligence is a critical part of that information; in fact, so critical I think it is fair to say that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is the most important component of information superiority. ISR is not wholly the responsibility of the MI Corps; rather, many elements conduct reconnaissance and surveillance missions, including MI. However, the MI Corps must provide leadership in two distinct functions—converting information into intelligence through analysis and integrating and focusing all available ISR assets.

U.S. Army Photo.

Major General John D. Thomas, Jr.

The Objective Force must also have the capability to provide information and intelligence "down" to the units actually involved in combat. These units, operating in the "Red Zone," need to add ISR to their equation of lethality, survivability, and mobility to achieve their missions. Newly available information technology gives the MI Corps the opportunity to provide this intelligence to combat units. "Integrated intelligence" is an opportunity to increase the value of the MI Corps, and it will truly allow information to become an element of combat power.

The Objective Force is an opportunity to continue the integration of MI as a part of the combined arms team, but it is an opportunity with challenges. There will be significant change as we move to the Objective Force; things will not remain the same. Resistance to change

is inevitable; however, the MI Corps will be critical to the Army transformation. We must embrace this change and actively participate in it. Sharing our experiences through ***MIPB*** and other professional military journals is an important part of the intellectual element of the transformation process. Think, write, and share your professional knowledge. With all of us participating, I am confident that MI will make a major contribution to the Objective Force vision of See First, Understand First, Act First, and Finish Decisively!

This is my last issue of the ***MIPB*** as Chief of Military Intelligence. By the time you read this issue, I will have changed command and begun my transition into retirement. It has truly been a privilege to serve for the last three years as the fifth Chief of MI. The great people associated with MI continue to impress me every day. The soldiers of the active Army, U.S. Army Reserve, and U.S. Army National Guard, as well as our Army civilians and supporting contractors, are truly our greatest assets. As General Dennis J. Reimer would put it, *"they are our credentials."* In every unit or location I visited, the professionalism, dedication, and innovation demonstrated by our folks is awesome. There really is no mission too tough, no challenge too difficult for the personnel of the MI Corps. As the Army moves to the Objective Force we will need all the talent and dedication that our folks demonstrate daily. I look forward to joining our retirees who provide such great support to our Corps and hope that I can continue to contribute to the Military Intelligence Corps. I am confident as our Army transforms into the Objective Force we will remain—

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

MI Corps Hall of Fame

The Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame (HOF) recognizes those individuals who have made a lasting contribution to the MI Corps or have distinguished themselves as intelligence professionals. Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, or professional civilians who have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position in the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination for induction into the Military Intelligence Corps HOF.

Nominations for HOF must be for individuals only; the MI Corps will not consider unit or group nominations for induction. Furthermore, individuals cannot nominate themselves, and nominees cannot be current U.S. Government employees in an intelligence role. An individual who has retired from military service but continues to serve as a U.S. Government civilian in any intelligence capacity is precluded from consideration until retirement from all forms of federal intelligence service. The exclusion from nomination includes temporary retirees, medical or otherwise, and members of the Active Reserve or National Guard until transition to permanent inactive or retired status.

Although nominees must have served with Army Intelligence in some capacity, the supporting justification for their nominations may include accomplishment from any portion of their careers, not merely their periods of service in Army intelligence. For example, a noncommissioned officer (NCO) who served in Army MI and then, after retirement, joined the Defense Intelligence Agency as a civilian, is eligible for the Hall of Fame by virtue of his or her Army service. However, the justification may include achievements from both the military and civilian careers, even though the civilian intelligence service was not with an Army unit.

Each Hall of Fame nomination packet must include the following:

- A nomination letter signed by the nominator that includes his or her current postal and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers.
- The full name and official rank or grade of the nominee at the time of departure, retirement, or death.
- A career biography, to include the crucial assignments and accomplishments of the warrant induction into the HOF.
- A narrative justification specifically stating the major accomplishments and achievements of the nominee and his or her impact on the Army and MI.
- The current address, E-mail, and telephone number of the nominee (if living), or the address and telephone number of a surviving family member.
- The nominee's Social Security Number/Service Number.
- An 8" x 10" photograph of the nominee, if possible. If an 8" x 10" is not available, any photo that clearly shows the nominee is acceptable.

Nomination packets must be complete. Any nomination packet received without the first four items above will not go before the Selection Board until receipt of the missing item(s). The HOF Action Officer will review all packets and, if needed, will ask the nominator to provide more information in order to assure the nominee receives the fullest consideration by the Selection Board.

Send your nominations to Headquarters, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-CDR (Jim Chambers), Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-6000, or by E-mail to james.chambers@hua.army.mil. The HOF telephone numbers are commercial (520) 533-1178 and DSN 821-1178. HOF will notify the nominators of the receipt of their packets and the date of the next Selection Board, as well as update them on the packet's strength, completeness, and the results of the Selection Board.

CSM FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Lawrence J. Haubrich

The first thing I would like to say as your new command sergeant major is to bid a fond farewell to CSM Scott C. Chunn, a great Military Intelligence (MI) warrior. His many distinct contributions to the MI Corps the last three years will continue to have an impact on our Corps through the transformation process.

I am delighted to introduce myself as your new MI Corps Command Sergeant Major and to share my view of the MI Corps' future. Until my recent selection as your CSM, I served in troop units both in the continental United States (CONUS) and outside CONUS (OCONUS), most recently as a brigade CSM. Throughout my career, I have had both a personal and professional desire to serve at the center of the MI community, but honestly believed an assignment to Fort Huachuca would come as an instructor, a first sergeant, or a battalion CSM. That said, I feel honored to serve as your CSM.

Values

I believe in "Duty, Honor, and Country" and that this belief will propel our Army and Corps forward into the 21st century. Our soldiers embody the Army values: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage. Our fundamental values are those we as soldiers live and die by. It would be an impossible task to choose which of the Army values is the most crucial; I would say all seven share equal importance for they all make soldiers what they are today. My top priority is to lead, develop, and care for our soldiers and their families as well as to have a positive influence on everyone with whom I come in contact. We in our Army and Corps have two basic responsibilities: the mission and the welfare of our troops. I support the Sergeant Major of the Army in guiding our Army back to the basics—we have to get back to traditions, customs, and courtesies, and I would encourage you all to read and have our soldiers read our oath of enlistment.

U.S. Army Photo.

Command Sergeant Major Lawrence J. Haubrich

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.

We MI professionals working in the Army have all sworn or affirmed to this or a similar oath. We all are volunteers and during this transformation, we will continue to shape this Army and our Corps to remain the best in the world.

The 21st Century MI Corps

At no time in my career has the future of the MI Corps or its place in our Army been more important or clear. Our clearly defined path is the ongoing Army Transformation: developing a force that is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. The Army's

transformation goal will ensure the Army fulfills its strategic responsibilities, continuously meeting the requirements of the National Military Strategy. To this end, the Army will meet its goal through continued focus in three areas: people, readiness, and transformation.

People. MI's investment in the Army is in its soldiers and civilian workforce, contractors, and surrounding communities. MI soldiers span the spectrum from the Active Component through the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. They serve worldwide, providing intelligence to tactical-, operational-, strategic-, and national-level commands. We work with the best and brightest soldiers our Army has ever known. They are intelligent, highly skilled, motivated, and fiercely loyal to our nation. Family members, communities, local employees, and dedicated contractors all support MI soldiers.

Readiness. Our MI Corps and community stand ready to support both warfighters and decision-makers at all levels. Throughout the world, our soldiers are in place and contributing to the readiness of our Army. From Korea, Southwest Asia, the Balkans, Colombia, and elsewhere throughout the world, our nation's readiness is stressed by the complications of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, and organized crime, to name just a few. The MI Corps is at a high state of readiness, whether it is the MI National Guard battalion providing intelligence support to Task Force Eagle in Bosnia, the MI soldier serving in Korea, those serving with joint or combined commands, our MI soldiers providing intelligence to national-level agencies, or those serving in CONUS or OCONUS, in both Active and Reserve status.

Transformation. The transformation process is moving our Army and Corps forward into the 21st century; it relies solidly on MI soldiers to enable a survivable and lethal force. Essential to transformation is the current Legacy Force, which sustains our Army and stands ready to fight and win our nation's wars. Next is our new Interim Force with the initial and interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs). Fundamental to the IBCT is a new MI force structure, ready to employ and respond to immediate operational needs and enable the strategic deterrence that will provide the National Command Authority with real and viable options. These MI soldiers will move forward with the Army to become the Objective Force, enriched by new and enhanced intelligence systems better capable of contributing fast-paced intelligence and analysis to crucial commands at the right time. The Army's science and technology programs, supported by our Army civilians, acquisition program managers, and industry representatives will both sustain and improve C^4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) systems such as—

- ❑ All-Source Analysis System (ASAS).
- ❑ Aerial Common Sensor (ACS).
- ❑ Couterintelligence/Human Intelligence Automation Tool Set (CHATS).
- ❑ Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS).
- ❑ Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS).
- ❑ Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT).
- ❑ Prophet.

Each product improvement to our crucial systems, combined with new technologies, will allow MI soldiers to provide the decisive indicators that focus our Army for success.

Final Thoughts

I am very excited to be your CSM during the historic changes that will occur with the Army's transformation. MI is poised for success because of you and soldiers like you. However, as much as the Army transforms, it remains the same—it stays the same in the sense that the individual remains the crucial element of our success. The key to success with soldiers remains the same: take care of soldiers, set and enforce tough demanding standards, treat each soldier with dignity and respect, and support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

We are a great institution, a great army, and a great corps. Let us take care of each other and our families. You train hard, you die hard; you train easy and die easy. Peace needs protection.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

Attention NCOs

Send us your articles and book reviews. If you have any experience you can share on MI doctrine, professional development, or "how-to" tips, please send them to ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin***. Topics of interest for future issues include: analysis, global conflicts, MI skills training, and tactical operations. E-mail them to mipb@hua.army.mil or call (520) 538-1005/6 or DSN 879-1005/6.

The Future of *MIPB*

If you are a subscriber to *MIPB* or a field unit, you should have recently received a letter that apologizes for the delays and discusses the crisis management plan mentioned below. A recent assessment of the causes for the unacceptable and significant delays in publishing this and the last few issues of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)* have resulted in the development of an aggressive plan to correct the problems. We are moving swiftly to get *MIPB* back on track. The plan includes aggressive measures to publish the October – December 2000 issue featuring Army Transformation on 14 August 2001, the January – September 2001 issue featuring Kosovo Forces on 31 August 2001, and the October – December 2001 issue featuring the Combat Training Centers and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield on 31 October 2001. These publication dates reflect the day the printer-contractor will be contractually responsible to mail the issue. The publication of these three issues, the introduction of more streamlined procedures, and the adoption of a more disciplined production process, will ensure we publish future issues of *MIPB* on time.

As another result of this assessment, our senior leadership has given the Doctrine Division, Combat Developments, the mission of improving MIPB in the near future. The mission of MIPB is to enhance professional development and to serve as a forum for discussing intelligence doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). This is a two-way forum that we must manage from our end and that you must participate in from your end. The dialogue allows us to discuss and evaluate TTP that we can add to our current field manuals (FMs) or to capture in some other type of document (like an initiative we hope to conduct on web-based field observations). We do not plan any radical departure from the course MIPB has been on in the past. However, we will take steps to better integrate doctrine, TTP, and other areas like force structure into MIPB and use MIPB input to affect these areas.

We plan to make some incremental changes in the future to improve *MIPB***.** Additionally, we look forward to your support. Page 72 has a portion that discusses how you can submit articles to *MIPB*. The quality of *MIPB* directly reflects the input we receive from you—the intelligence community. *MIPB* needs you to submit feature articles, to provide feedback through letters to the editor or other correspondence, and to participate in the *MIPB* book review program.

Again, I want to assure all subscribers that, although we did not produce four issues of MIPB in calendar year 2001, you will eventually get four issues for your yearly subscription. I appreciate your patience and understanding as we overcome this challenge.

Michael P. Ley
Managing Editor, MIPB

Intelligence Support to TF Falcon's Peace Enforcement Mission

by Major General Bantz J. Craddock

"Big Red One" Military Intelligence soldiers deployed twice during the last five years to conduct peace enforcement entry operations into the Balkans. The first deployment was in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and the second to Kosovo in 1999. When combined with operations in Macedonia, elements of the 101st MI Battalion remained in the Balkans for 45 continuous months. The Division's entry into Kosovo differed significantly from the entry into Bosnia in two important areas: we entered Kosovo with a reinforced brigade instead of a division, and we knew very little about the operational area and the situation. These challenges stretched our doctrine and forced us to rethink what we thought we knew and had validated. This was especially true for our intelligence operations and structure.

Kosovo proved to be an environment in which intelligence truly drove operations—operations and intelligence became one. Commanders and leaders on the ground, at all levels, depended on intelligence to shape their operations and define their tactical objectives. This was true across the breadth of operations, from the team or squad leader who had to know who operated in the blocks around his position to the Task Force Commander constantly dealing with the nuances of multiple interests, hidden agendas, and tenuous and shifting alliances.

In the following articles, soldiers from the 101st Military Intelligence Battalion—teamed with soldiers and civilians from our Army and national intelligence organizations—examine how they confronted these challenges and accomplished their unique missions. Using existing doctrine as a guide, they rapidly and effectively developed new procedures and structures to collect and analyze intelligence information to support commanders and leaders on the ground in Kosovo.

To meet these unique demands, we modified the Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) from top to bottom. Modifications ranged from task organizing human intelligence (HUMINT) teams, to supporting multiple allied commanders with analysis and control teams (ACTs), and developing custom analytical tools to assess the extremely complex personal, familial, and institutional relationships in our assigned operating area. As always, our strength was our soldiers. Their resourcefulness, ingenuity, and mental agility were the reason we were successful.

I am very proud of the contributions the Task Force 101 MI team made to this division and to the Military Intelligence community. They were instrumental in helping create and maintain the peace in Kosovo. Their accomplishments will continue to shape and influence emerging doctrine and their lessons learned will help the Army operate better in future peace operations.✹

Commissioned an Armor officer upon graduation from West Virginia University, Major General John Craddock has excelled in a number of command and staff positions including materiel design and testing, strategy, and policy development. He commanded the 4th Battalion, 64th Armor, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) for 26 months, deploying with the Division to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and commanded the 194th Separate Armored Brigade (SAB). As the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) of the 1st Infantry Division, MG Craddock became the first Commander of U.S. Forces, Kosovo (Task Force Falcon), deploying the initial TF into Kosovo in June 1999. He became commander of 7th Army Training Command in August 1999 and assumed command of the 1st Infantry Division in September 2000. In addition to his Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science, he earned a Master of Military Arts and Science degree.

Read Any Good Books Lately?

We welcome reviews of books related to intelligence professional development or military history. Please mail or E-mail your book reviews to elizabeth.mcgovern@hua.army.mil or mail them to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-FDR-CD (McGovern), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

Kosovo:
A Year of Intelligence Operations

TF 101 MI
Eyes of the Falcon

by Lieutenant Colonel John S. Rovegno

On 9 June 1999, Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, with representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) signed the Military Technical Agreement dictating the withdrawal of FRY forces from Kosovo. On that day, the 101st Military Intelligence Battalion—already split between Würzburg and Hohenfels, Germany—task organized to support the 1st Infantry Division in a forced entry operation against a prepared defense through the Kacanic defile into Kosovo. Less than 72 hours later, after load-out, marshalling, convoying to Ramstein, and arrival in Macedonia, lead elements of the 101st MI Battalion entered Kosovo Province with Multinational Brigade–East (MNB-E) on a peace enforcement mission (see Figure 1).

Initial entry operations are hard. You do not have the experience of a predecessor on which to build, so you rely on experience from the next best thing, the last war. We made mistakes as we built our intelligence structure in this war-torn region, but we accomplished the mission and forged the way for others to follow. We also applied our lessons learned from Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially those of human intelligence (HUMINT) operations and disrupting insurgent operations. Lessons learned from Bosnia provided the Task Force (TF) with a critical edge in conducting operations. This article, introduces several others on Kosovo operations, written by great soldiers, telling how they accomplished the mission and developed future tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). It outlines some of the significant accomplishments and shortfalls and explains how we built the team and conducted operations.

Building the Team

The initial entry force deployed on short notice, tactically configured for a difficult fight. We conducted a second, compressed, mission analysis while reconfiguring our sparse resources to provide the best mix of intelligence support for our evolving and expanding mission.

The 101st MI Battalion provided the headquarters and the bulk of the intelligence collection and analysis for MNB-E and TF Falcon for the first year of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission. A divisional MI battalion does not have the resources to sustain a mission of this magnitude for twelve months. If we try to do so, we cannot provide the commander with the quality of intelligence that we, as a community, owe to both him and the soldiers on patrol. That said, you go to war with what you have. The 101st MI Battalion was at 68-percent strength, the lowest of any battalion in the division and was the only battalion to execute the Kosovo mission for a full year. Major General (now Lieutenant General) John Abizaid's intent was very clear when he said "*There is no one in the division more important than the soldier on patrol in Kosovo in the middle of the night*." He further focused us with his "3 FARs" (special common sense rules) (see Figure 2). We, the intelligence community, violated rule number three; we could have done more. We could have pro-



Figure 1. Sectors of the NATO Kosovo Force.

vided the soldiers on patrol with better capabilities and a better mix of intelligence soldiers to support the mission. Figure 3 highlights the challenges we encountered, and shows what measures we took to overcome them.

- ❑ Don't get complacent.
- ❑ Don't underestimate your enemy.
- ❑ Never place American soldiers in harm's way without being able to mass the full weight of the U.S. Army behind them.

Figure 2. MG John Abizaid's Rules for Success.

The G2 and MI Battalion abbreviated the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and created the most austere organization possible to accomplish the mission. We then divided the available "trained" personnel into two rotations, which left significant gaps. We filled these gaps the best we could by cross-leveling MOSs. The primary bill payers were the 98Gs (Signals Intelligence [SIGINT] Analysts) who filled all of the HUMINT operations and analysis positions and many HUMINT collection positions. Using all available personnel, we filled 75 percent of the austere organization, accepting risk in reduced command and control (C^2), administrative, logistics, maintenance, and battle staff functions. Throughout the first rotation, we had no platoon leaders, platoon sergeants or executive officers, and the staff consisted of a first lieutenant as the S3 and a sergeant as the S1.

The Division identified several capability gaps and requested both equipment and personnel augmentations. Most requests either went unanswered or continuously returned for "further staffing." Our three most effective solutions were—

- ❑ Augmenting Battalion S2 shops with additional personnel (98Gs).
- ❑ Gaining an exception to policy to both continuous days deployed and second deployments for soldiers we needed to bring back.
- ❑ Pulling branch-detailed lieutenants out of maneuver units to fill vacant platoon leader positions.

While we were designing the organization, we deployed.

Crossing the Line of Departure

On 12 June 1999, Alpha Company, 101st MI Battalion, crossed from Macedonia into the Kosovo province tactically configured for combat operations. They moved up the Kacanic defile, which the Serbian Army had heavily defended just 48 hours earlier. The next day, A/101 MI occupied a wheat field just east of Urosevac, which today is known as Camp Bondsteel and three days later produced their first intelligence summary (INTSUM).

Two weeks later, B/101 MI entered Kosovo and moved to Gnjilane where they based at Camp Monteith. Initially, A/101 controlled the MI general support (GS) assets while B/101 had the direct support (DS) assets. As the theater matured, both companies assumed GS roles, dividing MNB-E into the North and South Sectors (see Figure 4). Initially, Field HUMINT teams from the 165th MI Battalion moved from Task Force Hawk in Albania to augment TF 101 MI. One month later, A Com-

Challenges

- ❑ G2 not permitted to deploy—To prevent the appearance of the Division colors forward on a brigade mission, the division primary staff could not deploy forward.
- ❑ S2 shops not resourced for peace support operations (PSOs)—The static nature of PSOs and continuous contact with the local populace resulted in far more intelligence reported directly to battalion tactical operations centers (TOCs).
- ❑ No one could deploy more than 180 days—Necessitated two rotations, unsupportable by a full strength battalion.
- ❑ 101st MI at 68% strength—Exacerbated the personnel-resourcing problem.
- ❑ Analysis and Control Element (ACE)—35 assigned/31 needed per rotation—Required significant augmentation with untrained personnel.
- ❑ Officers at 100% of Officer Distribution Plan (ODP)—Good news for one rotation, but the mission was two.
- ❑ Augmentation slices come without command and control (C^2)—Additional teams increase C^2 and admininistrative-logistics requirements.

Solutions

- ❑ Cross-Level Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs)
- ❑ Augment battalion S2s
- ❑ Exception to policy—increase authorized deployment days
- ❑ Bring back branch-detail lieutenants

Figure 3. TF Falcon MI's Challenges and Solutions.



Figure 4. Disposition of the Forces Comprising MNB-E.

pany, 519th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation) (Airborne), a composite company of soldiers from the A and B Companies of the 519th, replaced the 165th MI Battalion teams. Additionally, the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) from TF Hawk joined our team.

We now had the basic set with which to begin operations. The next section of this article discusses the types of operations we conducted while introducing some other articles in this issue of the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)*.**

Conducting Intelligence Operations

Our intelligence analysis and operations were huge successes. Former Major T. Mitchell "Mick" Cowan and I explain (see page 56) how the environment differed from anything our Army previously experienced, especially when entering such an intelligence void. Despite the difficulties, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians comprising TF 101 MI started with a zero intelligence baseline, and developed some of the most robust databases and predictive analyses ever seen in an initial entry operation. The following discussion introduces both the highlights and lessons learned from our intelligence operations.

Deteinee Questioning. Detainee questioning was not one of our specified or implied tasks, but through twelve months of operations, we questioned more than 700 detainees and screened 1,300. When we arrived, all the HUMINT Collectors were in Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs). Detentions were the responsibility of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and responsibility for questioning fell on the UNMIK Police. As arrests soared and the number of detainees exceeded UNMIK's holding capability, TF Falcon assumed detention, screening, and holding responsibilities. At first, we pulled HUMINT Collectors from THTs on a case-by-case basis but after the capture of the first Serbian Army patrol in the MNB-E sector, interrogation became one of TF 101 MI's full-time missions.

In addition to the shortage of HUMINT Collectors, we faced an ongoing challenge with detainee handling and evacuation procedures. Our units detained people for reasons ranging from hostile military operations to rape, murder, speeding, and petty theft. We had to segregate and evacuate some rapidly; others only needed lectures and release. Between the extremes, the situation was less clear and procedures changed. Compound that with the continuous swap-out of U.S. units and personnel and varying ways of defining the mission by our MNB-E allied units, and one realizes how hard it was to develop standing operating procedures (SOPs).

The last and most important challenge was understanding the limitations we faced in conducting interrogations in a peace support operation (PSO). First, the lawyers needed to define the legal status of each group of people. We were not at war, and although we captured Serbian soldiers, most detainees were civilians. Secondly, commanders had to decide jointly the spatial limits for maneuver units, and how the UNMIK Police, allied units, military police (MPs), and the criminal investigative division (CID) fit into the equation. Chief Warrant Officer Three Gary Barnett further explains detainee operations in his HUMINT Collection article (see page 18).

Tactical HUMINT Operations. Our HUMINT and CI soldiers have task organized into "force protection teams" in the Balkans for the past five years. Part of the reason for this name was to make it easier for the team members to explain what they did when conversing with the local populace; another reason was to focus the soldiers on force protection. While force protection is important, it is a G3 function and with the name comes multiple tasks, such as threat vulnerability assessments. It also brings false perceptions of what our teams should be doing. Force protection is defensive in nature—we cannot win wars or accomplish PSOs by withdrawing into a defen-

sive posture, but must rather seize the initiative with offensive operations. Hence, we gave it the name "Force Protection from without."

We changed the name of these teams from "force protection" to "Tactical HUMINT" early in the operation. This simple change made a big difference. We were able to focus on intelligence collection in support of our mission to establish a safe and secure environment for the people of Kosovo.

Initially we assigned the teams *opstinas* (counties) as their sectors. We later made some adjustments but still generally kept sectors along established government and social boundaries. Each team comprised a mix of HUMINT Collectors and counterintelligence (CI) agents. Their varied training and skill sets complemented each other as they worked with the local populace to accomplish their missions.

As we started to work with both higher and adjacent units, intelligence sharing became a problem. KFOR did not have a GS intelligence battalion similar to the Allied MI Battalion (AMIB) supporting the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. Instead, KFOR relied on all contributing countries to share information. We never completely solved the sharing problem and probably never will; however, all nations began producing releasable, comprehensive daily summaries.

Our two most difficult challenges were in replacing teams and gaining approval to operate under reduced force protection requirements. Coordinating HUMINT and CI replacements was the biggest personnel challenge we faced. This issue of ***MIPB*** discusses specific problems in the lessons learned article on page 20. Draft doctrine is beginning to address how and when the team relaxes force protection measures (for example, the number of vehicles in a convoy, continuous wear of body armor, and alcohol consumption). Contacts feel more at ease and mission effectiveness significantly increases. Generally, each time a new commanding general (commander) arrives, the MI commander and G2 must restate the reasons why teams should have relaxed standards. Sometimes the General approves, sometimes not. In our case, the first two CGs approved, then the third reversed the decision. Our mission effectiveness immediately declined as our contacts became warier of us. We tried all possible explanations like, "the environment is more tense," but we never regained the same rapport with new and old contacts. New doctrine must explain how reducing threatening gestures as well as understanding and adapting to the culture of the people with whom you work significantly enhances HUMINT and CI mission effectiveness.

Ground Surveillance Operations. Our ground surveillance systems operators conducted operations using every skill they knew. Operations ranged from DS for maneuver companies to GS for TF Falcon. They used AN/PPS-5 and/PPS-15 radars, both mounted and dismounted, to cover military and civilian movements throughout the sector. They even developed strategies to counter the mobile mortars' firing missions to harass Serbian people in several towns.

As TF Falcon received the Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS), the 96R (Ground Surveillance System Operator) soldiers recalled their prior training. The operators performed magnificently as they planned collection and emplaced sensor strings to monitor military movements and smuggling routes along the Kosovo–Serbia border. They later used additional sensors for perimeter security of small base camps near the borders, freeing up crucial personnel resources for other missions.

Finally, they worked hand in hand with the Canadian Coyote Teams, using today's technology in innovative ways. Captains Bob Culp and Frank Tank detail all of these operations in their articles (beginning on page 23).

Low-Level Voice Intercept (LLVI) Operations. Our Intercept operators combined new doctrine and TTP with old, finding innovative ways to cope with the constantly evolving signals environment. They used off-the-shelf equipment, in coordination with organic systems, as they developed an employment strategy that assigned teams to permanent sectors, similar to the HUMINT team's deployment. This approach gave our operators a situational awareness unmatched in any previous operation of the people,

U.S. Army Photo.

Camp Bondsteel's humble beginnings: The ACE and Task Force Falcon headquarters in a wheat field in June 1999.

Photo courtesy of author.

Houses burning in Kosovo.

communications nets and nodes, and communications timelines. They received authorization to jam communications nets but never exercised this capability. Perhaps the most significant event occurred on 8 February 2000 when the "King of Battle"[1] fired in DS of intelligence collection operations for the first time in history. The event, while not significant in overall collection volume, showed the trust of the commander in the Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) and his willingness to adjust operations to gain intelligence. It also brought the working relationship of Artillery and Intelligence even closer as, in this operation, we reordered field artillery D^{3}A doctrine to Deliver→Detect→Assess→Decide. First Sergeant David Redmon details these operations in his article (see page 29).

Interpreters. Kosovo operations again proved our dependence on linguist outsourcing. Intelligence interpreters—all U.S. citizens with security clearances similar to those of the soldiers with whom they worked—provided the critical link between our soldiers and the local population. They learned the language and culture as a part of growing up and possessed unique insights that are significant force multipliers.

Our military has not been able to predict the location of the next conflict for most of our existence. Therefore, we cannot forecast which language skills to train, although we know we will use interpreters in most future operations. We must expand the limited doctrine in this area and develop TTP for how best to use interpreters to accomplish the mission. We must also standardize our hiring methodology, streamline our procedures, and determine whether we should recruit a base of interpreters to hold on retainer for future operations.

In our interpreter article, which will appear in a future issue of ***MIPB***, Linda Hajdari and Drita Peresic (who entered Kosovo with us in the initial entry operation) join me in describing how Task Force 101 used interpreters. We chronicle the procedures from hiring and training to assignment and assimilation into operations, as well as recommending improvement and solutions for future operations.

ACE Operations. The Analysis and Control Element (ACE) produced timely, relevant, predictive intelligence for the commander. The ACE also explained the vast differences between Bosnia and Kosovo to the intelligence community. Not only was the environment austere, the intelligence database was nonexistent. Initial intelligence reports from "higher" were our own ACE's reports and this void of information from other than division resources was disturbing. Preparations focused on the FRY Army as the primary aggressor. We knew their structure, strengths, weaknesses, and how they fought…but now they were gone. Instead there were the now non-uniformed Serbian "Special Police," Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK), and armed civilians.

In addition to the intelligence void, the division's extreme personnel shortages hit the ACE very hard. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) intercept operators filled the HUMINT and all-source analysis cells. Following a steep learning curve, they accomplished every task. The HUMINT analysis cell developed the "Krypton HUMINT Database" and fused it with all-source intelligence to develop a complete picture. They leveraged data from the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to provide commanders with outstanding intelligence. Majors Donald Wood and Joan Mercier, two of our ACE Chiefs, explore peace support doctrine and how they leveraged the ACE to support our unique mission. (see page 33).

ACT Operations. We clearly have not standardized how to best support maneuver commanders with analysis and control teams (ACTs), as evidenced by the number of articles recently published on this subject. MI commanders continue to develop SOPs and TTP that work for them. "ACT Operations—With U.S. and Allies," written by four ACT Chiefs who accomplished the mission in an initial entry peace enforcement operation (PEO), provides unique insights of how to operate in this environment.

Captains Kirk Loving, Jason McCoy, David Payne and Jeff Thurnher, and First Lieutenant Melanie Shippitka explain how we established ACTs at our U.S. and Allied headquarters, what additional

intelligence and non-intelligence functions they performed, and how linguists made their tasks easier (see page 41). They outline the importance of knowing all the collection capabilities at our disposal and the need to be ready to perform mobile operations, in or outside their assigned sectors. They also explain the need to understand the customs, doctrine, and language of the supported unit, and how the specific PSO tasks of working with non-government organizations (NGOs), local organizations, MPs, Civil Affairs, FHTs, and Special Forces teams assist in accomplishing our mission.

Out-of-Sector Operations. When tensions exploded in Mitrovica, the KFOR commander ordered MNB-E to reinforce the French forces controlling that sector. TF 101 MI deployed assets into Mitrovica four times, providing DS first to the French, then to three MNB-E battalions from Greece, Poland, and the United States. In his article on page 44, CPT Jason McCoy explains the challenges in providing intelligence to both U.S. and allied units while operating outside our assigned sector.

Editor's Note: Readers may also wish to see "Multinational Brigade–East ACT Operations in Kosovo: 18th Airborne/Air Assault (Poland) ACT" by 1LT Mike E. Crane in the July-September 2000 issue of ***MIPB.***

The first, and most challenging deployment, occurred when we received orders to provide Interrogation Teams in DS of MNB-N (France). The French took more than 40 detainees during the initial clashes between Serbs and Albanians in Mitrovica. They had task organized the few interrogators they had on HUMINT teams and thus had not done any interrogations. The inherent national sensitivities in sharing intelligence quickly complicated the mission. MNB-N was reluctant to provide intelligence concerning the circumstances of capture and information known about their individual prisoners. The diminished sharing reduced the effectiveness of our interrogations and eventually convinced the command to end our support of the operation.

Intelligence soldiers produced significant successes during the next three out-of-sector operations. Our ACT and FHTs accompanied the 501st Mechanized Battalion (GR) and deployed with the intelligence-reach analytical power of the ACE. We added LLVI to the MI team accompanying the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (U.S.). The LLVI teams coordinated with the UK LLVI teams which had the same Mitrovica mission. LLVI teams shared both tip-offs and lines of bearing as they found, and never lost, the enemy. Finally, when we deployed to support the 18th Airborne (PL) Battalion, we knew the environment so well that we were able to provide immediate and continuous targetable intelligence to the commander.

Conclusion

Initial entry operations are hard. They are demanding, personnel intensive, frustrating, and dangerous. However, no matter the shortages, drains, demands, and length of deployment, one fact remained steadfast—today's MI soldiers are ready and able to answer the call.✹

Endnote

1. The "King of Battle" is a commonly used nickname for Field Artillery.

Lieutenant Colonel John Rovegno has served for more than 20 years as an intelligence officer throughout the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. His assignments include platoon leader, two company commands, S2, the first S2 Observer/Controller at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Battalion S3 and Executive Officer, Instructor, J2 Operations Officer, and G2. While at U.S. Army Central Command, he deployed on several operations including VIGILANT WARRIOR, VIGILANT SENTINEL, DESERT STRIKE, and RUGGED NAUTILUS. He joined the 1st Infantry Division in April 1997 as the G2, serving as G2, Task Force Eagle in Bosnia-Herzegovina for six months. LTC Rovegno remained the 1ID G2, working extensively in Germany and Macedonia until February 1999 when he took command of the 101st MI Battalion and deployed with the battalion as part of the Kosovo Initial Entry Force in June, remaining in Kosovo just over one year. He is a graduate of the MI Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Electronic Warfare/Cryptologic Officer Course, Command and General Staff College, and the Armed Forces Staff College. LTC Rovegno received a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration from Shippensburg University, Pennsylvania, and a Master of Public Administration degree from the University of Missouri. He is currently attending the War College. Readers can reach him via E-mail at johnrovegno@us.army.mil.

JAC/JRISE Needs MI Reservists

The Joint Analysis Center/Joint Reserve Intelligence Support Element (JAC/JRISE) located in Atlanta, Georgia, is looking for branch-qualified Military Intelligence officers (35B/D), warrant officers (350B, 350D), and enlisted personnel (96B, 96D). Applicants must have a current TS/SCI security clearance and be MOS-qualified. Unit members typically drill at Fort Gillem, Georgia, for IDT, ADT, and AT but also participate in mission work at the Joint Analysis Center in the United Kingdom and other overseas assignments on an as-needed basis. In addition, this unit offers training, challenging work (supporting real-world intelligence missions), flexible scheduling, and combined IDTs. Interested soldiers should contact SGT Campbell, the JAC JRISE recruitment NCO, at (404) 362-3151) or DSN 797-3151.

KOSOVO:LESSONS LEARNED

by Lieutenant Colonel
John S. Rovegno

There is no one more important than the soldier on patrol, in Kosovo, in the middle of the night.

—Lieutenant General (then MG) John Abizaid, former Commander Task Force Falcon

Initial-entry operations are difficult and those in peace operations (POs) are even harder. Harder because we train to fight an enemy organized and arrayed on a defined battlefield, but in Kosovo, this was not the case. A combination of thugs, criminals, radicals, and unknowns replaced the organized enemy. The lessons we learned may represent the future of war and peace. The battlefield and the enemy of the future will probably be like the situation in Kosovo, asymmetrical and undefined. This article takes a critical look at how the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps and Task Force (TF) 101 trained, deployed, operated, and redeployed. It addresses what we did and what we of the Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS), could have done better to support the commander and the soldiers on patrol.

We learned many lessons during our twelve months in Kosovo; some were new and some, unfortunately, were not. I will not repeat the operational lessons described by the other authors in this magazine, but will focus on overall lessons (see figure), particularly lessons concerning training, personnel, and equipment issues.

General Lessons Learned

- **Future POs will include coalition partners and constrained ground elements.**
- **Mission analysis is continuous—we must revisit it often.**
- **Doctrine works, but it needs some revision.**
- **We will be hard pressed to use legacy doctrine with the Transformation force.**
- **Communications and bandwidth—we need more everywhere.**
- **Command and control (C^2)—start heavy, you will grow to fit it.**
- **Train, then trust your junior leaders.**
- **Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) downlink with a recording capability is critical.**
- **Unclassified imagery is necessary.**
- **Field smaller, more capable, intercept and direction-finding (DF) systems. Cold War systems do not work.**

Learned in Kosovo

Kosovo reflects two aspects of POs we can expect to see in the future. First, we will operate in a coalition environment and must prepare with training and doctrine. Second, because most of the military forces of our allies are so thin-spread, we will operate with a small, constrained ground element.

Mission analysis is a continuous process; you must revisit it often. Mission requirements drive your troop-to-task analysis, determining the right forces for the mission. We were prepared for a forced entry, but then reorganized available forces to accomplish the new mission. This was an obvious mission change. Less obvious were the continual changes in organizations threatening mission accomplishment, local leadership, and technological advances, as the region recovered from war.

Doctrine, lessons learned, and the tactical training program, developed in prior operations, work well. The answers concerning the proper conduct of operations are out there. The challenge is finding the time to read these documents.

The MI community depends on stable communications and an ever-increasing need for more bandwidth. We must prepare early to move large quantities of data both vertically and horizontally, to leverage agencies outside the area of operations, and to support commanders within the sector.

Do not underestimate C^2. Success in POs is very dependent on large quantities of intelligence about multiple people, organizations, and factions. We are usually on the ground before we convince military planners and commanders of the need for more collection capability. Prepare before you deploy for the requirements associated with coordination, receipt, and execution of increased missions and resources.

Junior leaders in POs make decisions with strategic implications every day. They operate in small teams, interacting with critical faction leaders, and the media monitors them continuously. Clearly articulate goals, objectives, direction, and rules of engagement so they have the information necessary to make the right decisions.

UAVs are ideally suited for POs; their images are often the “smoking gun” we need to prove guilt or quell tensions during or after incidents. Use other imaging capabili-

ties like portable cameras, Apache guntapes, or Coyote camera tapes in the same way. Once you demonstrate the capability, you have the upper hand.

Unclassified overhead imagery is a significant force multiplier. A large percentage of operations occur in urban areas, and the best planning and C^2 tool is a picture. Given that we will conduct primarily coalition operations, we need to provide pictures printed in large format to both U.S. and allied leaders. As in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the enemy operated the most modern, small, handheld communications. We could neither intercept nor DF them.

Personnel

We go to war the way we are in garrison. Tactical MI units in the legacy force do not have the personnel in sufficient quantity or specialty to accomplish peace-support missions. TF 101 MI was at 68-percent strength when we deployed. My main intent in showing our personnel challenges is to help readers understand our decisions and to show that we need better Armywide management of intelligence personnel during POs. One can accomplish this by—

- ❑ Selecting an experienced G2.
- ❑ Centrally managing individual replacements.
- ❑ Synchronizing unit and team rotations.

The G2's role in a PO is even more crucial than during high-intensity conflict operations. The "bad guys"—any person or organization dedicated to disrupting our ability to accomplish our mission—are not obvious. The G2 needs to find this elusive enemy before we can plan operations. Politics kept our Division G2 from ever reaching Kosovo. Kosovo Force was a brigade mission; therefore, the division primary staff worked from the periphery. However, a General Officer commanded the Brigade and we deployed far more intelligence capability for this brigade than is organic to a division. TF Falcon needed a G2 with division- or TF-level experience to direct intelligence. Instead of canvassing the Army for talent, United States Army, Europe (USAREUR) was forced to look internally. We saw four G2s in the first ten months and still had no clear direction for the Intelligence BOS. We are measured by the capability and quality of our leaders. In the future, the MI Corps needs to look at all of our talent, build a qualified G2 pool from which to select, and let the commander decide.

Placing the burden of resourcing an operation of this magnitude on a tables of organization and equipment (TOE) unit, and allowing supporting units to decide how and when to provide replacements separates the intelligence effort and reduces mission effectiveness. This uncoordinated effort caused many problems including:

- ❑ Fifty percent of intelligence soldiers worked outside their military occupational specialties (MOSs). Untrained soldiers filled critical analytical positions when Army inventory had trained soldiers.
- ❑ Sixty MI soldiers deployed for more than 270 days although the Joint Chiefs of Staff order limited individual deployments to 180 days.
- ❑ TF 101 MI experienced seven-percent turnover per week. With reduced C^2 and a volatile mission, this extremely high turnover unnecessarily created continuous turmoil.
- ❑ Inconsistent assignment orders. Soldiers in nearly all TF Falcon units arrived on temporary change of station (TCS) orders. MI organizations sent soldiers in assigned, attached, operational control, temporary duty, and TCS status; not all orders passed rating authority and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority. Soldiers earned varying amounts of per diem pay and stayed varying amounts of time. Generally, the units cutting orders were trying to take care of "their" soldiers, while they unintentionally hurt other soldiers.

Photo by LTC John Rovegno.

Guard shack entrance to TF 101 MI TOC and ACE.

MI should be able to manage individual replacements centrally. Looking at soldiers available Armywide, we could fill most of the authorized slots with qualified soldiers. We saw similar problems when trying to synchronize unit and team rotations. Teams should be able to arrive prepared to begin operations. Synchronization requires direct coordination between supporting and supported commanders. The operational commander did not have direct liaison authority for the first human intelligence (HUMINT) team transition. This denial resulted in reduced intelligence capability for the commander and increased turmoil for the soldiers on duty. TF Falcon requested the simultaneous arrival of five trained, equipped, and task-organized tactical HUMINT Teams (two HUMINT collectors and two counterintelligence [CI] agents) for a mission rehearsal exercise. We received—

- ❑ One HUMINT collector team and four CI teams.
- ❑ Four separate arrivals over a five-week period.
- ❑ Fifty percent of soldiers arrived lacking the mandatory training.
- ❑ One team with weapons we could not maintain.
- ❑ One team without weapons.
- ❑ Teams had insufficient radios, vehicles, night-vision goggles, and Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System Receivers (PLGRs).

Equipment

Task Force 101 MI deployed with legacy systems designed for a major theater of war. Every request for systems with better capabilities met with roadblocks and delays. Individuals went out of their way to help, but in many cases, they were not able to overcome the bureaucratic hurdles. When our systems are unable to do the job, the validity of the MI Corps suffers.

The primary lessons we learned in equipment and system deployment were that MI must—

- ❑ Increase flexibility in fielding plans.
- ❑ Cross-level equipment to forces in contact.
- ❑ Leverage commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment.
- ❑ Field a NightStalker-Coyote-type ground surveillance system.

Inflexible fielding plans delayed deployment of both the CI/HUMINT Automation Tool Set (CHATS) AN/PYQ-3(V2) and AN/PRD-13(V2)s. TF 101 MI was scheduled to receive new equipment fielding of CHATS in summer 1999. With the impending deployment, we requested early fielding and training. After several unsuccessful attempts over the next four months by 1ID to gain approval for early fielding, we deployed into the combat zone with the less capable Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package (TRRIP) systems. Two months after we arrived in Kosovo and developed databases and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) using TRIPP, the CHATS systems and fielding team arrived. They requested that we pull our HUMINT teams out of contact for a week to train on CHATS. While the fielding team maintained outstanding flexibility, our soldiers never received the focused training that they deserved. The CHATS brought a better capability to parse into the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS), but our systems and databases were in place without ASAS. Similarly, we requested PRD-13(V2)s as an out-of-cycle fielding in May 1999. Twelve months later, after numerous requests from the TF Falcon Commanding General, the PRD-13(V2)s arrived. Early fielding of CHATS and PRD-13(V2) would have significantly increased both our HUMINT and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities.

Other equipment available in the system but not organic to TF 101 MI could have also enhanced our mission effectiveness. After hearing of our difficulty acquiring the PRD-13(V2)s and understanding that we were still using outdated PRD-12s, a fellow MI battalion commander greatly aided us by lending us some of his excess PRD-13(V1)s. We also requested Remotely Monitored Battlefield Surveillance Sensors (REMBASS) in May 1999, to use for both base camp perimeter security and route monitoring in sector. Rather than transferring systems from non-deployed units, the Army fielded our first sensors ten months later from TF Eagle in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both of these systems were in the inventory and could have increased force protection, improved collection effectiveness, and allowed our soldiers to perform other critical tasks. A central Department of the Army (DA)-level point of contact (POC), who knew where all the systems were in use could have facilitated coordination for finding and pushing systems forward.

U.S. Army Photo.

CPT Brian Scott, XO, TF101MI, Inspects wreckage of a Serbian tank.

Initial-entry operations magnify the validity of *"You don't know what you don't know."* In many cases, we did not even know what capabilities to request. COTS systems were available but when one is in contact with the adversary, it is difficult to research what system could best aid in mission accomplishment. During the first part of 2000, representatives from the Department of Defense command, control, communications and intelligence (C^3I) offered solutions to some of our problems. They provided scanners, frequency grabbers, and COTS versions of REMBASS. All of these systems proved invaluable to our mission. This type of assistance should happen immediately following initial entry, coordinated by a DA-level POC with the ability to deliver new and emerging technology.

Finally, the Canadians showed us how effective Coyote (a lightly armored system with both ground surveillance radar and day-night video capability) was in monitoring and tracking illegal activity. We had a similar system in the NightStalker a few years back. We need to use COTS technology and quickly build a similar system.

Looking to the Future

The future of MI is bright. The Army transformation is putting the right soldiers with the right equipment at the right place on the battlefield. We must remember that while the transformation prepares us for the future, the legacy and interim forces are in contact with the enemy protecting our soldiers as they construct a fragile peace in areas where most seem content with war.

POs and the Balkans mission will be with us for a long time. Because of the type of mission, a few units and specialties are doing more than their fair share of enforcing the peace. Specifically, the 501st, 519th, 165th, and 101st MI battalions are conducting multiple Balkans rotations, some are there now and others will return in the near future. Additionally, certain MOSs pull more than their fair share of the load. Virtually all HUMINT soldiers and warrant officers have completed multiple rotations. The Army is now tracking how many days each soldier deploys in a two-year period. We, as a Corps, must also track which soldiers are deploying and find ways to ensure that we spread the work to all the soldiers in those burdened specialties.

Current legacy units cannot accomplish the missions they are facing. Although future units will have more capabilities, they cannot prepare for what they do not know. We need to continue to build units that can accomplish the missions. DA-level teams to assist MI forces in contact would facilitate fielding the best force possible. We must trust the commander and G2 on the ground to tell us what they need; they are in contact and they know. The Intelligence community needs to put aside agency parochialisms, break down the bureaucratic obstacles, and focus on what the "Big Red One" accolade extols; *"There is no one more important than the soldier on patrol in the middle of the night."*✹

Lieutenant Colonel John Rovegno is currently a student at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He has served for more than 20 years as an intelligence officer throughout the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. He joined the 1st Infantry Division in April 1997 as the G2, serving as G2, Task Force Eagle in Bosnia-Herzegovina for six months. LTC Rovegno remained the 1ID G2, working extensively in Germany and Macedonia until February 1999 when he took command of the 101st MI Batallion and deployed with the battalion as part of the Kosovo Initial Entry Force in June, remaining in Kosovo just over one year. Readers can contact the author via E-mail at john-rovegno@us.army.mil.



Photo by LTC John Rovegno.

Sign covering a five-story burned out hotel in downtown Gnjilane, made by local Kosovar-Albanians for the celebrations marking the first aniversary of Americans (NATO) entering the sector.

HUMINT Collection During Peace Operations

by Chief Warrant Officer Three Gary G. Barnett

When the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) rolled into Kosovo as the initial entry force, Task Force 101 Military Intelligence (TF 101 MI) established intelligence operations. A critical fact we assumed during our mission analysis proved to be false: the United Nations (U.N.) Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and specifically the UNMIK-Police, not us, were responsible for all detainees. Within the first two weeks, the detainee flow exceeded UNMIK's capabilities, leading TF Falcon to establish a detention facility at Camp Bondsteel. Although most of the detainees were petty criminals captured by U.N. Kosovo Force (KFOR) soldiers, that changed when TF Falcon captured a Serbian Army patrol in the northern part of our sector.

This article addresses challenges TF Falcon faced in processing military and civilian detainees in a peacekeeping environment. It also discusses methods we used to build our capabilities and the lessons we learned that are applicable to future peace operations.

Background

The combat training centers (CTCs) continuously identify problems that units have with detainee identification and processing; entries from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Internet site record these observations in detail. HUMINT Collector interviews revealed that capturing units, soldiers detaining individuals, and military police (MP) at detention facilities attempted to question detainees. Untrained soldiers should not question detainees because it can destroy trust and hinder proper HUMINT Collection efforts. Units and soldiers also fail to document captured personnel, equipment, and material on DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag, and follow established procedures for interrogation operations. After several years in Bosnia-Herzegovina and two rotations in Kosovo, the same problems still plague units in peace operations.

Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, states, *"The goal of any interrogation is to obtain the maximum amount of useable and reliable information, in a lawful manner and in the least amount of time, which meets intelligence requirements."* Proper documentation and completed capture tags provide HUMINT collectors with essential information that assists their examination of detainees. Starting questioning by asking "*What brings you here today?*" is not the preferred approach technique, but without documentation, HUMINT collectors are not primed for success with the exploitable information that leads to the best approach in each case. Capture tags provide the means to verify the information in detainee statements. They also ensure—

- ❑ Timely processing.
- ❑ Accurate inventory of documents, material, and personal property.
- ❑ Easily retrievable data concerning detainees.

Timely Reporting

TF 101 MI implemented the following tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to assist in detainee processing. Efficient reporting provides early notification and implementation of standard procedures. To handle this age-old problem, the TF G3 charged units to expedite all detention reports to the G2 operations section. The quickest secure means of communication gave the intelligence "system of systems" time to prepare for incoming detainees. Most units used the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) network to alert the G2 Operations Battle Captain and furnish the required information from Part B of the EPW capture tag. (Since the 1ID units did not deploy with DD Forms 2745, the Operational Mangement Team (OMT), HUMINT Operations Center, and HUMINT Collection Chief, developed a locally reproducible form and E-mailed it to unit S2s.) After notification, G2 Operations provided the Part B information to the MI Battalion tactical operations center (TOC) and the G2.

G2 Operations maintained a list of high-value target (HVT) personalities; detainment of an HVT personality meant expedited interrogation. Detention of these personalities initiated immediate notification of the G2 and MI Battalion Commander. The MI Battalion TOC notified the on-call HUMINT collection team to begin preparation for an HVT detainee interrogation. This notification process prevented units from alerting the collectors directly for every detention of petty criminals and thus aided asset management. If there were any special linguist requirements, the MI Battalion TOC coordinated interpreter support from a pool of Category II (Secret cleared) linguists.

Upon receiving notification of detainees, the G2 Operations Battle Captain also informed the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) HUMINT Analysis Team (HAT) and provided detainee identification data. The HAT prepared target folders with information retrieved from the local HUMINT database and E-mailed the prepared target folder—including any new information requirements or special instructions for the HUMINT Collec-

tors—to the OMT, which passed the target folder and information requirements to the collectors. Once the HUMINT collectors received the target folders, they could initiate interrogation planning. The ACE-prepared target folder tailored the intelligence requirements to the individual detainee, which improved the interrogator's operational results.

A Soldiers' Common Task

Knowledge of detainment procedures is a soldiers' common task and includes standardized actions. Take control of the detainees. Search detainees for weapons, documents, and equipment and do not allow them to discard any belongings. If detainees possess radios, walkie-talkies, cellular telephones, or any other communications devices, do not adjust, turn off, or manipulate switches. Captured enemy equipment (CEE) ranges from the smallest specialized electronic device to huge pieces of machinery, weapons, or weapon systems. Captured enemy documents (CEDs) and CEE frequently provide valuable intelligence information and facilitate interrogation.

While conducting the search, do not allow the detainees to communicate with one another. Allowing detainees to talk may give them a chance to create and coordinate alibis and to corroborate or concoct stories to frustrate questioning attempts. Obtaining the "untainted" version of a detainee's story allows HUMINT collectors to cross-check each detainee's statement against others. Completing the entries on the three-part DD Form 2745 is one of the most helpful actions a soldier can do to assist the collectors. If capture tags are not available, provide the following information on a separate piece of paper:

- ❑ Date and time of detention.
- ❑ Last name, first name, and middle initial of detainee.
- ❑ Date and place of birth.
- ❑ Home address.
- ❑ Location where detention occurred, including city and grid coordinates.
- ❑ Name and full unit designation of soldier implementing the detention.
- ❑ Reason for detention.

Tag all detainees with Part A of the DD Form 2745. Ensure the tags accompany them, and are available to the soldiers, MPs, or persons who transport them to the detention compound. The MPs or other escorts should obtain this information from the detaining unit before transporting detainees to the intermediate detention facility (IDF).

Search the detainees for weapons, identification documents, and materials on which to record information such as papers, notebooks, planners, or books. Place into plastic bags all items removed from detainees or removed from the vehicle in which detainees were traveling. Tag these bags with the required information from Part C of DD Form 2745. Information listed on this part of the form provides an inventory of the items in the detainees' possession. This part of the capture tag also allows for the initiation of a "chain of custody" of both evidence and personal property. During detainee in-processing at the IDF, MPs will initiate a chain of custody in accordance with **AR 195-5**, **Evidence Procedures**, using DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document. The itemized lists should include serial numbers, colors, makes, models, license plate numbers, quantities of ammunition, lot numbers, money, and any other items found at the scene that may impact on future questioning of detainees.

Notify the battalion S2 of the detentions and forward data from Part B of the DD Form 2745. All CEE and CEDs possessed by detainees require transportation as quickly as possible to the detention facility. HUMINT collectors use CEDs and CEE to assist them in planning and conducting questioning and will pass them on for other exploitation. HUMINT collectors have the opportunity to confront detainees with these items and conduct repeat and control questioning to determine the detainees' cooperation and veracity. Unit S2s should ensure ample DD

(Continued on page 63)

U.S. Army Photo.

Soldiers from the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment hold their ground against Serbian crowds during the Mitrovica Riots, when U.S. Forces reinforced the French Forces assigned to Mitrovica.

MI Tactical HUMINT Team Operations in Kosovo

by Chief Warrant Officer Three Gary G. Barnett

What is a "Tactical HUMINT Team"? The concept of employing counterintelligence (CI) agents and HUMINT Collectors to obtain information from persons in the area of operations (AO) is nothing new. The name "Tactical HUMINT Team" gives a clear indication of the CI and HUMINT Collection teams' missions and capabilities. It also aptly described the concept of using CI and HUMINT Collection for collecting tactical information in the Kosovar environment.

Over the past several years, senior leaders and MI officers have referred to CI and HUMINT Collection teams as force protection teams. The term "force protection team" brought on many taskings as well as questions outside the CI and HUMINT Collection spectrum. We task-organized Tactical HUMINT teams (THTs) in Kosovo to provide the command with answers about persons and organizations in the Multinational Brigade–East (MNB-E) U.S. sector. The THTs collected information that enabled the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) to satisfy the TF Commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

Fielding Teams to Support Task Force Falcon

It was a challenge finding personnel to fill ten THTs and provide coverage in MNB-E. Personnel from five MI battalions and two continents rounded out the eight teams in Kosovo and two in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Eventually, we ran out of CI and HUMINT Collection personnel and began augmenting teams with signals intelligence (SIGINT) and infantry soldiers as well as ground surveillance systems operators. Two teams had a soldier serving in military occupational specialty (MOS) 11B; these infantry soldiers contributed to TF success and provided knowledge of patrol operations, movement, and security techniques. While not the preferred method of fielding a team, the MOS diversity did not hamper the mission. These Tactical HUMINT teams overcame many challenges while conducting their collection operations in a treacherous environment. Soldiers without a HUMINT MOS (97E Human Intelligence Collector) or a Counterintelligence MOS (97B CI agent) on the teams had limits in the scope of support they could provide, but their professionalism enabled them all to contribute their specific talents.

Team Composition

Ideally, we wanted to staff the THTs with CI agents, HUMINT collectors, and civilian linguists. Each THT consisted of either of the following configurations. A warrant officer (351B CI Technician) as a team leader, with a sergeant (97E HUMINT Collection) as the team noncommissioned officer (NCO) or a warrant officer (351E HUMINT Collection Technician) as team leader with a sergent (97B CI Agent) as the team NCO. We also wanted to give the teams a mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) soldiers.

Resourcing teams in this way enabled a broader range of expertise on each team and cross-leveled CI and HUMINT skills. We assigned civilian linguists based on the ethnic composition of the sector their teams patrolled. Building THTs in this way caused resentment among the soldiers at first because soldiers who deployed together did not always stay together as teams. Cross-leveling skills made better use of available personnel and gave each team a skill base on which to build. When teams transitioned, we took an inventory of their experience and cross-leveled to ensure continued mission success.

Transitioning and Preparing New Teams

Once a unit received deployment notification, they began training and honing MOS-specific skills. Most continental United States (CONUS) based units attended a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at their home stations or at Fort Benning, Georgia. Germany-based units attended an MRE at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels. In preparing to rotate six new teams for Kosovo Force Mission 1B (KFOR-1B), we realized we could provide incoming teams with a mission-focused MRE in Macedonia at Camp Able Sentry. TF 101 MI assembled a team of trainers (including officers, warrant officers, and NCOs), developed a task list, and assembled training packets. Transitioning six of the eight teams would be a major personnel turnover, and we wanted to broaden the knowledge base for incoming personnel. To acomplish this, we set up a training area comprised of senior members from the ACE, Operational Management Team (OMT), HUMINT Analysis Team (HAT), and TF 101 MI. Topics included:

- ❑ Briefings and hands-on experience with rules of engagement (ROE).
- ❑ Mission planning.

- ❑ Drivers and convoy operations training.
- ❑ Reporting requirements.
- ❑ HUMINT database.
- ❑ PIR.
- ❑ Collection planning.
- ❑ Detailed overview of the AO and personalities.

Based on the soliders' familiarity with the AO, it was evident that their parent units had prepared them for deployment to this area. The OMT tasked outgoing team leaders to develop a five-day relief-in-place plan to cover details of sector-specific mission requirements. Team leaders ensured that replacement soldiers knew the routes in sector, familiarized them with checkpoints, supported unit locations, points of contact, and Kosovars with whom they interacted. The "right-seat ride" with an experienced counterpart was probably the most important part of the transition. The time on ground gave the new teams the confidence they needed to continue with the collection mission uninterrupted, making the transition transparent to intelligence consumers.

Focusing HUMINT and CI Collection

Early in the initial deployment to Kosovo, the THTs did not have sufficient mission focus. County (*opstinas*) borders provided the basis of the teams' sectors. Teams planned Tactical HUMINT missions early by selecting a village or town the team had never visited or had not been to for several days. Meetings with contacts occurred by chance until the teams developed the security situation and the Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) matured. Other missions were reactions to incidents such as demonstrations and criminal activity. After the ACE developed a collection plan, teams planned missions based on PIR, information requirements (IR), and specific information requirements (SIRs) as they related to their AOs or team sectors. Team leaders briefed their teams on where they were going, sources they would contact, and the IR each source might meet. When the team satisfied the IR, they could disengage and move on to the next requirement or return to base camp for reporting. The collection plan was sufficiently detailed to allow for source selection, or the identification of requirements for source development. Before development of the collection plan, most of the work done by Tactical HUMINT teams was purely "initiative reporting" and the teams had no basis to determine if they had met an IR. The hard work the Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D) Section put into the collection plan gave THTs a tool that team leaders used as a map for intelligence collection. The plan's detail was adequate to drive the HUMINT and CI collection process. Using this intelligence tool, team leaders were not taking their teams and equipment into harm's way without a clear reason. As the teams learned to use the collection plan, teams' collection efforts matured, focus, and reports answered specific questions for ACE analysts and the TF commander.

Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Automated Tool Set (CHATS)

Deployments are "come as you are" situations. The 1st Infantry Division (1ID) received the Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package (TRRIP) in early 1998, and deployed with it to Kosovo. CI and HUMINT Collection teams in each MI battalion direct support (DS) company shared one of these systems. TF 101 MI received CHATS (AN/PYQ-3(V)2) during the summer of 1999, while deployed in Kosovo. A Mobile Training Team (MTT) conducted "train the trainer" sessions on the system, but it was evident that all THT soldiers needed detailed training on the systems, including the automated report formats in the CI/HUMINT utilities software.

The teams frequently sent information via field-produced intelligence reports (FPIRs) using their experience with TRRIP. The HAT received the FPIRs from the teams and posted them to the HUMINT database by

U.S. Army Photo.

A Tactical HUMINT team meets with Serbian villagers.

Lessons Learned

- **Task organizing quickly depletes organic HUMINT and CI assets.**
- **Assign linguists to a team; do not put them in a pool. Linguists are integral to the team. The teams establish confidence in linguists and the linguists establish rapport with contacts.**
- **Establish HUMINT and CI collection requirements early to focus collection.**
- **Home station intelligence preparation for deploying teams ensures a quicker transition; this broadens the base of knowledge concerning the AO.**
- **Detail the "right seat ride" and allow sufficient time to meet all points of contact with supported units, liaison contacts, and sources.**

cutting and pasting the data. CHATS has preformatted messages for both CI and HUMINT reports. The soldiers had experience with TRRIP and the systems in place; since it was working well, there was no push to change everything in the middle of the rotation. The teams rarely used the CI/HUMINT utilities software on CHATS. Lack of operator training and difficulty with the software and hardware in Kosovo's rugged environment were the most significant reasons for avoiding change to the new system.

The amount of data reported to the HAT by the THTs quickly exceeded the storage capability of the CHATS hard drive. The teams could no longer copy databases to the hard drive, so time-consuming queries to the HAT for information became the standard. Operators also experienced frustration with CHATS because the system sometimes locked up; rebooting meant lost data. Having four or five team members sharing one terminal also slowed reporting, which resulted in long days when the THTs returned from their missions and all needed to submit their reports.

Looking to the Future

Representatives of the MI Futures Directorate from the U.S. Army Intelligence Center visited TF 101 MI in Kosovo during KFOR-1B. After mission briefs and discussions on operations and mission requirements, we provided them an after-action review of the CHATS hardware and software.

When asked what we would include if we could design our own automated system for CI and HUMINT, we replied that we wanted a hardened laptop computer with a keyboard that could withstand dust. The notebook computer would slide into a vehicle-docking station located underneath the vehicle's communications equipment mount. The vehicle communications system would not be limited to line-of-sight. Our computer system would connect to a tactical radio and synchronize data with our next higher headquarters whenever the two echelons communicated. This ideal system would also parse information from preformatted reports into the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) Remote Workstation (RWS). A vehicle-mounted video camera, capable of hand held use, would record routes and points of interest and provide a video surveillance capability. Upon returning to base camp, we would remove the notebook and dock it to a workstation. When the system powered up, the notebook would update the database stored on the RWS hard drive.

Most importantly, soldiers who are proficient in HUMINT collection, CI force protection source operations (CFSO), tactical questioning, and Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) investigations will operate and maintain these systems. After all, the THT soldiers' making contact, establishing relationships, and fostering cooperation remains the pinnacle of the Intelligence BOS.

Conclusion

Reflecting on a year of operations and changes, our soldiers accomplished amazing feats while providing the TF Falcon Commander with the majority of his actionable intelligence. Soldiers from the United States and Europe, AC and RC, HUMINT and non-HUMINT MOSs, task-organized into cohesive teams and accomplished the mission. The fact that HUMINT soldiers provide the bulk of intelligence to commanders in peace support operations (PSOs), no matter how reliant we become on technology, was a significant lesson re-learned in KFOR.✹

Endnote

1. Six of our THTs were in Kosovo for approximately ten months.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Gary Barnett is currently the CI Team Leader, B Company, 101st MI Battalion. He served as Chief, OCE, for TF Falcon from March to June 2000. CW3 Barnett holds a Bachelor of Liberal Arts degree from the University of New York Regent's College and is a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy. Readers may contact him via E-mail at barnettg @hq.1id.army.mil and telephonically at 0931-889-7215 or DSN 350-7215/ 7309.

Ground Surveillance Operations: The Nightstalkers of Vitina— Countermortar Operations in Kosovo

by Captain Robert A. Culp, II

Stalking the Night

At approximately 2300 hours on a starlit night in July 1999, a three-man ground surveillance radar (GSR) team observed a named area of interest (NAI) from a remote hilltop in the Vitina *Opstina*, Kosovo, in the Multinational Brigade–East (MNB-E) sector. The team's mission was to observe, monitor, and report on mounted or dismounted movement through the vast cornfields north and east of two small, isolated Serb villages, Vrbovac and Mogila. Their purpose for this monitoring mission was to identify infiltration or exfiltration of an individual known as "the Mad Mortarman" to and from his firing position. The team had performed this mission for approximately one week. The last Mad Mortarman attack was a 60-millimeter mortar strike that impacted eight high-explosive point detonating (HEPD) rounds less than three hundred meters from the Team Apache Command Post (CP), the Infantry Company headquarters supported by the GSR team.

Somewhere in the vast cornfields to their front, the GSR team observed a single muzzle flash in the darkness and a few seconds later they heard the distinct *crrruummp of* mortar fire. The team was unable to observe the mortar round impact, but they heard an explosion to the South, in the Vrbovac vicinity. Immediately following the impact of the first round, the team observed five or six more muzzle flashes emanating from the same location as the first. The team leader shot an azimuth to the muzzle flashes, and performed a quick range estimation based on the flash-to-bang time and terrain association. The team leader called in a SALT (size, activity, location and time) report to the Apache Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The mortar was in the middle of a large cornfield, 1.5 to 2 kilometers from the GSR team's location. The team was unable to observe the individual(s) who fired the mortar but did determine the mortar fire position was within range of the GSR team's MK-19, 40-mm grenade launcher. The rules of engagement (ROE) allowed the team leader to fire on the mortar position at his discretion.

GSR teams from the 101st Military Intelligence Battalion conducted sustained surveillance operations during their first six months in Kosovo, supporting Task Force (TF) Falcon's operations to bring rogue elements, such as the "Mad Mortarman" and snipers, to justice in Cernica. Over time, these operations developed specific task organizations and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that adapted to the evolving operational environment and lessons learned. These demanding missions and the challenging operational environment proved that the non-standard, non-doctrinal methods required to accomplish the collection missions in a military operations other than war (MOOTW) environment demand junior leaders flexible enough to adapt their TTP to the situation and environment. Additionally, they must coordinate their mission requirements with the commanders they support.

Team Apache

The 101st MI Battalion attached two GSR teams (from A Company) to Team Apache, Task Force 1-77 Armor, as part of TF Falcon's countermortar operations. Based around A Company, 1-26 Infantry, and a Bradley fighting vehicle-(BFV) equipped mechanized company attached to TF 1-77 Armor, the Team's task organization included—

- Dismounted infantry platoon from TF 2-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR).
- A 120-mm mortar platoon.
- Two GSR teams.
- Avenger forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) team.
- Medics.
- Maintenance.

TF Falcon supported Team Apache with AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radars and on-call AH-64 attack helicopters.

The initial concept of the operation with Team Apache was to concentrate on two areas where the bulk of mortar activity (firing positions) occurred. The area targeted for collection offered a finite number of places in which the adversary could set up mortars and fire into the suspected target areas (isolated Serb villages). Three weeks of intensive patrolling operations and area saturation were effective in denying the mortarman the ability to operate undetected in the area, forcing him to move into other areas of operation. This change in the mortarman's tactics and operational area forced TF Falcon and the GSR teams of A Company, 101st MI Battalion, to adapt their tactics in an effort to find, fix, and capture or destroy the mortarman.

The Team Apache Commander had collection tasking authority for GSRs, and received SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment) reports directly from the GSR teams via the command net. Team Apache rifle platoons received one GSR team under their tactical control (TACON) for positioning, security, and coordination for life support and sustainment. The commander paired GSR teams with a BFV section during movement to and from the Company's CP to their radar site. Once at the radar site, the GSR team monitored an NAI that the BFV section could not effectively cover. The BFV section located on a separate hilltop within direct fire range of the team and a five- to ten-minute drive from the GSR team's location (see Figure 1).

Another effective technique employed in Team Apache was combining GSR and Avenger teams to monitor the same NAI. The GSR team's moving target indicator (MTI) capability and wide-area NAI coverage (cornfields, etc.), provided initial target detection capability with the ability to cue the Avenger team to observe specific areas with its ground-based FLIR sight. The Avenger can record the images captured in the sight on VHS™-format videotape and accurately engage point or area targets with the .50-caliber machinegun, calibrated to the FLIR.

Steel Tigers

The two GSR teams from A Company, 101st MI Battalion, were under the operational control (OPCON) of TF 1-77 AR, and performed ground surveillance operations in general support (GS) to TF Falcon. The GSRs were to operate in the TF 1-77 AR sector, with TF 1-77 AR tactically employing them in accordance with their assigned collection task. Collection tasking came from TF Falcon, but the GSR teams sent combat information reports directly to the company team CP in their sector. This reporting architecture resulted from the nature of Kosovo's operational environment and the GSRs' capabilities and limitations. Every report (e.g., *"one wheeled vehicle, moving northwest along Route Gold at 10 kilometers per hour, vicinity grid VQ123456"*) required verification by a patrol from the company team responsible for that sector. Reporting this type of combat information to the TF Falcon G2 Operations section would only result in confusion and an inevitable tasking from the TF Falcon headquarters to verify physically the nature of the activity reported by the GSR team.

During this phase of the countermortar operation, collection tasking came from the TF Falcon Analysis and Control Element's (ACE) Collection Management Officer (CMO). The TF Falcon ACE could more easily perform pattern analysis on the mortarman's time, location, methods of attack, and targets than could the S2s. ACE analysts could predict over a wider operational area (which crossed unit boundaries) where the next mortar strike would likely occur. This enabled the CMO to task the GSR teams with the NAIs that provided the greatest likelihood of catching the shooter. This represented a fundamental shift in tactics. The GSR teams were no longer collecting in a small area around known or suspected firing locations. Instead, they were attempting to pick up the mortarman as he infiltrated or exfiltrated to and from his safe haven to his firing location (see Figure 2).

Experience indicated that the GSR team stood a much greater chance of detecting movement inside NAIs placed on likely exfiltration routes. It became clear that the mortar was firing from an isolated location, adjacent to Albanian villages using the "direct-lay" method for employing the mortar. Once he fired the rounds, the mortarman exfiltrated to his safe haven either on foot or by vehicle, depending on the distance from the firing point to the village in which he would hide. This allowed us to focus our limited GSR collection assets on those NAIs most likely to produce *actionable* information. TF 1-77 AR GSR teams began working in pairs because it was easier to coordinate and sustain operations for teams self-sufficient in convoy and position security.



Figure 1. Layout of the GSR team's location.



Figure 2. The GSR team expanded the area covered to possible mortarman infiltration/ exfiltration routes.

Measurement and Signals Intelligence (MASINT) Operations in MOOTW

Unlike GSR operations in a mid- and high-intensity conflict. Stability operations and support operations require the tasking and reporting architecture, nature of command and support relationships, and doctrinal support roles to be flexible. In mid- or high-intensity conflict, a GSR team is normally OPCONed to a maneuver battalion TF. It operates in a direct support (DS) role to confirm or deny an enemy course of action (ECOA), by observing an NAI and reporting on specific orders or requests (SORs) issued by the controlling headquarters. Often, the GSR operates as the primary target observer in a target area of interest (TAI). Stability operations and support operations situations often require a GSR team or section to perform missions ranging from attachment to an infantry company team to general support (GS) for the U.S. Task Force, but under tactical control (TACON) to the maneuver commander in the area of responsibility (AOR). In TF Falcon, the GSR team leaders perform the majority of the coordination for positioning, casualty evacuation, indirect and direct fire support, convoy route clearance, and reporting communications architecture. They coordinated directly with the units they supported. The stability operations and support operations environment usually requires the GSR team to report combat information directly to the maneuver commander, who has the authority to maneuver assets to confirm or deny the information collected (as it did in Kosovo). Experiences in Kosovo showed these unconventional, non-doctrinal missions and roles will require junior leaders capable of operating within the commander's intent and coordinating the details of their mission on the ground with the units that they will work with and support.

Measures of Success

TF Falcon conducted successful operations to identify, locate, and eliminate the Mad Mortarman. Although we never captured or killed the individual, we forced him to stop his efforts to attack, isolate, and intimidate Serb villages in Vitina *Opstina*.

The concentrated efforts of TF Falcon to protect the Serb population from this form of terrorism were very visible to the Serb population. Mortar attacks have all but ceased and the Serb villages re-

Photo courtesy of the Author.

Depicts Mobile Interegrated Tactical Terminal, TROJAN SPIRIT II, and National Intellegence Communications Support Team comunications equipment with commercial Direct Support System dish during the early days of the deployment.

main occupied by Serb families. Most importantly, there were no U.S. casualties during the countermortar operations.

Stalking the Night

Although the Mad Mortarmen's attack penetrated the roof of a Serb house with one round that landed within 400 meters of the Team Apache CP, the Nightstalkers did not fire on the mortar firing position due to limited visibility. The GSR team leader was unable to verify that there were no civilians (that could be injured by MK-19 fire) in vicinity of the firing position. Fortunately, during this attack, no one was hurt. The Mad Mortarmen shifted their area of operations to the north one week later. They fired on the Serb Orthodox Church courtyard in Klokot, located less than 200 meters from a Task Force Falcon permanent Observation Post and Traffic Control Point. One female Serb teenager was killed and two other Serb civilians were severely injured.✹

Commissioned at New Mexico Military Institute, Roswell, New Mexico, Captain Robert Culp served as an Infantry officer in the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Following the MI Officer Transition and Advanced Courses, he served in a variety of positions in the G2, Division ACE, and S2 for TF 1-26 IN in Bosnia with 1ID. He commanded A Company, 101st MI Battalion, the GS MI Company, for TF Falcon in Kosovo. CPT Culp is currently assigned as TF S2 Observer/Controller at Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at Robert.Culp@polk.army.mil (work) or culpra@earthlink.net (home) or telephonically at (337) 531-0162 and DSN (312) 863-0162.

Ground Surveillance Systems Operations in Kosovo

by Captain Frank F. Tank

As the transition from Kosovo Force-(KFOR) 1A to KFOR-1B took place, the task organization of ground surveillance radar (GSR) teams in Task Force (TF) 101 MI remained the same. Two GSR teams from Camp Monteith and two from Camp Bondsteel supported TF 101 MI. All KFOR-1B units remained in the same location, serving the same missions as did their KFOR-1A counterparts. TF 101 MI maintained itself as the headquarters for all GSR operations in TF Falcon. At the end of the first month of KFOR-1B operations, mission analysis dictated that we conduct all 96R (Ground Surveillance System Operator) operations from Camp Monteith. This consolidation moved all GSR operations to C Company, 101st MI Battalion. C Company served in a general support (GS) role to the two maneuver TFs deployed to Camp Monteith: TF 2-2 IN (Infantry) and TF 1-63 AR (Armor). C Company provided all four of its GSR teams in direct support (DS) of TF 2-2 IN, which controlled a significant portion of the Serbia–Kosovo Provincial Boundary and the area harassed by the "Mad Mortarman."

Stopping the Mad Mortarman

During KFOR-1B, the TF 101 MI GSR teams continued the countermortar operations begun by their predecessors in KFOR-1A. TF 2-2 IN measurably improved the effectiveness of the countermortar operations tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) employed in KFOR-1A units. This section provides a short overview of TF 2-2 IN's successful countermortar operation and the role of the GSR team.

TF 2-2 IN refined its countermortar operations as practiced during their Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany. The TF S2, conducting pattern analysis, produced collection requirements for all available assets including the GSR teams. A countermortar operation stood up during each period that indicated an increased chance of mortar activity. The operation focused on potential mortar and likely kills locations. Using all available assets, the TF 2-2 IN S2 produced viable named areas of interest (NAIs) for all reconnaissance and surveillance elements in addition to integrating the TTP of the previous unit whose NAIs focused on firing locations and infiltration and exfiltration routes. TF 2-2 IN tasked subordinate units to conduct the mission either covertly or overtly. For the purpose of these countermortar missions, "overt" units moved about their locations with service driving lights and generally made their presence known. "Covert" units moved into and out of collection positions without detection. The combination of overt and covert elements left the general populace and potential attackers unable to determine when there were extra forces collecting information on the battlefield.

All TF 101 MI GSR teams were equipped with either the AN/PPS-5B or AN/PPS-15 radar sets. The majority of the radar missions in support of the countermortar operation used the AN/PPS-5B and an M1114 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV)

mounted with a .50-caliber machine gun. The GSR teams worked overtly in support of TF 2-2 IN in an environment of unexploded ordnance and undetected minefields. The presence of GSR teams served as a deterrent to any force that sought to disrupt the uneasy peace between Kosovar Serbs and Albanians. Team leaders reported in a manner similar to the method used during KFOR-1A, where combat information went directly to the platoon or company command post (CP) rather than the TF headquarters. The teams set up where they could acquire targets in probable areas of infiltration or exfiltration. Weather conditions such as heavy winter fog allowed the GSR teams to maximize their capabilities by allowing them to move undetected.

The countermortar operations within the TF 2-2 IN sector proved extremely successful. After the initial countermortar operation in December 1999, mortar activity within the RAMROD sector ceased. The ability to focus all available combat power deterred mortar activity and allowed for peaceful resettlement within the TF 2-2 IN sector.

Transition to REMBASS Operations

As a mechanized infantry divisional MI battalion, the 101st MI battalion was not equipped with any Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) or Improved Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (I-REMBASS) equipment. Although the 96Rs have REMBASS tasks listed in their respective Soldier Training Publications (STPs), we had none of this equipment to use during our MRE. DS companies do not use REMBASS at the CMTC. There was no REMBASS equipment in KFOR when the four GSR teams consolidated at Camp Monteith in January 2000. It was a similar situation to the experience of the 101st MI Battalion when entering Bosnia-Herzegovina. GSR teams in the DS Company trained primarily on the PPS-5 and PPS-15 radar sets, but would soon be using REMBASS to assist in keeping the uneasy peace.

KFOR MI leaders recognized the requirements for REMBASS systems and sent the request for validation from TF 101 MI through U.S. Army–Europe to the U.S. Army Communications–Electronic Command (CECOM) and Department of the Army in May 1999. We received our initial outlay of approximately 30 sensor systems from TF Eagle in Bosnia-Herzegovina in mid-March 2000. Subsequently, we received REMBASS sensors, programmers, and monitors in a piecemeal fashion from CECOM and Special Operations Forces (SOF) units in the continental United States. Training the soldiers and teams in the midst of an operational deployment proved a great challenge.

Immediately, TF 101 MI brought almost all 96Rs remaining at our home base in Wuerzburg, Germany, to support REMBASS operations in Kosovo. Requirements from TF Falcon dictated that TF 101 MI maintain the four GSR teams and field two REMBASS teams. Soldiers that deployed with KFOR-1A volunteered for a second deployment in order to work with this equipment not normally used by the 96R soldiers stationed in Europe. (These volunteers greatly assisted in bringing experience not only in REMBASS operations but also in GSR missions).

Boundary Operations

The TF Falcon G2 and Collection Management Officer selected initial NAIs for REMBASS operations during the weekly TF Falcon targeting meetings. The TF Falcon Commander approved the NAIs with the task and purpose of providing early warning of boundary incursions. Likely cross-boundary movement that concerned TF Falcon included the smuggling of weapons and equipment by Kosovar Albanians or incursions from Serbian patrols. The rugged terrain of the Kosovar–Serbian boundary served as the backdrop to several REMBASS operations.

The TF 2-2 IN S2, GS MI Company Commander, and the local maneuver Commander conducted a refinement of the NAIs. Now task-organized into two five-soldier REMBASS teams, the 96Rs of TF 101 MI conducted planning in conjunction with the local maneuver reconnaissance, TF 101 MI briefed the TF S2 and S3 and TF Falcon G2 and G3 on the emplacement, monitoring, and reporting of each REMBASS string. We conducted each string emplacement, battery change, and reconnaissance as a deliberate operation, ensuring that the REMBASS teams had adequate security, quick-reaction forces, and communications.

Monitoring

We co-located the REMBASS monitoring team at the company command post (CP). The REMBASS monitoring team consisted of three soldiers—a 96R20 and two 96R10s. The 96R20 was on call as the situation dictated while the two 96R10s maintained 12-hour shifts. Rotation of the monitoring team into GSR missions ensured an attentive operator.

Initially, the monitoring site used an AN/PSQ-7 Monitor/Programmer until the Sensor Monitoring Set (SMS) replaced it. Visual displays for the monitor included a 1:50,000 map, REMBASS overlay, and digital imagery products from the TF Falcon terrain team sketch maps and digital pictures of all emplacement locations. As we developed the NAIs, a special 1:25,000 map displayed all the NAIs and the deployed REMBASS. The TF S2 and GS Company Commander deter-

mined the reporting chain for the REMBASS monitoring team. Reporting REMBASS acquisitions went concurrently through the TF Battle Captain and the Analysis and Control Team (ACT) with SALTS-T (size, activity, location time type sensor) reports. The TF Battle Captain determined if any possible friendly elements were in the sector and started the response cycle of placing "eyes on" the NAI. The ACT informed the TF 101 MI tactical operations center (TOC) and TF Falcon G2 to ensure that if needed, TF Falcon assets would be available to react to boundary activities.

After receiving the SMS and additional PSQ-7s, we had ample systems to use in other areas within TF 2-2 IN. With hands-on training conducted by the 96Rs, we established two forward monitoring locations at remote company CPs. The CP personnel now had immediate knowledge of the acquisition of possible enemy personnel within their sector and the ability to move about their area of responsibility (AOR) with the monitor. The use of forward-emplaced PSQ-7s greatly enhanced the force protection and reaction time for the maneuver units.

The Coyote Comes to KFOR

A review of ground surveillance operations in KFOR-1B would not be complete without mention of the Coyote system. An acclaimed surveillance system— the Coyote— arrived with the Royal Canadian Dragoon Reconnaissance Troop from Petawawa, Ontario, during the KFOR-1B rotation. Attached to TF 2-2 IN, the Coyote monitored insurgent activities along and across the Kosovo—Serbia boundary and the region adjacent to the Presevo Valley. The Coyote proved to be a valuable asset for TF Falcon during the build up of an insurgent Kosovar-Albanian force known as theUCPMB and Serbian response.

- Train all 96Rs on REMBASS operations—all peace support operations (PSOs) need and use them.
- Imbed GSR training into habitually supported units early to prepare the units for future operations.
- Develop a standing operating procedures (SOP) headquarters to quickly accept and integrate non-organic modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) MI equipment.

Figure 1. Lessons Learned on Ground Surveillance Operations in Kosovo.

Mounted on a Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) chassis, the Coyote provided a thermal-imaging capability, radar, laser rangefinder, and a daylight television camera to monitor elements across the boundary. The surveillance equipment, mounted on a mast that extends above the LAV, raises ten meters from the ground. Its GSR can range some targets more than 12 kilometers (km) away. The daylight camera ranges targets up to 20 km and the thermal-imaging device provides passive observation during reduced visibility. Scouts are able to dismount all of the surveillance equipment from the vehicle for use in an observation post or for training. Dismounts can emplace the system more than 100 meters from the vehicle to reduce its signature. The system can record all images it produces on an internal VHS recorder.

The Coyote proved to be a remarkable ground surveillance system for TF 2-2 IN and TF Falcon. The ability of the Canadian forces to provide quality and "hard copy" surveillance from a well-protected system impressed most U.S. intelligence personnel. Additionally, it reminded us that intelligence operators need to remain familiar with what multinational intelligence units bring to the fight.

Mission Complete

The 1st Infantry Division (1ID) Commander, Major General John Abizaid, commented, "*There is no one in this Division more important than the soldier on patrol in Kosovo in the middle of the night.*" The 96R in TF 101 MI was often that soldier. Although Kosovo is a human intelligence-(HUMINT) rich environment, the measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) soldier operating as a GSR team leader or REMBASS team leader, often found himself with his team "on the front line" during countermortar or boundary operations. We must not underestimate the difficulty of operating in an unfamiliar, nonsecure environment laden with mines. The 96Rs in TF 101 MI were continuously, and truly, called upon to be the most forward "Eyes of the Falcon."✹

Commissioned as a Second Lieutenant through the Reserve Officer Training Corps at the University of North Dakota, as an Armor officer, Captain Frank Tank's first duty assignment was as a M1IP Tank Platoon Leader in 1-72 AR, in Camp Casey, Korea, He served as a M1A1 Tank Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer, and Batallion S4 in 1-40 AR at Fort Hunter Liggett, California. CPT Tank then transitioned to Military Intelligence, serving as the S2, 1st Infantry Division Artillery in Bamberg, Germany. His most recent assignment was as S4,and then as Company Commander, 101st MI Battalion. CPT Tank is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leader Course, Battalion Maintenance Officer Course, and the Military Intelligence Officer Transition and Advanced Courses. He earned a Bachelor of science degree in Psychology from the University of North Dakota. Readers can contact CPT Tank via E-mail at frank.tank@mn.ngb.army.mil or by telephone at (651) 282-4031 or DSN 825-4031.

Electronic Warfare Operations in Kosovo

by First Sergeant
David Redmon

A lone C-17 lifted off from Ramstein Air Base, Germany, in early October 1999 and turned southeast toward Camp Able Sentry, Macedonia. It was the first time that the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) had deployed its general support (GS) electronic warfare (EW) assets since Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Concept

The initial plan comprised four phases. Phase One called for the forward deployment of systems and cadre to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. The EW Company, D Company, 101st MI Battalion sent a force package of two AN/TRQ-32(V)2s (TEAMMATEs), two AN/TLQ-17As (TRAFFICJAMs), two AN/PRD-13s, and two AN/TSQ-175s with a cadre of eight Electronic Warfare Voice Interceptors (98Gs). Upon arrival, this squad performed system shakeouts and initiated limited signal surveys in the Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E) sector, as well as low-level voice intercept (LLVI) missions from the A Company, 3/504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) headquarters in the troubled city of Vitina.

"Team Dominator" initiated Phase Two shortly after the start of the new year. A "call forward" team of twelve 98Gs joined the existing cadre and completed a three-week training program consisting of convoy operations, site selection, and target briefings.

The plan for Phase Three was to conduct a validation of D Company's assets intended for use in collection in support of a high-intensity conflict. The validation plan in Figure 1 outlines the collective tasks assessed during this phase.

We never executed this phase and the final phase of redeployment of the "call forward" team to the Central Region. Intelligence gaps and the demonstrated capabilities during the first two phases forced a decision to leave the team in place and start LLVI operations throughout the sector.

Environment and Challenges

The operational architecture adopted after the decision to keep organic signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems in the MNB-E sector was at first doctrinal in its employment. Placement of the TRQ-32s and TSQ-17s ensured

Task Force 101 Military Intelligence (MI) Staff

- ❑ Prepare the logistics plan
- ❑ Develop the Battalion communications plan
- ❑ Manage intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets

Company Tactical Operations Center

- ❑ Execute GS MI company operations
- ❑ Perform limited analysis of reported information

IEW Platoon Operations

- ❑ Execute collection and jamming platoon operations
- ❑ Establish an electronic warfare support or electronic attack site
- ❑ Conduct voice communications intercept or radio direction finding using the AN/TRQ-32A(V)2



TEAMMATE

- ❑ Conduct voice communication intercept or RDF using AN/PRD-13
- ❑ Conduct high frequency (HF) or very high frequency (VHF) electronic attack (EA) operations using AN/TLQ-17A(V)3 TRAFFICJAM
- ❑ Monitor squad operational status

Security

- ❑ Implement information security procedures
- ❑ Prepare for communications security procedures

Figure 1. Validation Plan Training and Evaluation Outlines.

All Photos courtesy of LTC John Rovegno.

An EW site the first time artillery fired in direct support of intelligence collection, (8 February 2000).

Net Radio Protocol (NRP) connectivity with the Communication and Control Set (CCS) in the Analysis and Control Element (ACE).

SIGINT analysts (98Cs) were not included in the initial call-forward plan, nor was the ACE Technical Control and Processing Cell robust enough for this additional collection. D Company subsequently deployed 98Cs from the company tactical operations center (TOC) to conduct front-line communications analysis and asset tracking. These additional soldiers rounded out the end-state SIGINT platoon for Task Force (TF) Falcon.

Certain challenges to the first several collection missions forced adaptations to the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by the Electronic Warfare Platoon. These included lack of technical data, lack of organic Serbian-language linguists, equipment size, and the terrain.

The lack of available technical data created the need for a signal survey in each regional area of the country and dynamic retasking and database management. A general search followed by more directed taskings became the norm.

The Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Company's modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) contains only Russian and Arabic linguists; we were fortunate that three individuals had received Serbian language training at the Foreign Language Technical Center–Europe. This lack of organic military linguists resulted in the use of Category II civilian linguists under a civilian contract. Use of these linguists required reworking of collection and transcription methodology since they had no specific knowledge of system operations nor an ability to determine crucial intelligence indicators. Clearance levels of Category II linguists reduced the volume of technical data we could provide to the collection site, thus reducing sensor capabilities.

The organic company equipment did not meet the requirement for smaller and less recognizable element footprints throughout the sector. As a result, TF Falcon received commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware to allow the EW platoon to operate within this new requirement. This commercial hardware increased their capabilities while maintaining the smallest operational profile possible.

The greatest problem with rapid fielding of a SIGINT effort came in the terrain of Kosovo. Organic retransmission capability and Signal Corps support was never part of the

The first tactical SIGINT mission in Kosovo.

original design. To keep force protection requirements at a minimum, collection sites were colocated with friendly units and not always in the optimum locations for collection and direction finding (DF). Urban missions made line of sight nearly impossible. Careful placement of teams as relays to Camp Bondsteel enabled NRP and FM voice communications at the Company TOC. This dedicated systems for relay and security instead of collection.

Types of Missions

The missions tasked during the rotation were one of three types: urban, traditional hilltop collection, or special purpose. Of the urban collection missions, the most successful force protection mission occurred in Kosovska Mitrovica. The EW Platoon deployed north into the French Sector to provide direct support (DS) collection in support of the 3/504th PIR and the 18th Air Assault Battalion (Polish). An Analysis and Control Team (ACT) in DS to the maneuver commander accomplished all tasking and reporting. This mechanism ensured the rapid dissemination of intelligence to the Battalion S2s.

EW site near the Serbian border.

The most successful SIGINT collection occurred while operating in a more traditional hilltop collection role. IEW Company soldiers were able to use HIC TTP to provide analysts with the predictive intelligence in high demand. In addition, collection management within TF Falcon had more clearly defined this type of mission. All missions had the added benefit of providing additional information about the signals environment to consumers and analysts at all levels.

EW site near Vitina, Kosovo.

A first achieved by the task force was artillery firing in DS of SIGINT collection. Elements of 1-6 Field Artillery fired numerous illumination missions during the rotation; designed as a show of force for MNB-E, these were special-purpose Bright Sky missions. TF 101 MI took advantage of this capability by planning and executing illumination missions in areas where we needed clarification on critical intelligence questions throughout the MNB-E sector.

Crews and Operations

As we developed new TTP, the squad became the focal point for EW operations. Teams of four to six soldiers under the direction of a Staff Sergeant organized to form four LLVI teams. The company tasked the Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant for execution of all logistical and communications support. Whenever possible, external security elements from the supported unit provided the additional personnel necessary for site operations. The LLVI teams maintained a lower profile in areas in which the enemy had the results of our efforts.

Future EW Operations in Kosovo

The dynamic signals environment in Kosovo provides a unique set of challenges for SIGINT collection operations. Designed to provide combat intelligence to the tactical commander in a high-intenisty conflict environment, the GS MI Company must adapt to meet the changing mission parameters (see Figure 2).

The age-old discussion of the need for tactical SIGINT operations is apparent when analyzing TF Falcon intelligence operations. The focus of echelons above corps (EAC) intelligence organizations, and rightfully so, is still too broad in scope to satisfy the tactical commander's need for time-sensitive, combat intelligence and intelligence vital to making immediate force protection decisions. LLVI teams with equipment capable of collecting against a wide-range of enemy communications systems still offer the greatest potential for success. To operate against an enemy cognizant of our efforts to collect information, tactical LLVI teams must operate covertly (or less overtly) and with systems that are smaller and highly mobile.

Determination of collection and asset management strategies for the Kosovo problem must include continued development of the target set and regional focus must remain the standard for collection. The diverse ethnic composition and disbursement within the MNB-E sector make expert knowledge of numerous areas difficult. To ensure the highest degree of predictive analysis, the LLVI team employment must concentrate on allowing the collector-linguist team members to gain familiarity with their specific targets. It is impossible to know what is out of the ordinary when one cannot ascertain what normal looks like. Creation of half a dozen "collection zones" would lead to greater satisfaction of the commander's priority intelligence requirements and more focused operations.

- **Adapt doctrine to accomplish the mission.**
- **COTS items are force multipliers.**
- **Conduct periodic signal surveys—the environment changes.**
- **Native speaking interpreters greatly increase capabilities.**

Figure 2. Lessons Learned about EW Operations in Kosovo.

Deliberate intelligence architectures and increased support from the signal community must be part of the initial design for any operation in Kosovo. Only with clearly defined mission parameters and theater SIGINT support can we maintain the MI motto, "Always Out Front."

Endnote

1. A TRQ-32 equipped with additional scanners near Presevo, Serbia.

First Sergeant Dave Redmon has served as First Sergeant for D Company, 101st MI Battalion, since September 1999; he deployed to Kosovo with three Field HUMINT Teams, one Mobile Interrogation Team, the Task Force Falcon ACE, two ACTs, and the Battalion headquarters element. He previously served as a Technical Control and Analysis Center Noncommissioned Officer, 501st MI Battalion, 1st Armored Division; Training NCO and Platoon Sergeant at the U.S. Army Field Station-Key West; Division Officer at the Naval Security Group–Key West; V Corps ACE Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE) NCO in Charge and SYSCON, A Company, 302d Military Intelligence Battalion; NCOIC, Battle Technology Lab, Battle Command Battle Lab-Huachuca; NCOIC, Modeling and Simulations, Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. He participated in the Task Force XXI and Division XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), III Corps Warfighter Exercise, the Rapid Force Projection Initiative and KFOR Rotation-1B.

U.S. Army Photo.

An electronic warfare site at dusk.

Building the ACE in Kosovo

by Major Donald K. Wood and Major Joan B. Mercier

When the 1st Infantry Division rolled into Kosovo in June 1999, as part of Kosovo Force (KFOR), the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) of the 101st Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion was there to provide nearly instantaneous intelligence support to Task Force (TF) Falcon. As the ACE set up in the austere environment, it began the arduous task of providing timely and accurate intelligence to the Commander, U.S. KFOR. This article explores how the TF Falcon ACE adapted doctrine in organizing for its unique mission and what lessons we learned.

The Mission of the ACE

Doctrinally, the mission of the ACE is to perform collection management, produce all-source intelligence (ASI), provide intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) technical control, and disseminate intelligence and targeting data. The ACE supports the commander in executing battle command and planning future missions in the range of military operations.

ACE Organization

The TF Falcon ACE varied somewhat from doctrinal organization. It consisted of a—

- Headquarters element .
- Collection management and dissemination (CM&D) section.
- ASI section .
- Technical control and processing (TC&P) section, with a separate HUMINT (human intelligence) analysis cell (HAC)[1]
- National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).

Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D). The CM&D section was a multifaceted section, handling a myriad of tasks and managing more than 53 moving pieces throughout the sector. Their missions were collection requirements, requesting or tasking collection agencies for required information, and disseminating intelligence. Additionally, CM&D developed priority intelligence requirements (PIR), prepared collection plans, supported targeting, managed requests for information (RFIs), and coordinated with other intelligence elements.

CM&D had twelve members from various doctrinal and non-doctrinal intelligence military occupational specialties (MOSs), primarily 98G (Cryptologic Linguist) and 98C (Signals Intelligence [SIGINT] Analyst). During KFOR-1B, civilian analysts brought in by a contracted organization provided invaluable intelligence support to the section (96B is the military occupational specialty [MOS] for an Intelligence Analyst). They became the continuity between KFOR-1B and KFOR-2A.

The greatest challenge for the section was managing the collection plan and disseminating the PIR, specific information requirements (SIR), and specific orders and requests (SOR) to varied collectors to answer. The S2s did a great job of passing the PIR to the soldiers and developing the answers for the commander. The challenge came with SIGINT, imagery intelligence (IMINT), and the many other HUMINT assets such as psychological operations (PSYOP), Civil Affairs (CA), and Special Operations elements. The initial collection plan was more than 60 pages and very hard to follow. We refined it to 35 pages by the end of KFOR-1B, but it was still difficult to manage on a day-to-day basis. Consequently, many units did not use it as they should have.

The Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) was the primary means for intelligence dissemination. The ACE posted all products on the TF Falcon homepage so units could pull their own information off the Internet. For time-sensitive information, we contacted the units immediately.

All-Source Intelligence (ASI). The ASI section had one of the most challenging intelligence missions in

Photo by LTC John Rovegno.

Falcon ACE, Camp Bondsteel, June 1999.

Photo by Captain Robert A. Culp, II

View of the Task Force Falcon NIST area inside the TFF ACE SCIF, July 1999.

TF Falcon. It was the nexus for all information and intelligence flowing into the TF. The missions of the ASI section were multifold:

- Assimilate, analyze, and database all relevant information and intelligence.
- Produce two daily intelligence summaries (text and graphic).
- Prepare daily and weekly intelligence briefings for the Commanding General, TF Falcon.
- Provide input to the collection and target nomination cycles.
- Write special assessments and conduct long-term analysis.
- Conduct liaison with the NIST, KFOR, the Joint Analysis Center (JAC), 66th MI Group, V Corps, and the national intelligence agencies to build a common understanding.

As part of these tasks, the ASI section monitored and analyzed the movement of Yugoslavian Army (VJ) forces garrisoned less than ten kilometers from the Kosovo boundary. They also tracked the activities of insurgent groups active along the boundary between the Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E) sector and the Presevo Valley region of Serbia, as well as the political and ethnic situations in Macedonia.

Managing the volume of information and intelligence entering the ACE was the greatest challenge for the ASI section. On an average day, ASI section analysts reviewed approximately 300 messages and products from national, theater, and local sources. To manage this information, we divided the analysts into teams focused on specific districts (*opstinas*) within MNB-E. The teams were responsible for analysis of events in those areas. We required that they visit those *opstinas* periodically to talk to the commanders, S2s, and soldiers responsible for that sector. This practice enhanced their awareness of the geography, culture, and political considerations within their *opstina*.

The analysts conducted the majority of their research using the ASI database, SIPRNET resources, and local historical files. The ASI section also made extensive use of the SIPRNET Automated Message Handling System (AMHS), both to conduct research and to receive the bulk of the daily message traffic from national and theater sources.

The section developed a relational database using Microsoft (MS) Access™, which greatly enhanced the section's ability to query and export data into other products. The relative ease of using this database, the ability to export data to share with other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, and its adaptability made MS Access™ the ideal tool for the multinational, nonlinear environment of Kosovo. By the end of KFOR-1B, the database consisted of approximately ten thousand events, and we used the database in tandem with the Krypton[2] database as a powerful analytical tool.

Technical Control and Processing (TC&P). The TC&P section did a great job in managing all of the separate intelligence disciplines in the ACE. Some of the particular lessons we learned dealt with HUMINT and IMINT.

During KFOR Mission 1A (June–December 1999), the infrastructure of Kosovo was almost nonexistent, and HUMINT was our primary intelligence collection method. Trained linguists and HUMINT collectors well versed in casual source operations were critical. The information they gained allowed the ACE to quickly identify important individuals and groups in the sector and to determine with whom they associated throughout Kosovo. Trained analysts who could interpret the information were essential to the success of the intelligence mission. These HUMINT products were used daily not only by the Commander, U.S. KFOR, but also by the KFOR staff and other intelligence agencies throughout Kosovo.

IMINT was critical in the initial phase and for planning operations. The destruction of the local infra-

structure created challenges for TF Falcon planners. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) Customer Support Response Team (CSRT) produced imagery that provided commanders and planners with timely, accurate information for planning operations. Those products enabled the commanders and planners at all levels to visualize the terrain. The lesson is clear: never deploy without a NIMA CSRT.

National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). The mission of the NIST was to provide a tailored, national-level, all-source intelligence team to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations and to support the TF commander, under the staff supervision of the G2 ACE. Composed of representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and NIMA, the NIST performed the following functions:

- ❑ Provided reach-back to national agencies.
- ❑ Expedited time sensitive RFI.
- ❑ Coordinated indications and warnings (I&W) support.
- ❑ Coordinated special assessments.
- ❑ Provided video teleconferencing (VTC) and E-mail support for analyst-to-analyst deconfliction of reporting.
- ❑ Provided immediate access to national databases.
- ❑ Coordinated imagery support.
- ❑ Coordinated targeting and battle damage assessment (BDA) support.

The NIST provided invaluable support. The key to success for the NIST and the ACE in Kosovo was a cohesive group of professionals who worked as a team to answer the commander's questions. We found that the best technique was to hold periodic meetings to determine who had access to the best resources to answer PIR and then to divide and conquer.

ACE Support to the TF Falcon Targeting Process

From the Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS), the important

Lessons Learned

- ✹ Train on basic analysis skills thoroughly before deployment. Analysts must be proficient in time-event and pattern analysis, creating link and association matrices, and producing event overlays. Automation cannot replicate these tasks. Senior analysts must also be sufficiently comfortable with these tasks to adapt them to a nontraditional intelligence environment.
- ✹ Writing and basic automation skills are essential for all analysts. All analysts, regardless of rank, must be capable of producing intelligent, structured, and grammatically correct products requiring little editing. They must also be capable of adeptly using common programs, such as MS PowerPoint, MS Word, MS Excel, and MS Access. Train on these skills aggressively in garrison before deployment.
- ✹ Analysts must get out into the environment. They must understand the complexity and the dynamics of the peacekeeping environment.
- ✹ All-source intelligence fusion is very difficult but necessary. KFOR-1A and -1B proved that fusion can work in a environment as challenging as Kosovo. With the many sources of potential intelligence in the TF Falcon sector, it was imperative that someone collect all the information and then collate and package it into a usable product.
- ✹ The Hunter UAV proved itself again and validated the need for an airborne platform capable of providing real-time imagery to the commander and flexible enough for dynamic retasking. The Hunter UAV was extremely useful during KFOR-1A in developing the situation throughout the sector and as an effective tool in assisting in riot control. Along with the TS II, the commander wanted the Hunter UAVs fully mission capable at all times.
- ✹ The NIST gave the commander timely reach-back capability. The most important idea in using the NIST effectively in Kosovo was to understand its capabilities and exploit them to free up other assets.
- ✹ The ACE web page was a massive time saver. It provided situational awareness to users worldwide on a daily basis.
- ✹ The 66th MI Group provided a liaison officer (LNO), a 350B warrant officer (All-Source Intelligence Technician), to work in the TF Falcon ACE. The LNO's mission was to represent 66th MI Group at TF Falcon, coordinate 66th MI Group support to the TF, and to assist in intelligence analysis and production. The 66th MI Group sent its best and brightest soldiers to assist the TF. They proved invaluable by answering difficult and time-consuming RFIs. Having the LNO in the ACE simplified communications with the theater ACE. This made coordination for changing support requirements easier.

players in support of targeting and target development were the TF G2 Operations Officer, the ACE Collection Management Officer, the Field Artillery Intelligence Officer (FAIO), and the ACE Targeting Officer.

The targeting team also included the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), PSYOP, and CA. Supported by the ACE target nomination team, they worked with other ACE sections and staff elements of the command to support the targeting process. Interaction of the ACE with the fire support cell was essential to effective IEW support to targeting for both lethal and non-lethal fires.

TF Falcon was unique in that we focused our targeting on information operations (IO), not traditional targeting. Using HUMINT as our primary collector, the targeting cell largely focused on which messages to broadcast (tolerance, mine awareness, compliance with *United Nations* (*UN*) *Resolution 1177* and the *Military Technical Agreement*) and then determined the campaign's effectiveness.

The FAIO provided the critical link between the ACE and the fire support cell. He provided the ACE with a detailed understanding of the targeting process, attack system information requirements, and target acquisition system capabilities. The FAIO worked with the ACE to develop an intelligence collection plan that supported targeting and BDA-related PIR. During all operations, the FAIO helped the ACE identify and nominate potential targets to the fire support cell.

Identifying and tracking HUMINT targets was one of the most challenging aspects of the targeting process. When we consider targeting, we think in terms of lethal and non-lethal fires. In Kosovo, the majority of the time, we were targeting for collection: identifying the individuals who could provide us information, targeting them with collection assets, and gathering the critical information to assist in answering the commander's PIR.

Communications and Analytical Tools

The backbone of the intelligence architecture supporting TF Falcon proved to be the Trojan Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal II (Trojan SPIRIT II). The Trojan SPIRIT II (TS II) deployed with the initial-entry force of the 101st MI Battalion and was operational within hours of arriving, providing Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) connectivity to the ACE. It also provided SIPRNET connectivity to the ACE and the TF tactical operations center (TOC). The TS II later provided connectivity for the JWICS Mobile Integrated Communications System (JMICS). This provided the additional capability of sensitive compartmented information (SCI), VTC, and secure voice communications. The TS II remains the backbone for these capabilities today.

The Analyst Notebook software, commercial software designed for use by the law enforcement and intelligence communities to develop links between people, places, and events, proved to very helpful to our analysts. We used Analyst Notebook in conjunction with the Krypton database to aid the HAC in developing and understanding the infrastructure and the competing organizations throughout Kosovo.

The Hunter unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was extremely useful during KFOR-1A in developing the situation throughout the sector. It was used effectively to assist in riot control by feeding reports of potential riots into the ACE, allowing the collection manager to investigate these towns as necessary.

Conclusion

The KFOR mission has proven to be both unique and dynamic. The Task Force Falcon ACE provides the Army with a living laboratory to develop new doctrine on how best to provide intelligence support to the commander in an unknown environment. The Army will continue to refine and re-examine the lessons learned during KFOR operations for years to come. If there is one lesson that must stand out before all others, it is this: never be afraid to try something new.✹

Endnotes

1. An article by Chief Warrant Officer Two Timothy Larson and Warrant Officer One Cynthia Beard, "HUMINT Analysis in Kosovo," will appear in a future issue of the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin***. It discusses the HUMINT analysis cell in depth.

2. Krypton is a relational, event-driven targeting database that aids in finding the links from events to people, places, things, towns, and groups.

Major Donald K. Wood is the 1st Infantry Division ACE Chief in Würzburg, Germany. From July through December 1999, he served as the ACE Chief for Task Force Falcon during KFOR-1A, in Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. He has had assignments in Fort Hood; Baumholder, Germany; Fort Devens; and the National Training Center. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Texas Tech University. Readers can reach him via E-mail at woodk@hq.1id.army.mil.

Major Joan Mercier is the Executive Officer of the 101st MI Battallion, 1st Infantry Division in Würzburg, Germany. She served as the ACE Chief for Task Force Falcon during KFOR-1B in Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. She has had two tours in Germany and assignments in Korea; Fort Lewis, Washington; and California. MAJ Mercier commanded A/502d MI Battalion at Fort Lewis. She holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Resource Management from Slippery Rock University and is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College. Readers can reach her via E-mail at mercierj@hq.1id.army.mil.

G2 Operations in Peace Operations

by Captain Gregory P. Lisi

The Brigade S2 for the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Infantry Division, had the unique challenge of having to transition a brigade S2 shop into the G2 operations section for Task Force (TF) Falcon, Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E), in Kosovo. While we had the lessons learned from our Bosnia-Herzegovina support, establishing intelligence operations in Kosovo provided its own unique challenges. The TF Falcon G2 operations section was just one piece of the intelligence family that took on a new form.

Mission

The G2 operations section mission was not significantly different from a typical brigade S2 shop. The section's roles and players evolved over time as the MNB-E headquarters took form. In the end, our mission was to provide real-time intelligence support to the TF Falcon commander and staff. The section performed several important tasks:

- Conducting daily intelligence briefs to the TF Falcon Commander on current operations within MNB-E.
- Providing current intelligence support, through first-line analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), to G3 operations and MNB-E battle staff sections.
- Coordinating intelligence flow from the various U.S. and multinational battalions that comprised MNB-E, ensuring a timely flow of intelligence information from the TF analysis and control element (ACE) to MNB-E members and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) headquarters.
- Supplying current intelligence support to daily targeting meetings.
- Providing intelligence support to the Information Operations (IO) Working Group.

Organization

While a table of distribution and allowances (TDA) that the Division staff developed before deployment covered the section, the initial G2 operations section structure paralleled that of the Brigade S2 shop. We took advantage of early-established organizational and working relationships and began to forge new roles in an atypical environment.

The Brigade S2 became the G2 Operations Chief; therefore, the Brigade's Senior Intelligence Officer was no longer responsible solely to the brigade commander. The G2 Operations Chief worked in a division-like staff organization supporting the G2, a lieutenant colonel who answered directly to the TF Commander (a brigadier general). The G2 Operations Chief was responsible for the overall functioning of the section, ensuring that we processed and disseminated daily intelligence across MNB-E. In addition, he was the G2's representative for the daily close battle targeting meetings, and he provided intelligence support to the targeting process for the IO Working Group.

The Section noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) became the G2 Operations NCOIC, responsible for ensuring the well being of the section. He also interacted with the G3 Battle NCOs, G2 Sergeants Major, and ACE NCOIC to ensure that the task force was coordinating the current intelligence at the NCO level. The assistant brigade S2s became day and night "battle captains," whose primary role was disseminating the daily flow of intelligence information to the proper end users. They conducted daily battlefield update briefs, and kept the battle staff informed of current intelligence situations.

In addition, the G2 operations section also coordinated open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection and dissemination throughout MNB-E The section added an OSINT chief to over-

Photo courtesy of LTC John Rovegno.

Early morning at Camp Bondsteel.

Photo courtesy by LTC John Rovegno

Major Cowan briefs General Shelton on the intelligence situation.

see these duties, augmenting its traditional modified table of organization and Equipment (MTOE). The OSINT chief was a First Lieutenant (35D All-Source Intelligence Officer) assisted by one primary Category II (cleared for U.S. Secret level) translator and a pool of local national translators.

The greatest challenge came at the intelligence analyst level. Our 96Bs (Intelligence Analysts) had to learn and assist in developing an order of battle in an environment where there was no intelligence baseline. They had to draw analytical connections between emerging indicators and events that they did not normally track in a high-intensity threat environment. House fires, theft, drive-by shootings, ambushes of farmers, and random mortar attacks were regular threat events during TF Falcon's early months.

While the G2 section had to adapt its organizational duties to fulfill several additional roles, we were able to draw upon our fundamental wartime mission skills to forge an effective team. The principles of IPB did not change, only the operational environment did.

Challenges

In completing these tasks, the G2 Operations section had to overcome several obstacles that were unique to its position in MNB-E. First, the section had to define its role concerning the division's ACE. As a brigade S2 section, we did not usually have the luxury of operating so close to the ACE. A mechanized brigade will normally deploy with its organic analysis and control team (ACT), which provides connectivity to the division ACE. The formation of a MNB headquarters with its own ACE ended the requirement for the ACT and allowed the 101st Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion to deploy several ACTs throughout the MNB-E area of operations (AO). This facilitated intelligence flow and analysis across the brigade area.

Without the need for an ACT, the G2 operations section had to develop its own immediate relationship with the ACE. Frequent daily meetings with the All-Source Intelligence (ASI) section, collection management and dissemination, and G2X were critical to ensure we had a current picture of all the intelligence available within the TF.

As the G2 operations section, we had to avoid building a two-tiered knowledge system. We could not let the ACE become the "green door," holding critical pieces of information that other operation sections required. The multinational nature of MNB-E operations lent itself to the segregation of information.

The MNB-E tactical operations center (TOC) had liaison soldiers from Russia, Poland, and Greece, as well as other international organizations, forcing the operations sections to work only with information releasable to other nations, classified as "Releasable KFOR." Consequently, there was a low probability that all operations sections were fully knowledgeable of the complete intelligence picture. It was G2 Operations' role to ensure that all intelligence information was available (to cleared parties) for making daily operational decisions.

The sheer size and span of control of the MNB-E provided another unique challenge to the G2 operations section. While a typical mechanized infantry brigade is comprised of one armor and two infantry battalions, MNB-E was composed of one mechanized infantry battalion and one armor battalion that were organic to the BCT. In addition, a light infantry battalion from the 82d Airborne—with whom the brigade had not previously operated, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, a Polish battalion, a Russian tactical group, and a Greek battalion rounded out the early structure of MNB-E. This enlarged multinational brigade had intelligence officers and staffs who had not previously worked together. Each unit brought different standing operating procedures (SOPs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) with them as they assumed their missions in Kosovo.

To overcome these differences, it was important that intelligence officers from these various elements develop close working relationships. Monthly G2/S2 conferences, in which the various

intelligence officers could exchange ideas and perspectives, were helpful in overcoming some of these differences. Developing a close working relationship with liaison officers from our multinational contributing nations also assisted in easing the flow of intelligence information from these nations.

The decision to employ ACTs throughout the MNB-E sector was also critical to assisting in the control of intelligence information across the brigade. Using the ACTs, the G2 operations section and the TF ACE were able to establish Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) connectivity with the contributing nations. The result was comprehensive Internet information flow to and from U.S. intelligence soldiers who were working with the Russian, Polish, and Greek intelligence sections.

The G2 operations section, however, could not rely solely on information from the ACTs and battalion S2 sections. It was important that all G2 operations section members made frequent trips into the sector to see first-hand how the situation was developing on the ground. It was too easy for the intelligence section to bury itself, reading intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) and daily situation reports (SITREPs), losing perspective on what was really happening. We could not provide quality first-line analysis to the battle staff if we had not frequently left the confines of TF Falcon Headquarters to visit the different MNB-E sectors.

Interaction with the KFOR G2 brought its own unique set of challenges. Communications and connectivity was the first problem. While MNB-E relied on SIPRNET, secure frequency modulation (FM), and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) communications for the passing of intelligence information, KFOR worked with its own independent system. We initially passed INTSUMs and intelligence reports using systems we were not familiar with like Ptarmigan, Crisis Response Operations in NATO Operating Systems (CRONOS), and Linked Operational Intelligence Center, Europe (LOCE) computer systems.

While these systems were not complex, they did offer challenges in maintenance, upkeep, and compatibility with U.S. systems. The systems also came with their own classification concerns that allowed us to pass only information classified "Release KFOR" and "NATO Secret" levels. It was difficult to ensure that we passed only the appropriate level of information on each system, while continually providing timely and accurate information flow to KFOR headquarters. We were unable to create the most efficient information flow until we established secure connectivity with the KFOR main headquarters and a connection to U.S. elements using the Defense Secure Network (DSN) over MSE.

It was also important that we quickly learned the NATO report and INTSUM formats used by the KFOR headquarters and the other contributing members. Similarly, it was important that we understood the methods that other organizations used to move their intelligence information throughout the province of Kosovo.

The asymmetric nature of the Kosovo AO made it critical that we knew what was happening with the other brigades. We needed to have direct contact with other contributing nations in order to provide accurate intelligence support to current operations. While English is the official language of NATO, language skills often served as an impediment to information sharing. Fortunately, our immediate boundary was with the British in Multinational Brigade–Central (MNB-C), with whom we share a common language. The free flow of people across brigade sectors, the sharing of a common former Kosovo Liberation Army (UçK) operating zone, and the shared use of the primary main supply route from Skopje to Pristina made the open flow of communications with the British headquarters essential.

Regardless of the nation, the G2 operations sections from each MNB needed to feel free to talk directly to each other without the need to go through KFOR headquarters. Dependence on KFOR headquarters for information from our flanks meant a dramatic slow down and possible loss of critical information. Effective crosstalk between MNBs greatly enhanced overall situational awareness. We achieved this crosstalk not only through daily interaction but also through formal conferences sponsored by the KFOR G2.

Conclusion

During its six months as MNB-E G2 Operations, the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, S2 section fell back on several fundamental principles to perform its role. Good crosstalk, development of common SOPs, reliance on the basic IPB tenets, and a strong desire to develop a common picture of the battlefield allowed us to reorganize, refocus, and complete our mission.

Captain Greg Lisi is currently the Commander of B Company, 101st Military Intelligence Battalion, 1st Infantry Division. He served as G2 Operations Officer, Task Force Falcon, from June to December 1999. His previous assignments include S2, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division; S2, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment; Assistant S3, Scout Platoon leader, and Assistant S2 for 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood, Texas. CPT Lisi is a graduate of the Armor Officer's Basic Course, the Military Intelligence Imagery Officers Course, the Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and the Military Intelligence Officers Advance Course. CPT Lisi holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Government from Harvard University.

1. Orthodox church and Mosque stand side by side in Urosevac - Ferizaj.
2. MG Abizaid talks with 101 MI Bn's MSG Newton and other TF 101 MI maintenance personnel on Camp Bondsteel.
3. A Co, 101 MI, moves into their SeaHut.
4. The beginning of TF 101 MI HQ.
5. TF 101 MI soldiers continued to train even while deployed. Preparing to enter Quick Shoot M16 range.
6. SSG Peoples, TF 101 MI operations sergeant, in the TOC.

Photos courtesy of LTC John Rovegno.

ACT Operations--With U.S. and Allies

by Captains Kirk A. Loving, Jason B. McCoy, David P. Payne, Jeffrey Thurnher, and First Lieutenant Melanie Shippitka

When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) finalized the Military Technical Agreement, it incurred the immediate task of organizing and deploying the U.S.-led contingent of NATO Kosovo Force, Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E). Immediately after the signing, the 101st Military Intelligence Battalion quickly deployed assets, including Analysis and Control Teams (ACTs) throughout the MNB-E sector, to the U.S. and the newly identified allied battalions in the U.S. sector. This article discusses how they trained, organized, and operated during one of the most complicated peace enforcement operations in history.

Organization of the ACTs

The 101st MI Battalion, 1st Infantry Division (1ID), used ACTs to support maneuver battalions in the MNB-E sector of Kosovo during the KFOR-1A and -1B rotations. During the KFOR-1A, all four ACTs from B Company, the direct support MI company, we were based at Camp Monteith. One ACT remained on Camp Monteith and provided support to Task Force (TF) 1-26 Infantry and TF 1-77 Armor (AR) from 1ID's 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The other three ACTs deployed to remote sites and provided support to allied units: the Greek 501st Mechanized (Mech) Battalion, Polish 18th Air Assault Battalion, and Russian 13th Tactical Group (TG). For the KFOR-1B rotation, beginning in December 1999, the 101st MI Battalion reorganized into general support (GS) areas of responsibility. C Company replaced the Russian ACT and the Monteith ACT, which were now providing support to TF 2-2 IN and TF 1-63 AR from 3d BCT. D Company replaced the Greek and Polish ACTs.

Each ACT consisted of one MI Lieutenant, one Intelligence Analyst or Counterintelligence Agent (96B or 97B, respectively) noncommissioned officer in charge, and one or two 96B enlisted soldiers. The Russian ACT had one Voice Intercept Operator (98G) Russian linguist added to provide translation between the ACT and Russian unit. Each ACT used maps, overlays, the TF Falcon human intelligence database (known as Krypton), and mobile subscriber equipment to accomplish its mission. They also used a computer with connectivity to TF Falcon's Analysis and Control Element (ACE) through the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). Each remote ACT was collocated with a communications support team from the 121st Signal Battalion and a Liaison and Coordination Element (LCE) from the 10th Special Forces Group.

Pre-Deployment Training

Before deploying to Kosovo, all soldiers received the standard individual readiness training to prepare them for the country's environment. They received instruction in mine awareness, how to conduct vehicle and personnel searches, how to talk to the media, and how to react to direct and indirect fire. Following this training, they participated in a Mission Rehearsal Exercise where the ACTs trained in 96B skills and Kosovo-related situational awareness. However, these training events did not prepare the ACTs for operating with their allied units, and it did not realistically represent the work they would do while deployed. They gained most of this knowledge through on-the-job-training during the deployment. The situation was unique for all involved because this was the first time we worked in this capacity with units from Russia, Poland, and Greece, and we had no standing operating procedure (SOP) for integrating an ACT into allied units. Unfortunately, each allied unit used its ACT in a slightly different manner. Therefore, without one standard baseline SOP, each ACT trained only to meet the needs of the particular allied nation it supported.

The majority of the training the ACTs received was through rotations at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany. They deployed to CMTC with their habitual brigade S2, and provided support during high-intensity conflict scenarios against opposing forces. The ACTs, like every other unit that deployed to Kosovo, completely refocused their training for peace support operations. Fortunately, ACT personnel quickly adjusted their training focus and deployed ready to perform their missions.

ACT Operations

Each ACT was a conduit for intelligence from TF Falcon to its subordinate battalions (U.S. and allied), and this was their most vital role. This role was more critical for the allied ACTs because the allied S2s were not familiar with

their U.S. higher headquarters. By using the SIPRNET connection, each ACT ensured that its supported unit had the latest intelligence products from the TF Falcon ACE.

The ACT Supporting the Polish Battalion frequently provided assistance to the Polish S2 and staff during mission analysis for reconnaissance and surveillance missions. They also assisted in preparing intelligence annexes, conducting terrain analysis, and developing enemy courses of action.

The Russian government did not approve employing an ACT with the 13th Tactical Group until September 1999. Initially, the ACT translated daily Russian reports and created the 13th TG Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMs). Eventually, they provided daily INTSUMs for the 13th TG Commander and served as the primary pipeline for requests for information and imagery from the ACE to the 10th Group LCE. They also provided information to any U.S. units conducting missions in the area including field HUMINT, military police (MP), psychological operations(PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), and engineers. The Russian ACT quickly became the U.S. intelligence hub for their sector of Kosovo.

The ACT with the Greek Battalion provided the 501st Mech Battalion with the ability to obtain products such as imagery and the local personalities and organizations databases. They also assisted in intelligence preparation of the battlefield and mission analysis for operations in the Urosevac sector of Kosovo. A crucial element for success was integrating the Greek S2 into TF Falcon's staff operations. We introduced him to several individuals in the ACE so that he felt comfortable asking questions and obtaining information during his visits to Camp Bondsteel. The ACT also ensured there was a sharing of information between the Greek battalion and U.S. units operating in the area, to include the field HUMINT team (FHTs).

The Monteith ACT provided first-line analysis for the two U.S. TF S2s at Camp Monteith. They gathered all information collected by the units operating in their areas of operations (AOs) and provided intelligence products to the TF S2s. They cross-referenced raw data with patrol reports and S2 INTSUMS to produce an accurate intelligence picture on a daily basis. The Monteith ACT did not face the operational challenge of working with an allied unit, but it did face the challenge of working with multiple S2s and ensuring that the intelligence products they generated met the unit commander's needs.

Challenges

Doctrinally, an ACT has a habitual relationship with the maneuver brigade S2, and provides support to that S2 when the brigade deploys. However, the ACTs in Kosovo constantly supported S2s with whom they had never worked before. Three of the four ACTs supported S2s from other countries and had to deal with language and operational differences on a daily basis. Often, patrol reports or INTSUMS from allied units took hours to translate and send to higher echelons. This affected the ACT's ability to correlate the incident with a similar event and to predict follow-on events before they happened. The ACT supporting the Russians learned that operating with the 13th TG was different from working with a NATO country. They operated in a command-driven environment, with no real staff or staff process at all. The Russian Commander did not see the need for the levels of planning that are common in U.S. operations, so the ACT had to constantly communicate to ensure relationships and operations between TF Falcon and the 13th TG ran efficiently.

Maintaining communication connectivity from remote sites was one of the greatest challenges for all the ACTs. SIPRNET was the primary carrier for almost all products provided to units and the ACE. The ACT locations were anywhere from thirty minutes to two hours from Camp Bondsteel, making it too long a delay to courier products. Each ACT depended on a small detachment from the 121st Signal Battalion to maintain their SIPRNET link. Initially, the signal soldiers were not familiar with the equipment with which they deployed, and it took several weeks for the link to become a dependable means of communication.

The ACT's small size also presented a challenge for the soldiers. For example, when the ACT supporting the Greeks deployed forward to Mitrovica in support of 3-504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 501st Mech Battalion was without their ACT for the duration of the operation. The next time the Greek ACT deployed to Mitrovica, they left one soldier behind to provide intelligence support for the Greek Battalion. Since each ACT consisted of three to four soldiers, they had to prioritize their work and provide the most critical information in a timely manner.

Kosovo's harsh conditions also presented many problems during the initial months of the deployment. The ACTs operated in tents where the heat and dust made it necessary to continuously clean computers and printers to keep them operational. Zip disks were the only disks capable of withstanding the Kosovar dust, and

3.5-inch disks had a life expectancy of less than three days.

Lessons Learned

There were several lessons learned during our pre-deployment training. ACTs serving with allied units need training on the supported nation's customs, military structures, and language. They also need to know the mission of the CAs, MPs, FHTs, and Special Forces Liaison Teams and their capabilities. We should incorporate the aspects of working in a peace support environment— such as working with interpreters, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local nationals— into future training. Since the ACTs served as the supported unit's intelligence links to TF Falcon, it was vital the ACT shared information with all of these organizations to maintain current knowledge of their AOs. The ACTs provided efficient, timely, and accurate intelligence to their commands by knowing who knew what information and how best to obtain it.

Finally, we cannot overemphasize how important it was to have regular, face-to-face meetings between the collectors and the analysts. It was crucial that the ACT effectively convey requirements to the collectors on the ground and ensure that all reports received for analysis were accurate and timely. Although this was more difficult with allied units, it was no less important.

The most important lesson we learned was that the ACT was the critical link between each supported unit and TF Falcon in Kosovo's multinational environment. As the Kosovo mission continues, the ACTs' procedures and capabilities will become more refined to meet the needs of the units they support.✹

Lessons Learned

- ✹ Teach allied army customs, military operations, and language.
- ✹ Train peace support operations—specific tasks: working with interpreters, NGOs, and local organizations.
- ✹ Use all resources available: MP, CA, FHTs, Signal Operations Command and Control Element, International Organizations, NGOs.
- ✹ Maintain active communication between the collector and analyst.
- ✹ Use ACT to serve in linking the supported unit with its higher headquarters; this is a vital role.

Captain Kirk Loving is currently entering the Russian Foreign Area Officer program in Garmisch, Germany. Loving enlisted in the Army in 1988 as a Russian linguist-interrogator. He attended basic training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California; and advanced individual training (AIT) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and served with the 4th Psychological Operations Group. He was Commissioned through Officer Candidate School; he attended Field Artillery Officer Basic Course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He has served in numerous positions with the 17th Field Artillery Brigade at Fort Sill. After attending the Military Intelligence Officer Transition and Officer Advanced Courses at Fort Huachuca, he was the Battalion S2 in to the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, and subsequently was the S3 training officer and All-Source Intel Chief at the 101st MI Batallion. CPT Loving holds a Russian studies degree from George Washington University.

Captain Jason McCoy's current assignment is as Platoon Leader, D Company, 101st MI Battalion. He served as an ACT Chief with the Greeks in Multinational Brigade–East, Kosovo, Task Force Falcon, from December 1999 to June 2000. 1LT McCoy holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business and Economics from the Virginia Military Institute. Readers may reach him via E-mail at McCoyJ@hq.1id.army.mil and telephonically at commercial 0931-889-6565/7305 or DSN 350-6565/7305.

Captain David Payne is currently the Assistant S2, Brigade Combat Team, 1st infantry Division. He served as the 13th Tactical Group (Russian) ACT Leader from December 1999 to June 2000. His previous assignments include Executive Officer, Headquarters and Operations Company (HHOC), 101st MI Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, and ACT Leader, A Company, 101st MI Battalion. 1LT Payne holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Salisbury State University.

Captain Jeff Thurnher is currently the assistant S2 for Battalion, Infantry, in Vilseck, Germany. The assistant Operations Officer in Headquarters, 101st MI Battalion, 1ID, and previously served as the assistant S2 for Battalion, Infantry, in Vilseck, Germany. 1LT Thurnher has a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Virginia. Readers can contact him via E-mail at jeffthurnher@hotmail.com or by telephone at DSN 314-350-7213.

First Lieutenant Melanie Shippitka is currently the C Company Operations Platoon Leader, 101st MI Battalion, 1ID in Wuerzburg, Germany. She has also served as the Camp Monteith ACT Chief supporting 1-63 Armor Battalion and 2-2 Infantry Battalion from December

1999 to June 2000 in Operation JOINT GUARDIAN (KFOR-1B). This was her first assignment after the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course. 1LT Shippitka holds a Bachelor of Exercise Science degree and is a distinguished military graduate of John Carrol University. Readers may contact her at mshippitka@hotmail.com.

ACT In Action–In Mitrovica

by Captain Jason B. McCoy

By the end of 1999, the peacekeepers in Kosovska-Mitrovica saw the fragile peace deteriorate in this ethnically divided city. In January 2000, tensions passed the boiling point as Serbs and Albanians clashed in the streets and on the bridges spanning the Ibar River, which divides the city into ethnic enclaves. Seeing no immediate end to the riots, the KFOR Commander ordered Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E) (the U.S.-led Brigade) to reinforce the French peacekeepers in Mitrovica. Through January and February MNB-E deployed four task forces into Mitrovica. Two of these out-of-sector operations included an Analysis and Control Team (ACT). This article details the third out-of-sector operation—Mitrovica.

The Mission

In late February 2000, my ACT, which normally worked in direct support (DS) to the Greek 501st Mechanized (Mech) Battalion, deployed to Kosovska Mitrovica to support the 3/504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR).The 3/504th had the mission of reinforcing Mitrovica in what was dubbed Operation Ibar. Mitrovica is located in northern Kosovo and within the French sector (MNB-N), approximately 70 kilometers north of the U.S. headquarters at Camp Bondsteel. The Ibar River divides the city geographically and ethnically. Kosovar Serbs live primarily on the northern side of the river and Kosovar Albanians on the southern side. Because unrest in the city had stretched the French forces to their limits, KFOR units from other areas of Kosovo began providing temporary reinforcement. My ACT deployed to support a 3/504th company-size combat element, marking the first time that an ACT deployed in support of a company-size element. Our ACT consisted of two intelligence analysts (96B) and one intelligence officer (35D). Our mission was to provide as much real-time analysis as possible to support elements of the 3/504th PIR, and to serve as the communications conduit for both intelligence and operations traffic to MNB-E headquarters.

Deployment of the ACT and Support

Immediately upon notification of our deployment, we collected all necessary tools and supplies and then familiarized ourselves with the current situation in Mitrovica. The most critical tools needed included combat acetate, markers, various maps and imagery of the city, and a SIPRNET (Secure Internet Protocol Router Network) computer. The SIPRNET provided us a secure communications link with the rest of the U.S.-controlled zone (MNB-E). One of our 96Bs reconnoitered Mitrovica on an advance reconnaissance mission two weeks before our deployment. His reconnaissance gave the ACT invaluable information, allowing us to gain a working knowledge of the city. He explained in detail the unrest between the Albanian population in the South and the Serbian population in the North, a result of the desire for control of an area rich in natural resources. He also showed us the location and importance of the two traffic bridges and one footbridge that connects the

Photos courtesy of LTC John Rovegno.

Albanian demonstrators march in Mitrovica.

divided city. Finally, upon receipt of our attached interrogation/human intelligence (HUMINT) team, we deployed to Mitrovica in our Field Liter Ambulance (FLA), which provided the necessary workspace to operate on the move. With the satellite hook-up from the 121st Signal Battalion, we were operational three hours after arrival in Mitrovica.

Shortcomings

Our primary mission in Mitrovica was to consolidate all intelligence and to provide the 3/504th PIR's S2 with the latest analysis. Initially, we relied on the Intelligence assets of the French forces but, unfortunately, some allies hesitated when we required support, and we seemed to be the low priority for intelligence distribution. We also requested that 3/504th soldiers bring back information from their patrols in sector. The 3/504th PIR's first mission met with stiff resistance as Serbian crowds congregated around the soldiers. The Serbs then followed the patrols, harassing them by throwing rocks and yelling profanities. Fortunately, the 3/504th soldiers maintained their composure and came out of the incident with no serious injuries. Understanding that we needed a better way to predict and track possible threats for these patrols, we began seeking additional intelligence sources.

The second mission during the Albanian protest march from Priština to Mitrovica also caused my team difficulties. Approximately 200,000 Albanians participated in the march to Mitrovica, a protest against perceived French support for the Serbs. Reconnaissance did not begin tracking the crowd's progress until they were at the city limits. Thus, we had no real intelligence or warning as to what might happen that day. We realized that we needed organic intelligence collection in order to support our commander and soldiers properly. We therefore asked TF 101 MI for support to fill the void. Our commander, working in conjunction with the British forces reinforcing Mitrovica, then brought forward organic collection assets to support the 3/504th.

HUMINT teams establish operations in Mitrovica.

Low-Level Voice Intercept (LLVI)

TF 101 MI employed an LLVI team of six Army intercept operators and four contract linguists. They provided real-time intelligence to the commander on the ground, giving the commander the opportunity to be proactive rather than reactionary. The most critical pieces of information provided by the LLVI team were indications and warning (I&W) of planned riots. The LLVI team also provided information in so timely a manner that the 3/504th Commander was even able to determine when and where his soldiers were under observation throughout the sector. The LLVI team also was able to determine call signs and names of individuals and began databasing the local population. This gave the ACT a chance to analyze real-time intelligence and feed it directly to the S2 and the commanders on the ground. The LLVI team did a great service for the intelligence community with their support to the 3/504th PIR. They not only gave the U.S. Army intelligence community a better image with the infantry battalion, with which they worked, but also earned a great deal of respect among their peers.

HUMINT Support

TF 101 MI's Interrogation Team also deployed to Mitrovica. Despite severe constraints placed on them by the French Commander, the team accomplished great things while there. Although the French Commander did not allow them access to detainees during the cordon and search operations, they did not let this stop their mission. The team coordinated with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo–Police (UNMIK-P) to interrogate the current and incoming UNMIK-P detainees. The information obtained from these interrogations allowed us to start a database of criminals in the area. The interrogation team brought great credit to the intelligence community and made the ACT's job easier.

Later Deployments

An ACT from TF 101 MI would deploy to Mitrovica twice more, once in support of the Greek 501st Mech Battalion and once with the Polish 18th Air Assault (AA) Battalion. The ACT used the lessons learned from the first deployment to support the follow-on missions. Since future missions also took ACTs from their habitually supported units and placed them in support of new units, we made the determination that the ACT had to separate into two parts to continue intelligence support to our allied battalions in MNB-E. Thus, one soldier remained at the ACT base while the other two deployed to Mitrovica.

The LLVI team deployed again with the Polish 18th AA Battalion. This was the first time we knew of an intercept team deploying in direct support of an allied battalion. They succeeded in large part because of the frequency and call sign databases that they had started during their first rotation.

In addition to the previously mentioned lessons, we also learned the following:

- **National sensitivities often prevent intelligence sharing between military forces.**
- **Out-of-sector operations need dedicated intelligence collection capabilities.**
- **Sufficient bandwidth must be available to receive and disseminate intelligence products.**
- **Backfill all intelligence capabilities before deploying on out-of-sector operations.**

Figure 1. Lessons Learned from the ACT Operations in Mitrovica.

Deploying ACTs out of the MNB-E sector went relatively smoothly. The biggest challenge to the ACTs was in maintaining a continuous flow of intelligence. Since we did not have a full complement of U.S. intelligence collectors on the ground, a steady flow of information often did not exist, which left U.S. soldiers relying on other countries for intelligence collection. However, the ACT proved to be a great asset in Mitrovica allowing the S2 to plan while the ACT analyzed intelligence. All the MI soldiers who deployed to Mitrovica did an outstanding job and represented the Military Intelligence community extremely well.✹

Captain Jason McCoy's current assignment is as Platoon Leader, D Company, 101st MI Battalion. He served as an ACT Chief with the Greeks in Multinational Brigade–East, Kosovo, Task Force Falcon, from December 1999 to June 2000. 1LT McCoy holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business and Economics from the Virginia Military Institute. Readers may reach him via E-mail at McCoyJ@hq.1id.army.mil and telephonically at commercial 0931-889-6565/7305 or DSN 350-6565/7305.

Long-Range Surveillance Operations In Kosovo– Complementing Existing Capabilities

by Major Robert L. Chamberlain and First Sergeant Ralph Kluna

As the snow in the mountains overlooking the Kosovo-Serbia border began to thaw in late March 2000, the newly arrived U.S. contingent to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) Task Force (TF) Falcon began receiving reports of potential insurgent activity in this highly contested border region. Despite the TF's efforts and complement of highly sophisticated and diverse intelligence collection assets, they did not have a much-needed 24-hour, all weather, real-time collection and reporting capability to confirm insurgent activity.

In early March, the TF Commander personally requested Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) to provide such a capability. In response to a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) deployment order, V Corps tasked the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade to deploy its Long-Range Surveillance Company (LRSC), E Company, 51st Infantry, 165th MI Battalion, to Kosovo. This article tells the story of the LRS Company from its notification to its deployment, employment, and redeployment. It will detail some of the lessons learned in the six months these soldiers spent in the hills of this highly contested region.

Deployment

Preparing for a real-world mission is never a simple task. When the LRSC was notified of a possible mission in Kosovo in March 2000, it became a battalion effort to prepare the Company for deployment. The Battalion established a weekly in-progress review (IPR) schedule focused on the expected mission requirements developed in discussion with the Brigade and Corps. In mid-April the Brigade received the mission to deploy LRSC to Kosovo and to be operationally ready by mid-May. The Company immediately began preparations, readying equipment, conducting rigorous physical training, and honing their skills.

With the remainder of the staff and company heavily involved in the standard details of pre-deployment preparation, the Battalion S3 assembled a small Advance Team, for immediate deployment, to solidify the requirements onsite with the TF Falcon Commander. The Advance Team consisted of the S3, the long-range surveillance (LRS) operations Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC), and two intelligence analysts. Their tasks were to refine the mission, identify the specific operational requirements, and establish a presence for the LRSC.

During their ten-day deployment, the Advance Team addressed the following five critical requirements.

- Defining a working relationship with the TF Falcon staff and units operating in Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E). The LRS operations NCOIC determined the best way to integrate their procedures into the TF operational procedures. This presented many challenges, because TF Falcon's organization is not doctrinal.
- Establishing a tactical operations center (TOC) and an isolation facility (ISOFAC). The LRSC TOC needed to be in proximity to the TF TOC and have access to a large open space to serve as an antenna field. Due to the nature of the site, property and space were at a premium on Camp Bondsteel. Additionally, no facility existed on the camp that would serve as an ISOFAC, so we had to construct one from the ground up.
- Establishing a command and control (C^2)relationship between the LRSC and TF Falcon. The LRSC would be under operational control (OPCON) of the TF and under administrative control (ADCON) of the Military Intelligence (MI) task force (TF 101 MI and later TF 501 MI).
- Developing an in-country mission rehearsal exercise (MRE). This proved to be one of the biggest challenges the unit faced. It was critical to the overall success of



Photo courtesy of LTC John Rovegno.

The rugged terrain of Kosovo in which LRS teams operated.

the unit because it provided for training tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) with important elements of TF Falcon on some of the very terrain on which the LRSC would be operating. The TF Falcon wanted the LRSC to be operational as soon as possible, but an MRE was necessary before the company could assume any missions.

- Initiating the development of a focused intelligence database, geared specifically to the requirements of the LRSC, established a solid working relationship between the analysts of E Company and the TF Falcon analysis and control element (ACE).

Upon completion of their immediate mission, the Advance Team redeployed, except for the Battalion S3, who remained in Kosovo addressing the upcoming support and sustainment issues. He coordinated the terrain and support allocated to the company and the needed facilities, like the ISOFAC, for the company's arrival. He was joined briefly by the battalion's property book officer who conducted critical onsite coordination for supply management, maintenance, and property accountability.

As the deployment date grew closer, the Company deployed an advance echelon (ADVON) consisting of the communications platoon leader, a supply specialist, and representatives from each platoon. This ADVON ensured the completion of all logistical requirements and the implementation of a Kosovo-focused orientation program. The ADVON had to draw a number of equipment items through the installation and es-tablish accounts before the Company's arrival. They had to sign for up-armored high-mobility multipurpose, wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), individual body armor, ammunition, and barracks from Camp Bondsteel and then prepare for individual soldier issue. The orientation training was to familiarize the unit and soldiers with the forces and types of equipment conducting missions in the area of operation (AO). The company also conducted extensive mine awareness and rules of engagement training.

Arrival in Country

After several intense Battalion IPRs, a scheduled five-day field training exercise (FTX), and a block-leave period, LRSC was ready to deploy. The Company arrived at Camp Bondsteel on 25 April 2000 and immediately began three days of equipment issue and orientation training. The atmosphere was intense, and there would have been total pandemonium if not for the Battalion's advance preparations. The TF was eager to begin operations, but the Battalion had to conduct an MRE. USAREUR requires MREs because they are critical to allowing the TF and the unit to practice a host of procedures (from insertion and extraction to emergency procedures and quick reaction force [QRF] response).

Mission Rehearsal Exercise

The LRS operations section planned, coordinated, and executed the MRE. The TF wanted the exercise to mirror future operations, as well as to provide some operational intelligence with a reduced risk to the soldiers. TF Falcon's concept for the MRE was that it would take place in the TF Falcon AO mirroring the rugged mountains where the teams would eventually operate. Furthermore, it should validate planning and synchronizing the TF Falcon staff in order to support the LRSC with aviation, fire support, a QRF, and C^2.

The MRE lasted five days and involved nine teams that operationally deployed to gather intelligence. The LRS operations section developed battle drills for every possible contingency and tailored them to integrate into TF Falcon's operations. This exercise involved all LRS assets and validated the relationship between the LRS C^2 elements and the TF Falcon staff. This exercise proved the value of in-country MREs for elements deployed after the main body. It was essential in that it developed a working relationship with the other supporting units and oriented the unit to the AO in which it would be operating. The soldiers quickly realized that the numerous animals grazing in the area could constitute a considerable risk. A countermeasure of red pepper sprinkled enroute and in the vicinity of their hide site quickly neutralized this potential risk.

Mission Profiles

The company began executing missions 48 hours after the MRE. The missions were to provide intelligence

Photo courtesy of author.

Insertion aircraft at Camp Bondsteel.

data to the TF by conducting reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations. Over the next 6 months, the company conducted more than 21 LRS operations, consisting of 48 team missions.

The basic team mission profile consisted of five phases over seven days:

- Phase I - Isolation and planning.
- Phase II - Insertion and infiltration.
- Phase III - Actions on the objective.
- Phase IV - Exfiltration and extraction.
- Phase V - Debrief and recovery.

Every team followed this profile for all missions executed. The company also established a battle rhythm, and each platoon assumed either mission, training, or QRF cycles accordingly. Each cycle ensured continuous LRS coverage throughout the KFOR rotation. Mission cycles normally ran seven days and consisted of planning, rehearsing, and conducting the actual mission. The training cycle provided ample time to reinforce mission standards and conduct recurring training such as ranges, physical training, reaction drills, and emergency extraction techniques. The QRF cycle provided team leaders with the time to recover equipment used during the mission cycle and to prepare for the upcoming training cycle.

R & S Planning

We developed the geographic areas and general objectives for LRS R&S missions within an overall TF Falcon targeting process. This general information, consisting sometimes only of specific information requirements (SIR), with respect to one or more geographic areas, was then refined by a robust LRS operations cell into a target or set of targets for an LRS operation. Within the LRS operations cell, this process began with the TF Falcon ACE providing all available intelligence on the area designated by the TF Falcon G3 or G2. The LRS Operations Section would then further develop this data, conducting more detailed IPB in support of the potential LRS missions. Based on the IPB (which had to consider line-of-sight, ability to infiltrate and exfiltrate, local activity, mines, and ability to execute emergency actions in the area), two to three options for coverage were available for planning approval.



Photo courtesy of LTC John Rovegno.

The Falcon gym in use at Camp Bondsteel.

Once the operations section received planning approval on the targets, more detailed planning began, with continuous IPB throughout. After developing the plan, the LRS operations section prepared a mission approval brief for the TF Falcon Commander. (This was one of the many safety checks built into the system to mitigate potential problems.) This brief consisted of both a synchronization matrix and graphics to be briefed to the TF Commander 24 to 36 hours before the isolation phase begins. With the mission approval, the operations section completed the necessary mission planning folders and issued a warning order to the teams.

This process ensured the input of crucial players into the "targeting" process and resulted in a fully coordinated plan within the TF. It required a robust and highly competent LRS operations section.

Rehearsals

After extensive planning sessions, and while in isolation (Phase I), the teams conducted rehearsals for every facet of the mission. Rehearsals were paramount to success with at least review and conduct of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), QRF, communications, and actions on the objective procedures for each mission reviewed. The teams and LRS operations staff in coordination with every unit involved in the operation participated in the rehearsals. Since no units had habitual working relationships and personnel changes occurred often, we had to reinforce and practice standing operating procedures (SOPs) constantly to ensure successful missions.

Communications

Communications in Kosovo present a unique array of challenges. The rough terrain and the limited availability of tactical satellite (TACSAT) frequencies impeded communications with the teams. The communications architecture used by the Company during the deployment encompassed all systems organic to the unit. The

primary means of communications between the teams and LRS Operations was the AN/PRC-137 high frequency (HF) radio in digital mode. The alternate method was the AN/PSC-5 TACSAT in digital mode, with a contingency in voice mode. The AN/PRC-119 Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) had the ability to be used in the voice mode in emergencies to contact aircraft or the ground QRF. With redundancy, ingenuity, and resilience, we overcame the communications challenges, and they did not prevent the execution of a single mission.

Insertions and Extractions

Once the teams completed detailed planning and rehearsals, the next challenge was getting the teams to the mission site. Insertions and extractions were conducted using both air and ground platforms. The threat situation and terrain dictated the appropriate platform, and these operations would always take place during hours of limited visibility. A critical challenge to the success of the insertions and extractions was the constant rotation of the supporting units. The only way to mitigate this was to assign a liaison officer (LNO) to the insertion package and conduct detailed rehearsals with the crews.

The air insertion and extraction package consisted of a C^2 aircraft (if available), company medic, and an LNO. The company QRF element usually conducted ground insertion. This consisted of two vehicles per team, a QRF escort, and a communications vehicle.

Once a team arrived at the operational area, foot infiltration into the hide-sites proved challenging. Because of the rugged, mountainous terrain and heavy soldier loads, foot infiltration into the hide-site was only one to three kilometers from the drop-off point. Planning speed for foot infiltration was 300 to 500 meters an hour. The team tailored soldier loads as much as possible; however, water, ammunition, and batteries were all weight-producing requirements that we could not remove from the soldier's load.

Training

Throughout the deployment, the company continued to lose and receive soldiers. We could use neither stop-loss programs nor involuntary extensions for the soldiers. This presented the unit with the challenge of sustaining mission capability throughout a lengthy deployment that would see skilled soldiers and leaders depart, and new, untrained soldiers arrive. We had to conduct training throughout the deployment to ensure that the teams were always mission ready. The Company integrated a detailed training program into its battle rhythm. This program was centralized at the company level for planning, and decentralized at the team level for execution. We focused this training on reinforcing those tasks needed to execute the LRS missions.

A two-phased training program was necessary. Phase I began immediately after a soldier arrived at the unit at home station in Germany. The rear Detachment began an arduous process of preparing the soldier physically and mentally and teaching unit SOPs and basic LRS skills. This phase could last up to 30 days. Phase II began when the soldier arrived in Kosovo. It consisted of a two-week orientation program conducted by the Company leadership. A new soldier joined a team only after certification by the orientation cadre, and participated with a team mission only after approval of the platoon and team leadership.

This training program was one of the major successes of the operation. It was the principal reason the company was able to sustain a high level of performance throughout the mission, despite the loss of numerous soldiers and leaders.

Photo courtesy of author.

LRS Team ready to depart on a mission.

Mission Success

The LRS Company's high mission-success rate was a tribute to thorough training, planning, and small-unit leadership. Several missions stand out as noteworthy in the intelligence they produced. On one of these missions, a team inserted in the early morning hours near a suspected cache location near the Ground Security Zone (GSZ). Within 24 hours of insertion, the team was providing reports of insurgent activity: it reported several armed men

moving weapons and supplies into and around a small building. Upon receiving these reports, the TF dispatched a QRF infantry company (-) to the location. Using frequency modulation (FM) communications with the QRF, the LRS team vectored the QRF to the location, directed them to the cache locations, and singled out those individuals that had taken part in this illegal activity.

Another particularly successful mission resulted in the actual filming of insurgents' firing mortars and other weapons inside the GSZ. KFOR use this "evidence" to confront insurgent leadership when they denied engaging in such activities.

Overall, the LRSC missions—even those that produced "negative intelligence"—were extremely successful. The unit used doctrinal methods throughout, and they preserved the covert nature of their missions. After the MRE, we discovered that animals were a problem in compromising hide and surveillance sites; there were only seven instances during 45 missions when animals compromised the team's positions. (This was due to shepherds and mushroom pickers actually walking into the sites.)

Moreover, as is the measure with any intelligence operation, the information gathered during these operations produced usable operational intelligence that resulted in the confiscation and apprehension of personnel and equipment. The information also provided confirmation of insurgent activity, or lack of activity, in areas that we had not adequately investigated before.

Redeployment and Reintegration

As with the initial deployment, the redeployment required support from the entire Battalion. The Battalion began the redeployment preparation in late August, conducting IPRs and video teleconferences (VTCs) with the Company in Kosovo. Besides preparing soldiers and equipment for the deployment back to Germany, the Company had to prepare the soldiers' families for their return.

By the first of October, LRS missions supporting TF Falcon had ended. A Company advance team departed Kosovo for Germany to prepare for the arrival of equipment. During this transitional period, units provided classes for both spouses in the rear and deployed soldiers to prepare them for the reintegration with their family members after a six-month separation.

Upon arrival in Germany, the first priority was equipment accountability. After two weeks of recovering deployed equipment, using a half-day schedule that allowed for measured integration back into garrison and family life, the company received a three-week block leave. The two weeks devoted to equipment recovery not only gave the soldiers time to adjust to garrison and family life after a long absence but also gave the chain of command time to see soldiers during the adjustment period and identify any potential family or other problems. This program worked extremely well—there was not a single disciplinary incident during the first six months after returning from the deployment.

At the completion of block leave, the company began the long task of consolidating the unit property book (reintegrating the deployed equipment with the equipment that had remained in the rear). By mid-January 2001, all the administrative actions were complete, and the company was ready to initiate a three-month training cycle to become fully mission capable again. The focus of this training was on tasks from the mission-essential task list (METL) that we were not able to execute during the deployment, culminating with the Operations section planning missions for an upcoming Warfighter exercise.

Lessons Learned

As with any military operation, there were numerous lessons learned from the experience. Many of these lessons were of a very practical and detailed nature, and many relate directly to the execution of LRS missions. The unit has codified these lessons in a revamped SOP. These are some of the other larger lessons to come out of the deployment (see Figure 1).

Why did TF Falcon use the LRS Company? The LRSC was able to provide the TF with a capability that no one else could replicate. R&S is E Company's is primary mission. The company gathered critical intelligence, focused purely on answering the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR)—not available by any other means—and reported it directly to the TF Falcon command group. The LRS Company proved to be a valuable asset, with the flexibility to modify standard high-intensity conflict TTP in order to operate and succeed in the support and stability operational environment.

The resounding mission successes in Kosovo are attributable to the skill, training, and leadership of all the soldiers in LRSC who faced the challenges and hardships daily. The LRS Company's overall operational success supporting Task Force Falcon was due to the planning, support, and execution at all levels of command within the Company and TF Falcon.

As Brigadier General Dennis Hardy, a former TF Falcon Commander said—

> *In Kosovo, the Long-Range Surveillance Detachment performed vital reconnaissance and surveillance missions against a persistent, elusive paramilitary threat who had the home-field advantage—able to blend into the local countryside and population. In such*

situations, the tremendous intelligence capability [that] a well-trained, cohesive team offers is irreplaceable; reinforced but not replaced by modern technology. Using a combination of human ingenuity, stealth, and patience to develop real-time, actionable information, the LRS teams operated in both populated rural areas, as well as in unpopulated, rugged, densely forested terrain. Using their inherent warfighting skills and doctrine, the LRS detected and, most importantly, documented a wide variety of real-time, subversive activities, including actual cross-border, guerrilla-type offensive operations, weapons and small unit training exercises, illegal smuggling and weapons caches. Along the Presevo Valley sector, between Kosovo and Serbia, the LRSC's surveillance and documentation of weapons and insurgent training activities provided senior commanders the first reliable confirmation of suspected insurgent operations; information which was used to direct major interdiction efforts; information which played a major role in the eventual reduction and elimination of a potentially strategic threat—a clear example of a tactical operation with strategic significance.✷

Major Bob Chamberlain is currently the S3 for the 165th MI Battalion. He deployed with the ADVON to TF Falcon and prepared the company for the MRE and the initial missions. Major Chamberlain has served in numerous command and staff positions in airborne and light infantry units, and served also as a senior intelligence Observer/Controller at the JRTC.

First Sergeant Ralf Kluna served as the LRS operations NCOIC and then First Sergeant for E Company during the KFOR deployment. 1SG Kluna has served in numerous Ranger, LRS, and light infantry units. He is currently attending the Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss Texas.

- LRS employed in a doctrinal manner is a viable and valuable capability that has tremendous utility in a small-scale contingency operation like Kosovo. The current U.S. Army Training Doctrine Command (TRADOC) LRS doctrine, TTPs, and training work when adapted to unique characteristics of the terrain and mission. The LRSC's use of the current LRS doctrine and training ensured success.
- The employment of LRS requires the full participation of the controlling headquarters (in this case, TF Falcon Headquarters [HQ]). The employment of LRS teams is asset-intensive and requires detailed planning and coordination by the headquarters that owns "supporting" assets (medical, engineer, aviation, QRF) to ensure success.
- Units must fully integrate LRS assets into the C^2 and intelligence architectures. The ability of the TF to receive reports using various and compatible means is critical in allowing the LRS to provide timely intelligence. On numerous occasions, the LRS provided the initial report later handed off to a complementary intelligence system for monitoring and exploitation. The use of LRS as an intelligence tipper was highly successful.
- More work needs to be done to outfit LRS units with the best possible optical and communications equipment. Although our LRS deployed with a Mini-Remote Imagery Terminal digital video capability, they could not use it to its full capability due to its incompatibility with, and lack of dedicated access to, the TF communications network. Even though the LRS teams were successful in sending back video proof of GSZ violations, the quality was too poor to allow for "real time" use of the video, and insufficient bandwidth was available for continuous live video reporting.
- Critical to sustaining any deployed force is the unit's ability to rapidly integrate and train new soldiers. During the six-month deployment, our LRS Company conducted a successful turnover/integration of more than 15 percent of their soldiers. The success of the unit was clearly attributable to the development and execution of a training program that rapidly but deliberately integrated new soldiers into the LRS organization.
- Finally, a well-thought-out reintegration plan was critical to the well being of soldiers and families once soldiers returned from Kosovo. This program started in Kosovo, eased soldiers back into garrison and family life on return home, provided for block leave after an adjustment period, and then re-focused the unit through rigorous training.

Figure 1. LRS Lessons Learned in Kosovo.

Sustained Company Operations:
Lessons from the GS MI Company in Kosovo

by Captain Robert A. Culp, II

In February 1999, the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) in Germany began a deliberate planning process to conduct a forced entry operation into Kosovo to perform peacemaking operations. The training for this mission, from individual to collective and leader training, began immediately and lasted until two weeks before units of the 1ID began deploying to Kosovo in June 1999. The training included individual readiness training and a Mission Rehearsal Exercise at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), demanding maneuver live-fire exercises, and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training for leaders and flight crews. The successful 78-day air campaign in Kosovo (Operation ALLIED FORCE) negated the requirement to perform a forced entry operation. This change in the nature of the upcoming operation caused leaders at every level to expend enormous amounts of time preparing training and equipment as well as developing deployment and employment orders.

A Company, 101st Military Intelligence Battalion, deployed to Kosovo in two "serials," over two weeks, in June 1999. Upon arriving in theater, the company received immediate augmentation by a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) and Field Human Intelligence Teams (FHTs) from the 165th MI Battalion. In July, FHTs and an organizational control element (OCE) from the 519th MI Battalion as well as national level human intelligence (HUMINT) support replaced the 165th FHTs. By August 1999, the general support (GS) MI Company in Kosovo had grown to 125 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians.



Figure 1. TF Falcon GS MI Company in August 1999.

The 101st MI Battalion and the company leadership quickly realized that the unit's standing operating procedures (SOPs), although adequate for high-intensity conflict or operations at the combat maneuver training complex, were inadequate for operations from a base camp in Kosovo. The simple ideas presented below will help all units transition from the training cycles of garrison operations to sustained operations in a deployed environment.

Plan Before You Go

Leaders without SOPs for sustaining operations in a deployed environment will face certain challenges, even after intense preparation. They will need to simultaneously plan and execute missions in an uncertain and unfamiliar environment. Units will have to focus almost exclusively on executing the troop-leading procedures for these new missions and will often fail to take the time to develop a comprehensive unit SOP that addresses the necessary policies required for extended operations.

The types of processes and policies that sustain a unit in garrison will also sustain them in a deployed environment. The SOPs will be effective when modified in a well thought out, deliberate, integrated manner. Units that do not take the time to properly modify their SOPs to meet the local U.S. Task Force policies will be forced to develop expedient solutions for problems and incidents as they occur. This is dangerous because policies created "on the fly" are not thoughtfully developed and end up conflicting with each other or with local policies. Worse, policies and procedures developed hastily may not pass a legal review if tested, may violate local or Army regulations, or may have second- or third-order effects that are damaging to unit morale.

Control Measures

SOPs and policies are really a set of control measures used to guide individual and unit behavior through routine actions so their handling is consistent, fair, and efficient. Some examples of control measures that require implementation through policies follow.

Cohabitation, visitation, and sharing of facilities. Soldiers of different genders deployed to an austere location may not have separate facilities for sleeping and hygiene for a period of time. Eventually the chain of command must decide whether male and female soldiers may share tents or barracks. If they do, what control measures will be put into place to ensure that everyone's dignity and right to privacy are respected without adversely affecting the morale of a particular group? Latrine use must similarly be considered. Married couples who deploy together may wish to cohabitate or have conjugal visits. Policies that address the topics above must be balanced and realistic and allow soldiers to visit one another during off-duty hours without creating dissension or low morale for other groups.

Security of arms, ammunition, and explosives. We must realistically address the security of arms, ammunition, and explosives. Since unit arms rooms will most likely not exist. The standard sensitive-items reports that sustain units through field exercises will not be sufficient to address the range of activities in which soldiers and units will be involved during an extended deployment. The more a unit operates its deployed arms room like a garrison arms room, the less likely the unit is to lose accountability of sensitive items. While soldiers will most likely retain their individual firearms and ammunition, it is not realistic to expect every team and squad to guard its crew-served weapons, mines, pyrotechnics, or nightvision goggles around the clock for extended periods of time. Where will the unit store this equipment? Who will guard it? Who has the authority to issue and receive these items? What is the mechanism for controlling the inventory of stored items? The unit should address all the above questions before arriving in theater.

Weapons and ammunition safety. Proximity to large numbers of weapons and ammunition presents a safety issue that must be addressed and briefed to soldiers before they are issued the ammunition. Failure to develop these policies before a unit deploys will result in soldiers being issued ammunition and discarding the packing material that will help them maintain the ammunition in a clean, safe manner for the duration of the deployment. How will soldiers carry grenades or belted ammunition on their person? What is the stoage/load plan for mines and explosives in vehicles? Current range practices in most units and field training exercises with blank ammunition do not adequately address these considerations.

Maintenance operations. Failure to develop an aggressive maintenance program before deployment can have disastrous consequences. While units can use most of their garrison SOPs in a deployed environment with a little modification, it is vitally important for the chain of command to communicate maintenance standards while on deployment. This will quickly dispel the rumor that maintenance standards will be different when deployed. Failing to meet the standard before deployment will result in many hours of work for the maintenance section and the chain of command to get maintenance operations up to standard.

Soldiers will still need training and licensing on unit equipment. Did the unit instructor driver (UID) ensure that all current drivers' licenses for deployed soldiers are in the Unit-Level Logistics System-Ground (ULLS-G) computer? Did the UID bring the company UID book and appropriate regulations for training and licensing drivers? Units must conduct and track services on all categories of unit equipment and must calibrate tools. The Army Oil Analysis Program will eventually become operational in the theater. All of these maintenance systems are administratively intensive. Units that deploy without the appropriate manuals, documentation, forms, and ULLS-G configuration are doomed to having an ineffective maintenance program. Before deployment, enlist the expertise of the maintenance experts and civilian contractors. This will help prepare maintenance policies to ensure that the policies are adequate for extended operations in

a deployed environment. This will also ensure that the unit deploys with all the required paperwork and documentation to maintain the Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS).

Company administration. Standard garrison procedures for processing routine administrative actions may not apply in a deployed environment. Promotion boards, personnel actions, pay inquiries, and a host of administrative procedures will be different based on the servicing personnel and administration center (PAC) and finance unit. Commanders and first sergeants must sit down with unit S1s and PAC noncommissioned officers early in the deployment to iron out the problems that will occur in adapting to the new systems.

These issues make the importance of having SOPs and systems for tracking administrative actions even more important than they are in garrison. The same types of data you track in unit orderly rooms and at command and staff meetings in garrison require tracking in deployed units. Plan on having regularly scheduled meetings to sit down with the company and battalion leadership to review this data, just as you would in garrison. The inability to process routine personnel actions because of inadequate tracking systems seriously decreases unit morale.

Physical Training. The decentralized nature of a general support MI company requires a realistic, innovative approach to implementing a physical fitness program. Night time meetings with sources, shift work, early morning maintenance recovery operations, and a host of other factors demand a flexible physical training (PT) program. It must have achievable standards and allow first-line supervisors the latitude and flexibility to tailor the workday and PT schedule to meet soldier, mission, and Army standards.

It is not sensible to insist that all soldiers assemble at 0630 for unit PT every day. This type of program will fail because the mission will continuously intrude on the PT plan. The objective of the PT program should be to ensure that soldiers remain fit and healthy and to develop unit esprit de corps. First-line leaders who will lead small teams of soldiers on intelligence collection operations should be able to execute, without supervision, a unit PT program that meets basic standards.

Inprocessing and outprocessing. During extended military operations, units will gain personnel when they receive replacements. Personnel will also leave the theater due to sickness, injury, family emergency, or death. Soldiers will arrive in country with a variety of backgrounds and experiences. They may come from sister services or other government agencies. All will need training on the equipment that they will operate and the weapons they will handle. They will need to know the rules of engagement, uniform and equipment standards, SOPs, and the policies and procedures of the higher headquarters. The unit's replacement training program is the most important, fundamental training program in the company; you must strictly enforce it to be successful.

First-line leaders are responsible for executing the program according to the standards that you set. First sergeants and commanders must spot check and supervise to ensure that the standards are met. Failure to do so can endanger soldiers because of inadequate training or poorly maintained equipment. This must be a zero-defect policy.

Similarly, leaders must carefully control and supervise the out processing of soldiers from the unit. Failure to establish clear out processing guidelines supervised by first-line leaders and checked regularly by everyone in the chain of command can result in soldiers leaving the area of operations with unit equipment. A strictly enforced SOP will ensure that soldiers depart the theater with all awards and entitlements, while will drastically reducing the number of reports of survey for missing equipment.

Simple Solutions

The issues addressed in this article may seem overly simple; however, "Murphy's Law" is always in the details. The practical execution of routine company business can be enormously difficult and time consuming for the company's leadership if not properly set up and executed. In order to be successful, units must implement clear, directive unit SOPs and policies before an extended deployment.✹

Commissioned at New Mexico Military Institute, Roswell, New Mexico, Captain Robert Culp served as an Infantry officer in the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Following the MI Officer Transition and Advanced Courses, he served in a variety of positions in the G2, Division ACE, and S2 for TF 1-26 IN in Bosnia with 1ID. He commanded A Company, 101st MI Battalion, the GS MI Company, for TF Falcon in Kosovo. CPT Culp is currently assigned as TF S2 Observer/Controller at Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at Robert.Culp@polk.army.mil (work) or culpra@earthlink.net (home) or telephonically at (337) 531-0162 and DSN (312) 863-0162.

Kosovo: Ancient Battlefield, Ancient Enemies

by Lieutenant Colonels John S. Rovegno and T. Mitchell Cowan

On 12 June 1999, just three days after Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson signed the *Military Technical Agreement* (*MTA*) with representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the lead elements of Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo. The path into Kosovo was through the narrow Kacanic pass, a route very familiar to Task Force (TF) Falcon intelligence analysts who had studied it in detail as a possible invasion route. Once in Kosovo, the scenes of the recent fighting became evident. We saw a few Albanian flags (signs of a perceived victory) but most apparent were the destroyed buildings, burned-out cars, animal carcasses, land mines at the side of the road, and a notable absence of people.

This article discusses the formation and deployment of KFOR and the differences between Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We then present a short lesson in Balkans history and how it affects KFOR.

TF Falcon and MNB-E

TF Falcon, the U.S. element led by the 1st Infantry Division (1ID), and the Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E) entered Kosovo on 12 June, established base camps Monteith and Bondsteel, and commenced operations in the U.S. sector. The Multinational Battalions from Greece, Poland, and Russia augmented the Brigade. MNB-E's area of operations (AO) is in southeastern Kosovo; it includes the *opstinas* (counties) of Kosovo Kamanecia, Novo Brdo, Gniljane, Vitina, Urosevac, Kacanic, and Strpce. The AO shares borders with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the south, FRY to the east, German sector to the west, and the British sector to the north (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. NATO and the U.S. Sector.

The pre-conflict population of the area was approximately 47,000 Serbs and 400,000 Kosovar Albanians. When U.S. elements entered the MNB-E area of operational responsibility, there were approximately 35,000 Serbs and fewer than 1,000 Kosovar Albanians. By 24 June 1999, nearly 150,000 Kosovars had returned and retributions began.

Establishing the Intelligence Baseline

Kosovo was an intelligence void. The *MTA* removed all Serb forces from Kosovo; the Minister of Interior Police (MUP), Paramilitary Forces, and Serbian Army (VJ) forces had departed. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UÇK)—its force composition never documented—entered cities and towns to establish itself as the "rightful" government of the province. The historical notion of "enemy" did not apply. There were few uniforms (some uniformed UÇK), no units, no armor, no radio nets, and most significantly no frontlines.

The bombing campaign of Operation ALLIED FORCE had two significant impacts on intelligence collection before our entry. First, it reduced the telephone lines and cellular telephone networks to rubble, effectively eliminating the use of electronic surveillance to gather information. Second, the movement of the population out of Kosovo negated timely intelligence on ongoing operations.

Collection operations encompassed all facets of MNB-E. Patrols, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Special Operations Forces (SOF), civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PYSOP), force protection teams, U.S. National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners all provided vital input. Collection focused on any area where Serbs remained and along the border to the east where the VJ stood poised to return. It was quickly apparent that tensions would and did rise in the areas of the most brutal ethnic cleansing.

What is Different in Kosovo?

In a word, everything. This was not Bosnia—although it may have looked like another Balkans mess, it was completely different. There was no zone of separation: Serbs and Albanians lived side by side, separated by language, culture, and, for the most part, an intense hatred fueled by more than 600 years of conflict. Albanians and Serbs both claimed the MNB-E region as their own and there was plenty of fight left on both sides.

The initial threat, the VJ, was gone, as were the MUP and the brutal paramilitary. There was no judiciary or civil government to administer the law and govern the people. Organized crime inflated prices and established storefronts. Violence and retribution continued. The Albanian population, which had fled under the relentless pressure of Serb intimidation, returned and immediately sought vengeance. Whether personal or clan, this retribution was part of the Albanian code discussed later in this article. In areas where Serbs had committed atrocities against Albanian families, the Albanians struck back hard and without mercy. They used threats, intimidation, and violent attacks to drive the remaining Serbs from Kosovo. In areas around Urosevac (now Ferazai), the Serb population dwindled from 5,000 to fewer than 25 in 3 months.

In the first nine months of MNB-E operations, more than one thousand incidents occurred between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. These included 826 reports of hostile fire, 24 mortar or recoilless rifle attacks, 144 grenade attacks, 63 mine strikes, and numerous physical assaults. Hostile action resulted in the death of 1 MNB-E soldier and 32 wounded.

Balkans History

Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it.

—George Santayana, The Life of Reason

Kosovo is a history lesson. There are no short-term memories, forgiveness, or compassion where history is concerned. Whether it covers events of the past 600 years or the past week, history drives the mindset of both Kosovar Albanian and Serb. It is a history set in epic poem[1], storytelling, and folk song. To understand the people, you must first understand their past, however skewed it is. History is a standing priority intelligence requirements (PIR). To gain the advantage and disrupt an event, action, or revenge, learn the history of the town, *opstina*, and clan (family) (see Figure 2).

The Albanian People

One cannot understand the Albanian people without understanding the code (*kanun*) of Leke Dukagjine. (He was a powerful 15th century Albanian feudal lord generally credited with the formation of the code.) This "code" has an impact on a person's word (besa) or honor. Personal honor is the primary principle of the code. Individuals who break their word pay for the offense, not in property but in blood. In Kosovo, the extended family is the executor of retribution and the blood feud exists today as a reason for retribution in Kosovo. Family honor is at stake and satisfying that honor is paramount. It is easy to justify vengeance with history as an ally.

While personal honor is the basic principle of the code, another principle is the *besa* (oath) equivalent to one's word of honor, which creates a situation of inviolable trust. No contract or witness is necessary for an oath to be binding. One forestalls the burden of "entering into" a *besa* by not saying something unless intending to deliver.

Much of the Albanian history of revolts and rebellions is attributable to the internalization of the *kanun*. Bloodshed is the only remedy to dishonor; a person must arm himself at all times to be ready to protect his honor. The implications for KFOR are obvious. One of the peacekeepers' primary tasks is confiscation of weapons, but the Albanians believe they cannot give

7th Century - Slavic Serbian Territory
12th - 14th Century - Serbian Independence
1389 - The Battle - Kosovo Polje - Turks Win
1690 - 1738 - Serbs Fled
1878 - Treaty of Berlin - Serbs Independent
1914 - WWI - Kingdom of Serbs, Croats & Slovenes
1944 - WWII - Tito liberates Yugoslavia - Detaches Kosovo
1963 - Kosovo Receives Autonomous Status
1989 - Milosevic Revokes Kosovo Autonomy
1991 - Kosova Shadow Government
1996 - UÇK Formed
1998 - MUP Sent to Quell Unrest
1998 - UN Observers Enter
1999 - Peace Talks / UNSCR 1244 / MTA

Figure 2. Kosovo: A Short History.

them up. Family retribution retains honor no matter who is in control.

> *I grieve for my birth place, necessity and misfortune compelled me to move. My father and grandfather and great-grandfather are buried in Kosovo; my heart is down there. I'll never be myself here, in spirit I'm still in Kosovo.*
>
> **— Serb worker after fleeing to Serbia from Kosovo, August 1999**

The Serbs

Kosovo has been a part of the national consciousness of the Serbian people for six centuries. The basic ethical values bequeathed to the Serbians on Vidovdan in 1389 are impressed in the innermost being of every Serb. Every nation has one date in its history that it considers most important; for the Serbs, that date is 15 June by the old calendar or 28 June by the new or Vidovdan calendar. On that day in 1389, Serbian and Turkish armies clashed on the Kosovo Field.

To the Serbs, Kosovo is their Holy Land, the cradle of Serbdom, which contains their inalienable historical, national, and cultural heritage. Vidovdan, 15 June 1389, is not just the date of a battle but the day the national identity was born; the will and testament containing religious, ethical, and national principles that guided all Serb generations since. In the national conscious, that historic day divides Serbian history. On the Kosovo Field on Vidovdan, the Serbs chose by unwritten pledge their religious, cultural, ethical, and national identity and they live by that pledge today.

KFOR and MNB-E are now charged to protect the Serbs in their enclaves and reverse the effects of social and economic isolation brought on by the Albanians.

Conclusion

Life in Kosovo has clearly improved during KFOR's first year. Job growth continues and employment exceeds that of the pre-war years, traffic clogs the roads, 70 percent of small businesses in Kosovo have restarted, and the main population areas' streets have a continuous succession of cafes and bars. However, problems still exist and infrastructure is still weak. Kosovo still operates without light or heavy industry. The water system is problematic everywhere and many towns use shallow wells sited beside outhouses. A judicial system and local government are still lacking, but the elections are a step in the right direction. However, a government that represents only one side can never solve the problems or overcome the history each holds so dear.

Indicators of normalcy abound, but as George Santayana asserted, "History cannot be forgotten." Security in the region exists because of our presence; it will last only as long as KFOR soldiers are there. The situation still requires an international end-state. If the international community develops the right strategy, we can act now at a much lower cost in personnel and other resources than if we wait for the situation to deteriorate further.

Endnote

1. Task Force Falcon's name comes from an epic Serb poem. Its first three lines are—

> *The Fall of the Serbian Empire*
> *Yes, and from Jerusalem, O*
> *from that holy place, A great*
> *gray bird, a taloned falcon flew!*

Lieutenant Colonel John Rovegno has served for more than 20 years as an intelligence officer throughout the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. His assignments include platoon leader, two company commands, S2, the first S2 Observer/Controller at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Battalion S3 and Executive Officer, Instructor, J2 Operations Officer, and G2. While at U.S. Army Central Command, he deployed on several operations including VIGILANT WARRIOR, VIGILANT SENTINEL, DESERT STRIKE, and RUGGED NAUTILUS. He joined the 1st Infantry Division in April 1997 as the G2, serving as G2, Task Force Eagle in Bosnia-Herzegovina for six months. LTC Rovegno remained the 1ID G2, working extensively in Germany and Macedonia until February 1999 when he took command of the 101st MI Battalion and deployed with the battalion as part of the Kosovo Initial Entry Force in June, remaining in Kosovo just over one year. He is a graduate of the MI Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Electronic Warfare/Cryptologic Officer Course, Command and General Staff College, and the Armed Forces Staff College. LTC Rovegno received a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration from Shippensburg University, Pennsylvania, and a Master of Public Administration degree from the University of Missouri. He is currently attending the War College. Readers can reach him via E-mail at john-rovegno@us.army.mil.

Lieutenant Colonel Mick Cowan is currently the Chief, Intelligence Support to Acquisition and Current Intelligence, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command. He has served in a variety of intelligence positions including S2 for 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, 25th Infantry Division (Light). He served as S2, 1st Brigade, and Commander, A Company, 124th Military Intelligence Battalion with the 24th Infantry Division, at Fort Stewart, Georgia. While assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, he served as G2 Plans Officer for TF Eagle in Bosnia, and G2 Plans Officer and Deputy G2 with G2 TF Sabre, Macedonia, G2 TF Falcon/Multinational Brigade-East in Kosovo, and Executive Officer, 101st Military Intelligence Battalion. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. LTC Cowan earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Criminology from Saint Leo College and a Master of Science in Management from Saint Mary College. Readers may contact him via E-mail at thomas.cowan@monroe.army.mil or cowantm@monroe.army.mil and telephonically at (757) 728-5385 and DSN 680-4194.

1. Thumbs up for NATO.
2. BG Fast speaks with Intelligence soldiers at Camp Montieth.
3. Camp Bondsteel with mountains in background.
4. D Co, 101 MI, breaks the monotony with a donut eating contest. SPC Juan Aponte takes the gold.

Photos courtesy of LTC John Rovegno.

CONCEPTS & DOCTRINE

TRADOC Analysis Center—Fort Lee Reconnaissance Study Part II: The Findings

by Michael P. Ley

*Editors Note: The first article, "...Part I: The Study," was in the July-September 2000 issue of **MIPB** on page 47. You can access it at the **MIPB** website (http://huachuca-usaic. army.mil/mipb/mipbhome/welcome.htm).*

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments (DCSCD) designated the TRADOC Analysis Center, Fort Lee (TRAC-Lee) as the lead agency to conduct this study. The study focused on the four tactical reconnaissance systems that the Interim Brigade Combat Team's (IBCT) Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron would employ through 2010.

Purpose and Relevance of the Study

The purpose of this study was to conduct a comprehensive examination on how the IBCT's RSTA Squadron could fulfill their reconnaissance requirements using these systems. The study also identified requirements and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for command and control (C^2), communications and computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) architecture interface and technical improvements to meet the maneuver commander's reconnaissance needs.

TRAC-Lee evaluated four reconnaissance systems. The one Legacy System and three newer systems include:

- ❑ RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter.
- ❑ The Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV).
- ❑ The Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS).[1]
- ❑ The Shadow 200 Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV).

The TRAC-Lee Reconnaissance study focused on those systems that will serve as the Army's primary reconnaissance platforms through end of this decade. When fielded, combatant commanders and intelligence managers and analysts will rely on these systems not only to collect information critical to the outcome of the close battle, but in the case of the Comanche, to serve as a weapons platform and critical force multiplier. Because of their value to combatant commanders, the IBCT's S2 and intelligence analysts should have an understanding of both their information collection capabilities and their combat capabilities, limitations, and survivability factors. This study provides information that is important because it is relevant to mission planning, ISR management, and force design. TRAC-Lee designed this reconnaissance study to provide information in an exercise environment that is as realistic as possible. All of the exercises used a simulated Balkans environment.

Supporting Exercises

Three exercises supported the evaluation. These included:

- ❑ Virtual Exercise. Employing eight specific treatments, this exercise focused on the proposed TTP associated with the four systems under study. Fort Knox, Kentucky, hosted this May 2000 exercise.
- ❑ Constructive Exercise. This exercise examined the effectiveness of the reconnaissance systems and associated TTP across the full spectrum of conditions—terrain, threat, and visibility. The focus in this exercise was to further explore potential TTP and assess the effect on mission accomplishment as METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and time available and civilians) conditions varied. Whenever possible, the exercise contained sufficient replications to attain statistical validity and quantification of variations in performance within each case or iteration and for each reconnaissance system. This exercise took place at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, in July 2000.
- ❑ Subject Matter Expert (SME) Map Exercise (MAPEX). In September 2000, the third in the series of exercises and evaluations was also at Fort Knox. This exercise focused on issues associated with specific alternatives and excursions not addressed by the constructive simulation. This exercise also addressed employment of the previously identified reconnaissance systems within an urban environment, an environment in which their capabili-

ties would be weakest. This exercise used the target urban area of Pristina, where a mixed infantry regiment—light and mechanized—represented the threat.

Study Objectives and Issues

Given METT-TC constraints, the Reconnaissance Study explored the TTP associated with the IAV, TUAV, FSCS, and Comanche in scenarios revealing their expected capabilities in 2007 and 2010. The objectives were to:

- Expand the body of knowledge concerning how IBCT RSTA units execute the combined arms reconnaissance mission.
- Provide insights into the value added by those systems in selected scenarios.
- Demonstrate the utility of both manned and unmanned reconnaissance systems.
- Supply criteria to determine the appropriate mix of systems within reconnaissance organizations.
- Identify the synergies that occur when the reconnaissance systems are truly interoperable.
- Contribute insights regarding the best C^2 solutions.

TRAC-Lee, working in conjunction with the respective system proponents, identified four major issues. They studied these issues under a range of battlefield environmental conditions and identified each system's strengths and weaknesses within those specific environments. The major issues included:

- How should Comanche, IAV, FSCS, and the TUAV inter operate as a combined arms reconnaissance capability?
- What operational TTP will IBCT RSTA ground and air reconnaissance systems employ under widely disparate METT-TC conditions?
- What tactical C^2, communications and computers, and ISR requirements exist to ensure Army XXI cavalry and reconnaissance units can successfully obtain, fuse, share, and exploit battlefield information across METT-TC extremes?
- What improvements to existing methodologies, models, and simulations would provide better analysis of intelligence, reconnaissance, and situational awareness issues?

Conclusions

The synergy of Comanche, TUAV, IAV, and FSCS performing reconnaissance as part of an internetted combined arms team, proved an effective force on the battlefield. This force was able to conduct its reconnaissance mission, keep the initiative, dominate the enemy, and move through the zone at will.

The situational awareness provided by the robust C^2 network focused the effort of the squadron's organic reconnaissance systems, and permitted these systems to maneuver with less risk. As the squadron combined its systems' capabilities with the external ISR network, the resulting situation awareness led to "self-synchronization" of the squadron's battlefield operating systems, which both enhanced the effectiveness of the reconnaissance effort and further minimized risk for the squadron.

As designed, the 2007 scenario included use of the TUAV, IAV and Comanche while the 2010 scenario included use of the TUAV, FSCS and Comanche. Each of these systems brought some degree of unique reconnaissance capability to the squadron. When employed simultaneously on the synthetic battlefield, these reconnaissance systems proved to be an extremely capable force.

RAH-66 Comanche. The Comanche is a powerful combination of wide-area, rapid search sensors; terrain independent mobility; and highly lethal weapon systems. The Comanche provided a powerful wide-area search capability, and across the battlefield. Linked to the C^2, communications and computers, and ISR architecture, the Comanche without equal in its ability to maneuver to an area, quickly assess the situation, and provide this information to the unit's common operational picture (COP). When needed, the Comanche could provide lethal fires and direct effects such as artillery-delivered smart munitions or close air support (CAS).

IAV and FSCS. The IAV and FSCS offered a combination of a wide search area, rapid search sensors, and superior mobility, and they operated with cavalry scouts. The FSCS proved the more capable of the systems. Without a doubt, they were the source of sustained situational awareness within their areas of operation. Their enhanced sensor packages facilitated their ability to detect the enemy at extended ranges, which often influenced the squadron's scheme of maneuver. Due to the diminished observation capability of aerial reconnaissance platforms in complex terrain, the squadron needed the IAVs and FSCSs to reconnoiter those areas. The systems, especially the FSCS, allowed the squadron to employ lethal indirect and direct fires on the enemy, based on their detection capabilities. Just as with the TUAV, the IAV and FSCS, with their laser-designation capabilities also served as "sensors" for armed aerial platforms such as the Comanche and Air Force CAS.

TUAV. The TUAV proved to be a responsive reconnaissance system, minimizing risk to soldiers, providing detailed information regarding focused areas, and offering a powerful capability as an effective platform. The squadron commander and his staff—primarily the S2 and fire support officer (FSO)—capitalized on the TUAV's ability to assist in mission completion. In particular, the TUAV was useful in both the aerial reconnaissance and targeting roles. The S2 often deployed the TUAV well ahead of follow-on reconnaissance assets to paint the picture of the zone of action. It effectively provided critical information on maneuver routes, danger areas, and the final reconnaissance objectives. However, the Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Utility Software Environment (MUSE) simulations limited TUAV sensor performance to threshold capabilities. This level of sensor performance forced the TUAV to fly close to named areas of interest (NAIs) and detected enemy systems, thus exposing the TUAV airframe to additional risk. Improved sensor performance would improve detection capabilities and permit the TUAV to observe wider areas from a given operating location. In addition, improved sensor and laser performance would permit the TUAV to achieve observation and direct effects from a greater standoff range.

There are tremendous synergies between Comanche, IAV, FSCS, and the TUAV. This combined arms force, leveraging shared situational awareness, proved to be highly synergistic. When higher echelon C^2, communications and computers, ISR assets, and tactical reconnaissance systems were all using the same COP, self-synchronization occurred as various elements of the force reacted to a given situation. This synchronization rendered the enemy initiative ineffective, making it a desirable feature during future operations. The second effect of interface between higher echelon and tactical assets is the constant ability for the tactical assets to tune their actions to the current situation. Finally, linking external ISR assets with tactical reconnaissance systems created an environment in which commanders could react swiftly and directly.✹

Endnote

1. The U.S. Army plans to replace the less capable IAV with the FSCS between 2007 and 2010.

Mr. Mike Ley is currently a doctrine writer in the Doctrine Division, Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD), in the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. He retired from the Army in 1990. While on active duty, he served two tours as a military advisor in the Republic of Vietnam. He also served as a Polish linguist at Field Station Berlin. He was the Operations officer for the 265th Army Security Agency (ASA) Company and was the S2 for the 2/503d Infantry Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He also served as the Operational Test Officer, at the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Board, and an Independent Evaluator, at the Fort Huachuca Directorate of Combat Developments. He was the Collection Management Liaison Officer for the Third Republic of Korea (ROK) Army and later worked as a software test engineer on both the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) and on the Hunter UAV project. He has a degree in Cartography from Ohio University, Athens. Readers may contact Mr. Ley via E-mail at michael.ley@hua.army.mil or telephonically at DSN 879-0979.

- ❑ The Army should continue movement toward internetted forces, tied to a near real-time shared situation awareness. The resulting agility and synergistic cooperation gives a unit combat power greater than is achievable by any other means.
- ❑ The Army should aggressively pursue further development and acquisition of advanced tactical reconnaissance platforms. The Comanche, IAV, FSCS, and TUAV all offer unique and powerful capabilities that will dramatically enhance reconnaissance effectiveness and directly affect the outcome of future Army operations. The Army should further develop each of these systems with a clear intent to incorporate automated and semi-automated data feeds into the C^2 network.
- ❑ Development of advanced TUAV sensors should continue, particularly those efforts that provide the TUAV a wide-area search capability and improve its ability to observe from standoff positions. The Army should also consider providing the TUAV operator an aided target detection capability, similar to those planned for the Comanche and FSCS.
- ❑ Finally, any follow-on studies and model development efforts should better address ISR and information dominance issues.

Figure 1. Recommendations for Improving IBCT Reconnaissance.

HUMINT Collection During Peace Operations

(continued from page 17)

Forms 2745 are available to each soldier in the unit who may detain suspects.

Conclusion

In the fog of operations, we can overlook routine and simple tasks. Efficient processing of EPWs and detainees improves the ability of HUMINT collectors to provide crucial intelligence information that aids intelligence analysis. By standardizing reporting procedures, TF 101 MI enabled HUMINT managers to focus on mission requirements and improved asset management. The G2 had better information on the number of persons detained and the reasons for detention. Our intelligence system could respond much faster to the questioning of HVT personalities and go into the "booth" better prepared for questioning. The most important lessons learned we can share on peace operations include—

- ❑ Work continuously with units to ensure that they understand the proper procedures to use in personnel detention and the rapid evacuation of detainees to the rear.
- ❑ Obtain a legal opinion of what HUMINT Collectors can and cannot do based on the rules of engagement (ROE) and the Law of War.
- ❑ Prepare a standing operating procedure (SOP) or memorandum of agreement (MOA) that delineates criminal investigation and intelligence collection responsibilities for local police, MPs, soldiers, the criminal investigation division (CID), intelligence collectors, U.N. police, and the units.✹

Chief Warrant Officer Three Gary Barnett is currently the CI Team Leader, B Company, 101st MI Battalion. He served as Chief, OCE, for TF Falcon from March through June 2000. CW3 Barnett holds a Bachelor of Liberal Arts degree from the University of New York Regent's College and is a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy. Readers may contact him via E-mail at barnettg @hq.1id.army.mil and telephonically at 0931-889-7215 or DSN 350-7215/ 7309.

Objective Force Needs High-Speed Strategic Lift and Leader Development

by Jim Caldwell

FORT MONROE, VA. (TRADOC News Service, 18 July 2001) – Strategic high-speed air and sealift will be essential to get the Army's Objective Force to a theater of operations within the 96-hour deployment goal. The current chain of command—brigade, division, corps, and echelons above corps—will still be necessary on the dispersed battlefields of the future.

The second Transformation Wargame held at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 22-27, showed that the Army must retain and develop these two areas to make Army Transformation a reality.

"This objective force would be a force that would be combat-configured, ready to fight off the ramp," said Bill Rittenhouse, director of wargames at Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) headquarters. Rittenhouse oversees staging the annual wargames.

Objective Force units can operate widely dispersed because of powerful ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) communication networks. Commanders can concentrate devastating direct and indirect fires on enemy targets without massing forces.

The scenario for the wargame, called Vigilant Warriors 01, is set in 2015, with the countries of Iraq and Iran united to form the Independent Republic. The Republic is ready to go to war with Syria and Turkey, who have dammed the Euphrates River, threatening its water supply. Syria and Turkey, as allies, call the United States for help.

TRADOC has published initial findings in the "Army Transformation Wargame 2001 booklet. Anyone interested may read or downloaded the report at: http://www.tradoc.army.mil/whatnew.htm.

TRADOC Analysis Command is performing an in-depth study of the wargame. Their results will be published later this summer as the Army Transformation Wargame Integrated Analysis Report.

PROPONENT NOTES

The Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (OCMI), website contains timely information on proponent issues ranging from enlisted career management field (CMF) overviews by military occupational specialty (MOS) to warrant officer current and archived newsletters. The address is http://huachuca-usaic. army.mil/ocmi/. We regularly update this site, and it has undergone recent improvements. Please add our site to your "favorite" resources for the latest information on the MI Corps.

Enlisted Actions

We have completed the first year of the new century. It seems just a short while ago that I joined OCMI and stepped into a rapidly paced environment undergoing some radical changes. We had just completed the Functional Review and the Functional Assessment Analysis. The new Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) had just been selected after undergoing a "fly-off" here at Fort Huachuca. The OCMI's lifecycle managers were putting the final touches to the Military Occupational Classification Structure (MOCS) for implementation upon the publication of the Notification of Future Changes (NOFC). We had settled on an MI force structure embedded within the Initial Brigade Combat Team. A great deal has happened in the last year and much more is sure to follow.

Many of you have already heard about the MI Corps vision of the future and the changes that are forthcoming within the 98 CMF. On 11 December 2000, the 111th and 112th MI Brigades, including the Noncommissioned Officers Academy (NCOA), Futures, and OCMI briefed the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) on the proposed implementation of the 98 CMF merger. Major General John D. Thomas, Jr., concurred with proceeding to merge the functionality of MOS 98J (Electronic Intelligence [ELINT] Interceptor/Analyst) (the *technical ELINT functions*) with 98K (Signals Collection/Identification Analyst) creating the new multimode MOS, 98Y. Additionally, the 98J *operational ELINT functions* will merge into MOS 98C (Signals Intelligence [SIGINT] Analyst).

There is still a great deal of coordination necessary as we discuss changing each affected billet with the appropriate major Army commands. The effective date of implementation will follow in an NOFC published in the October 2001 period. Follow-on considerations to create the multifunctional MOS are ongoing with further details not yet ironed out. A team from Fort Huachuca will visit and apprise the field of these changes specifically and how they affect the CMF and the soldiers holding those MOSs.

OCMI continues to work with MI Branch, the School House, and the field on all MOS issues including accessions, training, retention, incentives, and promotion issues related to Star MOSs[1]. All 13 of our MI MOSs have incentives for enlistment, reenlistment, or both to assist in our endeavors to provide commanders and senior enlisted leaders qualified soldiers to the field.

MI Branch has been extremely successful in brokering the MI Corps position with incentive monies for our soldiers. This year, however, the Army has taken a significant decrement in incentive money, and we are no longer able to shift incentive money from one MI MOS to another MI MOS. Now, all Army MOSs compete for the same shared funds.

One of our greatest concerns is the issue involving Star MOSs. As of December 2000, we have 10 of our 13 MI MOSs listed as Star MOSs for the Sergeant and/or Staff Sergeant ranks. Only 96U (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle [UAV] Operator), 97E (Human Intelligence Collector), and 98G (Cryptologic Linguist) MOSs are not listed as Star MOSs. Leaders must take a close look at their respective organizations and determine whether the Specialists and Sergeants in their units who are eligible for promotion based on time-in-grade and time-in-service are deserving of that next promotion. If so, units must board these soldiers for promotion to assist in filling those authorizations. If commanders board these readily eligible soldiers, the Army would select them for promotion almost immediately (within 90 days) to fill those vacant authorizations.

Lifecycle managers will work the next MOCS inputs through March 2001. Some of the issues we expect to address in the current MOCS cycle (beyond the 98 CMF merger recommendations discussed above) are—

- ❑ Changes in duty title for the 33W (Electronic Warfare/Inter-

cepts Systems Repairer) MOS as recommended by the Critical Task Site Selection Board CTSSB).

- Modification of the 33W grade structure as a result of the TUAV fielding.
- Additional skill identifier (ASI) S9 concerns and requirements we develop as the 11-week National Imagery Association Course for the 96D (Imagery Analyst) MOS.
- A new ASI that will replace the old ASI of 2T for the 10-week Tactical Exploitation System (TES) Course.
- Structure changes affected by the fielding of the TUAV and Common Ground Station (CGS) systems.

In all, the last year was extremely busy. This year does not appear any different as we forge ahead with the changes for the future. I would like to take this opportunity to formally bid farewell to OCMI's 33W Career Lifecycle Management Noncommissioned Officer (NCO), Master Sergeant John Zehmisch, who retired, and hail his replacement, Sergeant First Class Roger Bonesteel.

The primary point of contact (POC) for enlisted actions is Sergeant Major Antonio Moreno. You can reach him via E-mail at antonio.moreno@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-1174 or DSN 821-1174.

Warrant Officer Actions

The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has approved a proposal from the OCMI to establish a new warrant officer MOS 350U (TUAV Operations Technician). The feeder MOS will be 96U. The TUAV Operations Technician will be the primary advisor to the Commander on all aspects of TUAV employment and operation. The final details on personnel authorizations are undergoing completion, and we expect that the March 2001 Warrant Officer Accession Board will make the first selection. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) is currently accepting applications for MOS 350U TUAV Operations Technecian.

All current information on application procedures and prerequisites is available on the U.S. Army Recruiting Command homepage at http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant/Warrant.htm. Readers with questions can also call Chief Warrant Officer Five Rex Williams via E-mail at rex.williams@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-1183 or DSN 821-1183.

Officer Actions

During recent years, the Army has undertaken several initiatives to reduce field grade officer and captain authorizations to meet Defense Officer Personnel Management Act ceilings. On 7 September 2000, the Army Vice Chief of Staff approved several proposals to include the downgrade of 164 Modified Table of Organization and Equipment battalion S2 positions. Specifically, the Army identified the following battalion S2 positions for downgrading to lieutenant: Aviation, Engineer, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Military Police, Signal, Military Intelligence, and Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, and regimental support squadrons of the Armored Cavalry Regiments. The Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans sent implementing instructions in a message date-time group 310422Z October 2000.

The POC for officer actions is Ms. Charlotte Borghardt. You can reach her via E-mail at charlotte.borghardt@hua.army.mil, and by telephone at (520) 533-1188 or DSN 821-1188.

Endnote

1. A Star MOS is one for which the Army finds itself short authorizations in either the SGT or SSG ranks.

Contributing Editors and Proofreaders

We thank the following officers for their many contributions to the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*** for January-September 2001. They all worked in the MIPB Office while on casual status. We wish them all the best in their classes and their follow-on assignments!

Contributing Editors: CPT Robert S. Davidson, Jr., CPT Brian E. Jackson, CPT Timothy W. Johnson, and CPT Thomas H. Nguyen.

Editing, Proofreading, and Other Contributions: CPT Felix J. Almaguar, CPT Lakisha H. Anderson, 2LT Jason R. Campbell, 2LT Laurel M. Denniston, CPT Adam T. Fain, 2LT Robert D. Giuliano, CPT Joshua A. Grimm, CPT Demetrius "Mac" McClarty, CPT Maura K. McGrane, 2LT Susan M. Meggars, 2LT George P. O'Malley, 2LT Cory D. Poppe, CPT Mark G. Reardanz.

SLY FOX

by Sergeant First Class Eddie D. Shope

The new Chief of the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) Master Analyst Branch (AMAB) is Sergeant First Class Shope. My predecessor, Master Sergeant Kristine Sleighter, is now "standing up" the digital tactical operations center (TOC) in Rowe Hall, at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The digital TOC replicates a brigade TOC with all of the Army Battle Command Systems (ABCSs).

What is new with the ASAS Master Analyst Course (AMAC)? With the ongoing fielding of the ASAS Block II Remote Workstation (RWS), we are developing and transitioning our training to support the new system. Beginning with AMAC 01-003 (4 June through 30 July 2001), all RWS training will focus on the Block II RWS. We are also accepting candidate nomination packets from the combat maneuver brigades that will be fielding the Block II RWS. More of the training will focus on interoperability between the brigade S2 and the division analysis and control element (ACE). We have already begun training and assigning Master Analysts to the maneuver brigade S2 shops and the supporting military intelligence (MI) companies.

As the Army and MI transition into the digitized world, we at AMAB will continuously evolve our training to support the future needs of our MI soldiers. If you have any questions about our course, please review our website at URL (uniform resource locator) 138.27.202.66 or contact us by choosing "E-mail: AMAP" at this site.

Sergeant First Class Eddie Shope is the chief of the All-Source Analysis System Master Analyst Branch. You can contact him through the AMAB website, via E-mail at eddie.shope@hua.army.mil, and telephonically at (520) 533-4652 or DSN 821-4652.

TSM NOTES

Update on the Joint STARS Common Ground Station

by Colonel Stephen J. Bond

Last August, I became the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager, or "TSM," for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), Common Ground Station (CGS), and the Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT). For those of you not familiar with the TSMs, they are the Army's designated centralized managers and "user representatives" for high profile systems. They manage the combat development requirements, as well as oversee the TRADOC mission areas of doctrine, training, leader development, organizational structure, materiel, and soldiers for the designated systems.

TSMs are the counterparts to the Program and Project Managers (PMs), the designated materiel developers for the systems. Colonel Ron Nelson at Program Executive Office, Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, is the PM for the CGS, Joint STARS, and JTT. Colonel Nelson also arrived last summer. Although we are both relatively new to the positions, I can assure you that the TSM-PM team is engaged to support. If you have an issue or need information relating to the Joint STARS Common Ground Station (AN/TSQ-179) or its associated equipment or components—Joint Services Workstation, Commanders Tactical Terminal, or Joint Tactical Terminal—the TSM is the first stop for information and support.

CGS Version 2 (V2) Fielding

Last August, the Department of Defense Acquisition Executive approved the CGS for full production. We will procure and field 96 CGSs, and upgrades to the system will continue until mid-2004. We have already started to produce the upgraded Version 2 (V2) CGSs and have positioned three in Korea to support user testing and evaluation, six are in the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to support the First Digitized Division (FDD) Division Capstone Exercises (DCXes), and other V2s are in use at the Intelligence Center for training.

Formal fielding of these systems will occur when the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command gives the system a formal materiel release. Based on this likelihood, this summer we will begin to replace CGSs with upgraded V2s, in the 525th MI Brigade, 313th MI Battalion, 311th MI Battalion, and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Fielding to the rest of the active force and to selected Army National Guard (ARNG) Enhanced Brigades (eSBs) will commence in fiscal year 2002 (FY02). The V2 is a major improvement of the earlier CGS (V1). The improved V2 CGS has the added capabilities of connectivity to tactical collateral local area networks (LANs), access to various Imagery Product Libraries, enhanced imagery manipulation tools, connectivity to Airborne Reconnaissance Low-Multifunction (ARL-M), U-2R, Predator Ground, and an enhanced simulation capability.

CGS-Joint Stars Connectivity

During Joint STARS live flights, CGS operators often report failure to link with the aircraft or report receiving the downlink but cannot uplink with the aircraft. We believe that many of the problems are attributable to encryption or encryption devices.

The TSM Office and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) 93d Air Control Wing are collecting data and reviewing joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to correct this problem. We need feedback from units with CGSs when problems occur, and we will provide information on corrective actions at a later date.

High Mobility Trailer

The Army deadlined the M1102 High-Mobility Trailer (HMT) for safety reasons in 1998, due to problems with the trailer brake actuator and tow bar, which in turn caused problems to the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) bumper. This has affected fielding of the CGS. For this reason Army fielded the CGS in an interim three-vehicle configuration. This interim configuration includes the mission vehicle, one support vehicle, and one additional cargo HMMWV. A skid-mounted generator is available at the unit's option. The Army conducted extensive testing of the trailer, with a modified brake actuator mechanism and strengthened trailer chassis and tow bar. CGS fielding will recommence in the objective two HMMWV, two-trailer configuration in mid-2001. One HMMWV will mount the mission shelter, and the other is a standard four-passenger HMMWV support vehicle. Each will tow an M1102 HMT mounting a mobile electric power (MEP)-803A 10 kW Tactical Quiet Generator (TQG).

Field Engineer Support

The TSM office often receives inquiries about contract field service representatives (FSRs) support for exercises and normal maintenance support. As part of the system fielding for CGS, there are regional Field Support Offices at Fort Bragg, supporting units with CGSs at Forts Bragg, Campbell, Drum, Stewart, Polk, and Gordon. The Fort Hood regional office is responsible for the area including Forts Hood, Sill, Carson, and Bliss; the Motorola Scottsdale Activity supports Fort Lewis, Hawaii, and Alaska. There are also FSRs in Europe and South Korea.

These field engineers are part of the maintenance support provided with the fielding. One caution, the contract for field engineer maintenance will expire in FY02. However, the 33W (Electronic Warfare/Intercept Systems Repairer) maintainers are trained and capable of performing maintenance on the CGS system. In order to lessen the impact when the field support maintenance contract expires, ensure that you have established a relationship with your support organization 33Ws; they to perform maintenance on the system when required. Meanwhile, the maintenance contract is in place and the contract holder has an Online Technical Support Center staffed Monday through Friday, 0700 to 1700 Mountain Standard Time. If you need assistance, call toll free 1-888-898-4187. After hours, there is a voice-mail service at this number, or you can E-mail the Center at support1@email.mot.com.

SCDL Hotline

The developer of the Surveillance Control Data Link (SCDL) antenna and the CGS Ground Data Terminal (GDT) recently established a user hotline. Users with SCDL or GDT maintenance problems, questions, or concerns may contact the contractor directly at 1-858-864-2299 or go to http://www.nextel.com to send an E-mail message.

Colonel Steve Bond is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) for Joint STARS, Common Ground Station, and the Joint Tactical Terminal. Readers can contact him via E-mail at steve.bond@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-3605 or DSN 821-3605. The Deputy TSM is Lieutenant Colonel Trip Sproul. Readers can reach him at merril.sproul@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-8937 or DSN 821-8937.

ASAS RWS Block II Is Down Range!

by Colonel Jerry V. Proctor

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager (TSM) for the All-Source Analysis System New Equipment Training (NET) Team deployed a five-person team to Bosnia from 1 through 15 December 2000 to provide All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) Remote Workstation (RWS) Block II training to the 3d Infantry Division. This was the first time that the training team deployed into the Balkans to conduct a training mission.

The 3d Infantry Division (3ID) provided 20 soldiers and 13 leaders for the training at Eagle Base Camp. The Field Software Service Support (FSSS) representatives at the site prepared the ten RWS versatile computer units (VCUs) and encountered no significant hardware or software problems. The Division Commander, Major General Walter L. Sharp, gavethe lead-off speech for the operator training. He stressed the importance of the system, and the role it would play in the Balkans and back in the continental United States when the unit prepares for their Warfighter Exercise. The Sergeant Major of the Army, Jack L. Tilley also visited the training.

While in Bosnia, the NET Team also assisted the division in working through issues with the intelligence systems architecture. Members of the team met with the MI Battalion commander, his staff, and the G6 to discuss the issues and help reach solutions. Feedback from the unit was positive; the remainder of the 3ID ASAS users trained with the NET Team at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in January.

Mr. Mike Strack is the Acting TSM for ASAS. Readers can contact him via E-mail at mike.strack@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533-3504 or DSN 821-3504. The Deputy TSM is Lieutenant Colonel Vic Fink. Readers can reach him by E-mail at james.fink@hua.army.mil or by telephone at (520) 533-5145 or DSN 821-5145.

Have You Moved Recently?

Please notify ***MIPB*** of your address change. You may send an E-mail to ATZS-FDC-D@hua.army.mil with a subject: "address change." You can also call at (520) 538-1015 or DSN 879-1015 and write us at Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-FDC-D (MIPB), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

MI CORPS Hall of Fame

The Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame is proud to announce its five most recent inductees. This high honor recognizes the outstanding contributions made by these distinguished Americans to our country, our Army, and our Corps. The Hall of Fame inductees for 2001 are Chief Warrant Officer Five (Retired) Michael L. Fried, Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Randolph S. Hollingsworth, Lieutenant General (Retired) Patrick M. Hughes, Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Raymon V. Lowry, and Major General (Retired) Charles W. Thomas. The Hall of Fame 2001 Induction Ceremony to honor these distinguished Military Intelligence (MI) professionals took place on Friday, 29 June 2001.

This year the MI Corps also installed the Honorary Warrant Officer of the Corps at the Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony. The Honorary Warrant Officer of the Corps is a distinguished retired warrant officer who, with the Honorary Colonel and Honorary Sergeant Major of the Corps, seeks to perpetuate the history and traditions of the Corps, thereby enhancing morale and esprit de corps. This year the Chief of the MI Corps, Major General John D. Thomas, Jr., appointed Chief Warrant Officer Five (Retired) Michael L. Fried as the Honorary Warrant Officer of the Military Intelligence Corps.

Editor's Note: The biography of CW5 Fried follows; the other inductee's biographies will appear in a future issue of the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin.***

Chief Warrant Officer Five Michael L. Fried (U.S. Army, Retired) Discipline: Interrogation and Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Chief Warrant Officer Five (Retired) Michael L. Fried was born in 1934, in Koenigsberg, Germany. Fried and his family spent five and one half years in a Nazi concentration camp, after an attempt to escape persecution in Germany. Fried finally left the camp in 1945, and arrived in the United States in 1947.

In 1955, Michael Fried enlisted in the 10th Infantry Division. Because of his native German-language fluency, Military Intelligence recruited Fried. He served as an interrogator debriefing illegal border crossers, as well as members of the East German Border Troops who defected from East to West Germany. He performed as an Expert Linguist until his appointment as a Warrant Officer. Upon completion of the Vietnamese Language Course, he went to Vietnam, where he served as a Prisoner of War Interrogation Technician in the 101st Military Intelligence Company, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

He served as the 82d Airborne Division's Interrogation Prisoner of War Team Chief. While there, he was responsible for training soldiers of the Division in resistance to interrogation.

After completing the Warrant Officer Senior Course at Fort Rucker, Alabama, Michael Fried served as Chief, Border Operations Officer in the 165th MI Battalion in Frankfurt, Germany. He planned and supervised the overt East-West German border collection program and operations of the 165th MI Battalion. He exercised direct supervision of the Fulda, Bad Hersfeld, and Eschwege border resident offices and conducted liaison with major West German law enforcement and customs agencies. In February 1979, at Frankfurt, Germany, he assisted in debriefing Department of Defense-affiliated returnees from Iran. These extensive debriefings of a large number of people contributed significantly to the critical collection of information in response to national-level taskings levied by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the United States European Command. This aided in providing a timely basis for evaluations of the status of sensitive documents and equipment, and of the existing threats of the safety of U.S. citizens pending evacuation.

From July 1980 to April 1986, Fried served as the Interrogation Team Chief and Assistant S1, 109th

MI Battalion (Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence), at Fort Lewis, Washington. As Interrogation Team Chief in the Army's High Technology Test Bed Battalion, Chief Fried was responsible for providing HUMINT and document exploitation support to brigade and battalion intelligence officers during tactical operations.

Chief Fried then served in the 511th MI Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fulda, Germany, as the Border Liaison Officer. He controlled and directed the Regiment's Border Liaison System and exercised direct supervision over three Border Resident Offices operated by organic and supporting personnel. He provided tactical interrogation training support to the Regiment during field training exercises. He noticeably revitalized the Border Resident Office program within V Corps by developing new procedures and obtaining new equipment to facilitate the collection and reporting of intelligence information pertaining to the East-West German border. Fried escorted the first observers from the Warsaw Pact during REFORGER 87 and CARAVAN GUARD 88.

After completing the Master Warrant Officer Course, Fried served in the 18th MI Battalion, 66th MI Group in Munich, Germany. As the Assistant Battalion Collection Manager, he coordinated source acquisition, debriefing activities, and all operational matters which were crucial to Battalion debriefing activities of a number of highly knowledgeable sources. Chief Fried also conducted inspections of the Battalion sub elements on DIA collection strategies and compliance with Army regulations. He coordinated interrogation activities with local Navy, Air Force, and Allied Partners. From December 1990 to April 1992, Fried served as the Transition Cell officer-in-charge OIC for the 18th MI Battalion. He was responsible for the relocation and reorganization of the 18th MI Battalion and three companies of personnel and equipment from Munich to Augsburg. He closely monitored the progress of German contractors that renovated new Battalion facilities using his native German language skills to translate work specifications and coordinate with contractors on behalf of the Brigade Transition Cell.

CW5 Fried retired on 30 October 1996 with 41 years and 7 months of active service. He had also served in the New York National Guard before coming on active duty. Michael Fried is a full-time volunteer in the S1 section, 201st MI Brigade, at Fort Lewis, Washington.

1st USAR Linguist Unit (RTU)

The 1st USAR (U.S. Army Reserve) Linguist Unit (RTU) is a points-only linguist unit located in Alexandria, Virginia, but with a world-wide membership.

Our mission is to provide linguist support to Active and Reserve Component forces globally and to maintain perishable language skills by training qualified linguists in the Army Reserve. Membership is open to all Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Army Reservists regardless of rank, branch, foreign language background, and location.

The three major requirements are—

- ❑ Certified language ability (minimum Defense Language Proficiency Test or DLPT 2/2)
- ❑ Strong desire to maintain and increase language proficiency
- ❑ Motivation to actively contribute to the unit through projects and staff responsibilities. We are extremely flexible with training. This unit provides a great opportunity to use your foreign language skills, earn an officer or noncomissioned officer evaluation report (OER, NCOER), and gain access to paid, real-world language training opportunities with agencies world wide.

Interested candidates should contact Lieutenant Colonel Canning Kraft, Unit Recruiting Officer, at E-mail CKrafts@aol.com or write to Commander, 1st USAR Linguist Unit, ATTN: Recruiting Officer, Lieber USAR Center, 6901 Telegraph Road, Alexandria, VA 22310.

DISTANCE LEARNING

Fort Huachuca Distance Learning Office Supports the Soldiers

by Thomas Daley

The Fort Huachuca Distance Learning Office serves as the steward for the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) Distance Learning (DL) program. The DL Office oversees the development and release of DL products to support a wide variety of military occupational specialties (MOS) and disciplines. Defined as "learning occurring in which the instructor and student are separated by space and possibly time," DL presents challenges never before encountered by traditional instructional methods.

The DL Office website at www.intel.army.mil currently hosts more than one hundred different products addressing prerequisite, sustainment, and informational blocks of instruction. We invite you to check out our site and see what we have available. We have just fielded the Ground Surveillance System Training (GSST) lessons which will be a 96R (Ground Surveillance System Operator) MOS qualification course for U.S. Army Reserve and U.S. Army National Guard soldiers. The GSST lessons will join the 33W (Electronic Warfare/Intercept Systems Repairer) Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course and Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course courseware as one of our largest courses.One of our best resources for ideas and support is the soldier with the experience to know what works. You can play a part in the development of one of our newer initiatives; an electronic resource to support MI analytical skills, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and the military decision-making process. We are developing courseware to strengthen those skills for soldiers at all levels. We will make available on our website a library of examples of the matrices, templates, and checklists important to the intelligence professional. Send us your best stuff. Let us know how you have incorporated the material into your job, and why it will help your fellow soldiers. We will post it, host it, and make sure you get the credit for the contribution.

Do you know of a great site or resource that already exists? Point us to the right site or download and E-mail it to us. You can contact us at: USAIC&FH, ATZS-FDR-TA (Distance Learning Office), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. Please visit the DL site at www.intel.army.mil, or E-mail us at dlo@hua.army.mil.

Tom Daley is a Training Specialist in the Fort Huachuca Distance Learning Office. Readers can reach him via E-mail at dlo@hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 538-1012 or DSN 879-1012.

The 902d MI Group Needs Reservists for Training Opportunities

The 902d Military Intelligence Group and its subordinate units need highly motivated and physically fit MI soldiers from the Reserve Component (RC) to participate in a variety of training opportunities. Tours vary in length. A limited number of Individual and Drilling Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA/DIMA) and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) augmentation positions are also available. The Group's subordinate elements include the 308th and 310th MI Battalions and the Foreign Counterintelligence Activity.

The 902d is looking for RC noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the grades of E5 through E8 with a military occupational specialty of 97B (Counterintelligence Agent) and RC warrant officers with a MOS of 351B (Counterintelligence Technician). The 902d MI Group's headquarters is at Fort Meade, Maryland; however, it has subordinate elements in various locations across the continental United States. These locations include Forts Monroe, Bragg, Gordon, Knox, Benning, Leonard Wood, Monmouth, Leavenworth, Bliss, Hood, Huachuca, Lewis, Campbell, Sill, Carson, Devens; Rock Island Arsenal, Redstone Arsenal, Detroit, Atlanta, Orlando, White Sands, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and Los Alamitos, California.

Interested personnel should contact Ms. Helen Flowers-Hayes, the 902d MI Group's Reserve Affairs Officer, at (301) 677-4301/3897 or DSN 923-4301/3897. Come join the MI soldiers in the 902d MI Group who are truly "the quiet professionals."

How to Submit an Article to *MIPB*

Select a relevant topic of interest to the military intelligence community. For example, it could be about current operations and exercises, equipment, TTP, or training. It could be historical, explain lessons learned, or it could be an essay-type thought-provoking piece. It could be a short "quick tip" on better use of equipment or personnel, or fast "work-arounds" for problems. Articles from the "hot spots" are always welcome. Seek to add to the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Propose changes, describe a new theory to dispute an existing theory, explain how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or explain how a new piece of technology will change the way we operate.

Write an outline to organize your work and include a working title and headings. Plan to write 1,000 to 2,500 words (about 2 to 4 single-spaced text pages with normal margins, not counting graphics) and include graphics that enhance understanding of your topic. Quick Tips should be 300 to 800 words. Put the "bottom line up front" and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs. Follow proper rules of grammar. Consult **DA Pamphlet 600-67**, **Effective Writing for Army Leaders**, *or William A. McIntosh's* **Guide to Effective Writing**.

When writing for ***MIPB***, *the following are stylistic pitfalls to avoid for a clearer, more forceful article.*

- **Maintain the active voice as much as possible**. *Write, "The soldier performed the task" rather than "The task was performed by the soldier."*
- **Make your point**. *Avoid writing about internal organization administration. If your topic is a new piece of technology, tell the readers why it is important, how it works better, and how it will affect them. Avoid lengthy descriptions of who approved the new system, quotations from senior leaders describing how good the system is, the reports your organization filed regarding the system, etc.*
- **Use the fewest words to state your points**. *Write "Leaders must emphasize training" rather than "It is imperative for Military Intelligence professional leaders to refocus their attention to training issues."*

Please send the article via E-mail to elizabeth.mcgovern@hua.army.mil or mail it (with a soft copy on disk) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-FDR-CD (MIPB Editor), [expedited shipping: Bldg 61730, Room 102], Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. (Please do not use special document templates and do send the graphics separately if by E-mail). We can accept articles in Microsoft Office2000, Word 6.0, Word Perfect 6.0a, and ASCII and Adobe, Corel, and Power Point graphics. Please include with your article—

- *A cover letter with your work, home, and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers, stating your wish to have the article published. Please include your social security number (SSN) so that we can find you if you transfer, PCS, or ETS/retire before we publish your article; we will protect your SSN and make no other use of it. Also, indicate whether we may put your article on our Internet web site even if we do not publish it in the printed magazine.*
- *Pictures, graphics, and crests/logos with adequate descriptions. Try to find good "action" photos that illustrate your article; photos and other graphics really enliven an article. We need complete captions for the photos (the who, what, where, when, why, and how); the photographer credits; and include the author's name on photos. We can return photos if so requested—be sure to include an address to which you want the photos sent after we use them. We will gladly accept photos without articles too.*
- *A release signed by your local security officer or SSO stating that your article is "unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable in the public domain." (***MIPB*** is available for sale by the Government Printing Office and posted on the Internet.)*
- *The full name of each author in the byline and a biography for each. The biography should include the author's current duty position, other related assignments, civilian degrees (degree, school, major), and advanced military education (CGSC, War College, SAMS, MSSI, SEIP, PGIP, etc.). (Tell us if we may print your telephone number and E-mail address with the biography.)*

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles. We will send you an acknowledgment that we received your article. We may notify you again when we get ready to run it. Please inform us of your current E-mail, telephone numbers, and postal addresses if you change jobs, move, or PCS. It can take a year or more before we run some articles.

*U.S. Government Printing Office: 2001 — 681-035/42100

142d Military Intelligence Battalion (Linguist)

Oriental blue and silver gray are the traditional colors of military intelligence units. A dagger superimposed over a silver beehive and globe symbolizes military preparedness. A silver scroll inscribed with "INTO ALL THE WORLD" in black letters surrounds the globe. The globe and motto represent the worldwide capabilities and responsibilities of the unit. Two bunches of silver sego lilies issue from the scroll ends. The sego lilies are symbols associated with Utah and reflect the unit's location in that state.

The 142d Military Intelligence Battalion (Linguist) started out as a numbered intelligence company of interrogators on 12 February 1960, with a strength of 54 service members. On 1 April 1981, the unit became a battalion when counterintelligence specialists joined the ranks. Since 1988, the 142d MI Battalion, one of the six linguist battalions in the Army National Guard, has been responsible for Europe and Southwest Asia.

The Battalion contains 45 language sections of five soldiers each. The battalion now has linguists in 30 languages, in four different MI disciplines: interrogation, counterintelligence (CI), interpreter/translation, and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Ninety-five percent of the personnel in the 142d MI Battalion have a specific language skill.

Before 1981, the general mission of the 142d MI Battalion was interrogation. However, the battalion has been involved in all facets of intelligence work. Some of these experiences include missions such as delivering intelligence information to allied units during an exercise in Western Europe, scanning Chinese newspapers in Japan for current order of battle information, translating military field manuals and other materials, and working with the United States Military Liaison Mission in Berlin.

The primary mission of the Battalion is to conduct interrogation operations such as supporting strategic debriefings, document exploitation and translation, and, most recently, tactical interrogations during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The Battalion's secondary mission, CI operations, provides soldiers the opportunity to participate in Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities (FORMICA) interviews and personnel security investigations. In 1988, the 142d MI Battalion expanded into SIGINT with five sections of voice intercept operators. This unit has supported SIGINT in Europe, Central America, and the continental United States, as well as providing Arabic SIGINT support during DESERT STORM.

In addition to their military intelligence role, the 142d MI Battalion also provides interpretation and translation support to other types of operations such as: nation building (airfield and road construction and public facilities constructions), support to medical and dental readiness exercises, civil-military operations, liaison missions, and any other operations in which linguist support is necessary.

In August 1990, the 142d provided Arabic linguists to support the U.S. military response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Nineteen soldiers deployed on 26 August 1990 to support the 18th Airborne Corps, 7th Corps, and subordinate military intelligence and civil affairs units during their nine-month tour of duty in Southwest Asia. They provided linguistic support at all levels. Following the conflict, they provided humanitarian support to thousands of displaced refugees.

In January 1991, A Company, 142d MI Battalion, used the skills they had practiced at the Toreador Sword theater interrogation exercise at Fort AP Hill, Virginia, when they conducted interrogation operations during DESERT STORM with the 202d MI Battalion Personnel used their interrogation skills at two Joint Interrogation Facilities, and they provided the theater-level document exploitation facility.

The 142d MI Battalion is a diverse unit with an outstanding future ahead of it. The battalion is unique in the National Guard system and the United States Army because it supports language requirements throughout the entire Army. The organization has continued to grow since its inception in 1960. The language skills of this unit are unexcelled in the United States Army.

Gung Ho!

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca
ATZS-FDR-CD (12)
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000

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